Andrzej Baranski
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Andrzej Baranski has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
David Cooper
3 shared publicationsJeong Kyu Lee
3 shared publications- Diogo Geraldes
School of Economics, University College Dublin
2 shared publications - Ernesto Reuben
New York University (NYU) - New York University Abu Dhabi; IZA Institute of Labor Economics
2 shared publications - Nicholas Haas
Aarhus University
2 shared publications Rebecca Morton
Division of Social Science, NYUAD, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 17 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 160
Competing for power in multilateral negotiations under majority and unanimity rules
- 17 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 160
Competing for power in multilateral negotiations under majority and unanimity rules
- Open Access
- 3 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Who is Watching? Gender Composition of Observers and Risk Taking
We experimentally investigate whether the gender composition of an observing peer group affects individual risk-taking. Participants are randomly assigned to three-person groups differing only in gender composition. They complete an incentivized lottery task knowing that their choices will be observed by the other group members. We find that men's willingness to choose the riskiest lottery increases monotonically with the number of female observers, whereas women exhibit no comparable response to the number of male observers. Men in all-male groups display levels of risk-taking statistically indistinguishable from those of women in all-female groups, indicating that the observed gender gap emerges primarily in mixed-gender groups. A mating-motivated signaling mechanism is consistent with our results.
- 3 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWho is Watching? Gender Composition of Observers and Risk Taking
We experimentally investigate whether the gender composition of an observing peer group affects individual risk-taking. Participants are randomly assigned to three-person groups differing only in gender composition. They complete an incentivized lottery task knowing that their choices will be observed by the other group members. We find that men's willingness to choose the riskiest lottery increases monotonically with the number of female observers, whereas women exhibit no comparable response to the number of male observers. Men in all-male groups display levels of risk-taking statistically indistinguishable from those of women in all-female groups, indicating that the observed gender gap emerges primarily in mixed-gender groups. A mating-motivated signaling mechanism is consistent with our results.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
CAT: An LLM-based Tool for Content Analysis in Experimental Economics
We introduce the Communication Annotation Tool (CAT), an LLM-based tool for content analysis. CAT is intended to analyze free-form communication from economic experiments, accommodating a wide variety of communication structures. We describe CAT's features including a broad array of customization options and a template for developing a coding manual. A detailed guide for using CAT is provided, including a step-by-step demonstration showing how CAT is used to quantify the content of communication from an experimental dataset. CAT is designed for easy monitoring of the coding process which ensures replicability of the communication coding method and simplifies identification and resolution of problems. We conclude by discussing CAT's limitations and issues that users should keep in mind.
- 1 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCAT: An LLM-based Tool for Content Analysis in Experimental Economics
We introduce the Communication Annotation Tool (CAT), an LLM-based tool for content analysis. CAT is intended to analyze free-form communication from economic experiments, accommodating a wide variety of communication structures. We describe CAT's features including a broad array of customization options and a template for developing a coding manual. A detailed guide for using CAT is provided, including a step-by-step demonstration showing how CAT is used to quantify the content of communication from an experimental dataset. CAT is designed for easy monitoring of the coding process which ensures replicability of the communication coding method and simplifies identification and resolution of problems. We conclude by discussing CAT's limitations and issues that users should keep in mind.
- Open Access
- 31 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Are LLMs Reliable Coders of Communication Content in Economic Experiments?
Analysis of free-form communication from experiments has largely relied on manual coding by research assistants (RAs), a costly and time-consuming process. We outline an easily implemented method for coding communication data using large language models (LLMs) and propose a novel standard for evaluating the performance of LLM-based coding ("reliability"). Using data from three published articles, we find that LLM-based coding meets our two reliability conditions: (1) differences between LLM-based and RA-based coding are no larger than differences between the RA-based and original coding and (2) the LLM-based coding largely replicates qualitative conclusions from the original papers. That said, there are cases where the LLM-based coding agrees poorly with the RA-based coding or fails to replicate statistical results from the original papers. We demonstrate that these problems can be ameliorated with better prompt design. We conclude that use of LLMs can reduce research costs and time without sacrificing reliability, making content analysis a more accessible tool for experimental economists. However, only with a combination of test coding by RAs and prompt design by researchers can we avoid significant problems with LLM-based coding, highlighting the continued importance of human input.
- 31 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAre LLMs Reliable Coders of Communication Content in Economic Experiments?
Analysis of free-form communication from experiments has largely relied on manual coding by research assistants (RAs), a costly and time-consuming process. We outline an easily implemented method for coding communication data using large language models (LLMs) and propose a novel standard for evaluating the performance of LLM-based coding ("reliability"). Using data from three published articles, we find that LLM-based coding meets our two reliability conditions: (1) differences between LLM-based and RA-based coding are no larger than differences between the RA-based and original coding and (2) the LLM-based coding largely replicates qualitative conclusions from the original papers. That said, there are cases where the LLM-based coding agrees poorly with the RA-based coding or fails to replicate statistical results from the original papers. We demonstrate that these problems can be ameliorated with better prompt design. We conclude that use of LLMs can reduce research costs and time without sacrificing reliability, making content analysis a more accessible tool for experimental economists. However, only with a combination of test coding by RAs and prompt design by researchers can we avoid significant problems with LLM-based coding, highlighting the continued importance of human input.
- Open Access
- 24 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Are LLMs Reliable Coders of Communication Content in Economic Experiments? Working Paper #0115
Analysis of free-form communication from experiments has largely relied on manual coding by research assistants (RAs), a costly and time-consuming process. We outline an easily implemented method for coding communication data using large language models (LLMs) and propose a novel standard for evaluating the performance of LLM-based coding ("reliability"). Using data from three published articles, we find that LLM-based coding meets our two reliability conditions: (1) differences between LLM-based and RA-based coding are no larger than differences between the RA-based and original coding and (2) the LLM-based coding largely replicates qualitative conclusions from the original papers. That said, there are cases where the LLM-based coding agrees poorly with the RA-based coding or fails to replicate statistical results from the original papers. We demonstrate that these problems can be ameliorated with better prompt design. We conclude that use of LLMs can reduce research costs and time without sacrificing reliability, making content analysis a more accessible tool for experimental economists. However, only with a combination of test coding by RAs and prompt design by researchers can we avoid significant problems with LLM-based coding, highlighting the continued importance of human input.
- 24 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAre LLMs Reliable Coders of Communication Content in Economic Experiments? Working Paper #0115
Analysis of free-form communication from experiments has largely relied on manual coding by research assistants (RAs), a costly and time-consuming process. We outline an easily implemented method for coding communication data using large language models (LLMs) and propose a novel standard for evaluating the performance of LLM-based coding ("reliability"). Using data from three published articles, we find that LLM-based coding meets our two reliability conditions: (1) differences between LLM-based and RA-based coding are no larger than differences between the RA-based and original coding and (2) the LLM-based coding largely replicates qualitative conclusions from the original papers. That said, there are cases where the LLM-based coding agrees poorly with the RA-based coding or fails to replicate statistical results from the original papers. We demonstrate that these problems can be ameliorated with better prompt design. We conclude that use of LLMs can reduce research costs and time without sacrificing reliability, making content analysis a more accessible tool for experimental economists. However, only with a combination of test coding by RAs and prompt design by researchers can we avoid significant problems with LLM-based coding, highlighting the continued importance of human input.
- Open Access
- 23 December 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in PNAS Nexus
- Vol. 4 (1) , pgae553
Exclusionary bargaining behavior in 14 countries: Prevalence and predictors
Primates are known to engage in exclusionary behavior, forming alliances to block a minority from accessing scarce resources. Humans are no exception, and examples of exclusionary behavior abound in political, business, and social settings. However, despite its socio-economic relevance, little is known about the prevalence and determinants of such behavior worldwide. Conducting an experimental game in which a group divides resources by majority rule, we document considerable global heterogeneity in exclusionary behavior. Whereas exclusion is modal in some countries, inclusive behavior is the norm in others. Despite significant cross-country variability, we nevertheless find that individual-level characteristics matter similarly across contexts. Men, individuals with a deliberative reasoning style, and ideologically right-leaning individuals, are consistently and substantially more exclusionary. Cross-country differences in the formation of exclusionary alliances correlate with an original Hierarchy Tolerance Index, derived from variables measuring cultural acceptance of power inequalities. Our findings carry important implications for decision-making bodies, as they indicate that the identity of decision-makers and the culture in which they are embedded can affect how equitably resources are divided.
- 23 December 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in PNAS Nexus
- Vol. 4 (1) , pgae553
Open AccessExclusionary bargaining behavior in 14 countries: Prevalence and predictors
Primates are known to engage in exclusionary behavior, forming alliances to block a minority from accessing scarce resources. Humans are no exception, and examples of exclusionary behavior abound in political, business, and social settings. However, despite its socio-economic relevance, little is known about the prevalence and determinants of such behavior worldwide. Conducting an experimental game in which a group divides resources by majority rule, we document considerable global heterogeneity in exclusionary behavior. Whereas exclusion is modal in some countries, inclusive behavior is the norm in others. Despite significant cross-country variability, we nevertheless find that individual-level characteristics matter similarly across contexts. Men, individuals with a deliberative reasoning style, and ideologically right-leaning individuals, are consistently and substantially more exclusionary. Cross-country differences in the formation of exclusionary alliances correlate with an original Hierarchy Tolerance Index, derived from variables measuring cultural acceptance of power inequalities. Our findings carry important implications for decision-making bodies, as they indicate that the identity of decision-makers and the culture in which they are embedded can affect how equitably resources are divided.
- 1 October 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (10) , 6622-6636
An Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining
Women are underrepresented in business, academic, and political decision-making bodies across the world. To investigate the causal effect of gender representation on multilateral negotiations, we experimentally manipulate the composition of triads in a majoritarian, divide-the-dollar game. We document a robust gender gap in earnings driven largely by the exclusion of women from alliances rather than differential shares within alliances. Experiments with different subject pools show that distinct bargaining dynamics can underlie the same inequitable outcomes; gender-biased outcomes can be caused by outright discrimination, but they can also be driven by more complex dynamics related to differences in bargaining strategies. Although replacing the male with a female majority all but eliminates the gap in one pool, it has minimal effect in the other. These findings show that there is no “one-size-fits-all” solution to the gender gap we uncovered and highlight the importance of studying bargaining dynamics in detail. This paper was accepted by Marie-Claire Villeval, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: A. Baranski recognizes financial support from Tamkeen [under the New York University Abu Dhabi Research Institute; Grant CG005]. J. Tremewan acknowledges funding from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche [Grant ANR-21-CE03-0018 (Project ENDURA)]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01800 .
- 1 October 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (10) , 6622-6636
An Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining
Women are underrepresented in business, academic, and political decision-making bodies across the world. To investigate the causal effect of gender representation on multilateral negotiations, we experimentally manipulate the composition of triads in a majoritarian, divide-the-dollar game. We document a robust gender gap in earnings driven largely by the exclusion of women from alliances rather than differential shares within alliances. Experiments with different subject pools show that distinct bargaining dynamics can underlie the same inequitable outcomes; gender-biased outcomes can be caused by outright discrimination, but they can also be driven by more complex dynamics related to differences in bargaining strategies. Although replacing the male with a female majority all but eliminates the gap in one pool, it has minimal effect in the other. These findings show that there is no “one-size-fits-all” solution to the gender gap we uncovered and highlight the importance of studying bargaining dynamics in detail. This paper was accepted by Marie-Claire Villeval, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: A. Baranski recognizes financial support from Tamkeen [under the New York University Abu Dhabi Research Institute; Grant CG005]. J. Tremewan acknowledges funding from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche [Grant ANR-21-CE03-0018 (Project ENDURA)]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01800 .
- 8 June 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Ecological Economics
- Vol. 224
Sharing the burden of negative externalities: A tale of gridlock and accountability elusion
- 8 June 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Ecological Economics
- Vol. 224
Sharing the burden of negative externalities: A tale of gridlock and accountability elusion
- Open Access
- 14 March 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 27 (1) , 1-8
Introduction to the special issue in honor of John H. Kagel
- 14 March 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 27 (1) , 1-8
Open AccessIntroduction to the special issue in honor of John H. Kagel
- Open Access
An Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining
Women are underrepresented in business, academic, and political decision-making bodies across the world. To investigate the causal effect of gender representation on multilateral negotiations, we experimentally manipulate the composition of triads in a majoritarian, divide-the-dollar game. We document a robust gender gap in earnings driven largely by the exclusion of women from alliances rather than differential shares within alliances. Experiments with different subject pools show that distinct bargaining dynamics can underlie the same inequitable outcomes; gender-biased outcomes can be caused by outright discrimination, but they can also be driven by more complex dynamics related to differences in bargaining strategies. Although replacing the male with a female majority all but eliminates the gap in one pool, it has minimal effect in the other. These findings show that there is no “one-size-fits-all” solution to the gender gap we uncovered and highlight the importance of studying bargaining dynamics in detail. This paper was accepted by Marie-Claire Villeval, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: A. Baranski recognizes financial support from Tamkeen [under the New York University Abu Dhabi Research Institute; Grant CG005]. J. Tremewan acknowledges funding from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche [Grant ANR-21-CE03-0018 (Project ENDURA)]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01800 .
Open AccessAn Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining
Women are underrepresented in business, academic, and political decision-making bodies across the world. To investigate the causal effect of gender representation on multilateral negotiations, we experimentally manipulate the composition of triads in a majoritarian, divide-the-dollar game. We document a robust gender gap in earnings driven largely by the exclusion of women from alliances rather than differential shares within alliances. Experiments with different subject pools show that distinct bargaining dynamics can underlie the same inequitable outcomes; gender-biased outcomes can be caused by outright discrimination, but they can also be driven by more complex dynamics related to differences in bargaining strategies. Although replacing the male with a female majority all but eliminates the gap in one pool, it has minimal effect in the other. These findings show that there is no “one-size-fits-all” solution to the gender gap we uncovered and highlight the importance of studying bargaining dynamics in detail. This paper was accepted by Marie-Claire Villeval, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: A. Baranski recognizes financial support from Tamkeen [under the New York University Abu Dhabi Research Institute; Grant CG005]. J. Tremewan acknowledges funding from the Agence Nationale de la Recherche [Grant ANR-21-CE03-0018 (Project ENDURA)]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01800 .