An Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining
Authors:
- Andrzej BaranskiABAndrzej Baranski
- Diogo GeraldesDGDiogo Geraldes
- Ada KovaliukaiteAKAda Kovaliukaite
- James TremewanJTJames Tremewan
- José ApesteguíaJAJosé Apesteguía
- Katherine BaldigaKBKatherine Baldiga
- Olivier BochetOBOlivier Bochet
- Christine ExleyCEChristine Exley
- Becky MortonBMBecky Morton
- Ronald PeetersRPRonald Peeters
- Ernesto ReubenERErnesto Reuben
- Arno RiedlARArno Riedl
Preprint
Abstract
Women are underrepresented in business, academic, and political decision-making bodies across the world. To investigate the causal effect of gender representation on multilateral negotiations, we experimentally manipulate the composition of triads in a majoritarian, divide-the-dollar game. We document a robust gender gap in earnings driven largely by the exclusion of women from alliances rather than differential shares within alliances. Experiments with different subject pools show that distinct bargaining dynamics can underlie the same inequitable outcomes; gender-biased outcomes can be caused by outright discrimination, but they can also be driven by more complex dynamics related to differences in bargaining strategies. Although replacing the male with a female majority all but eliminates the gap in one pool, it has minimal effect in the other. These findings show that there is no “one-size-fits-all” solution to the gender gap we uncovered and highlight the importance of studying bargaining dynamics in detail. This paper was accepted by Marie-Claire Villeval, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: A. Baranski recognizes financial support from Tamkeen [under the New York University Abu Dhabi Research Institute; Grant CG005]. J. Tremewan acknowledges funding from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche [Grant ANR-21-CE03-0018 (Project ENDURA)]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01800 .Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 38 references indexed in Scilit:
- The determinants of multilateral bargaining: a comprehensive analysis of Baron and Ferejohn majoritarian bargaining experimentsExperimental Economics, 2022
- Are women more generous than men? A meta-analysisJournal of the Economic Science Association, 2021
- Does gender diversity in panels of judges matter? Evidence from French child support casesInternational Review of Law and Economics, 2020
- Women ask for less (only from men): Evidence from bargaining in the fieldJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2018
- On the cultural basis of gender differences in negotiationExperimental Economics, 2017
- A failure to communicate: an experimental investigation of the effects of advice on strategic playEuropean Economic Review, 2016
- How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communicationInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2011
- Dictator games: a meta studyExperimental Economics, 2011
- Gender pairing and bargaining—Beware the same sex!Experimental Economics, 2009
- z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experimentsExperimental Economics, 2007