Does consciousness entail subjectivity? The puzzle of thought insertion
- 1 April 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 26 (2) , 291-314
Abstract
“There is a thought in me which is not mine.” This is, roughly, the complaint of patients suffering from thought insertion. This first-rank symptom of schizophrenia is particularly puzzling for it seems to challenge a very well entrenched principle to the effect that our conscious thoughts are necessarily subjective, that we necessarily have a sense of ownership for them (Cartesian principle). Despite their wide disagreement, classical accounts of the symptom save the Cartesian principle by interpreting thought insertion as a problem of the sense of agency for thought rather than as a problem of subjectivity. I argue that those accounts fail and that thought insertion really is a problem of subjectivity. We can nevertheless save the Cartesian principle if we realize that the presupposition, shared by classical accounts, to the effect that inserted thoughts are unequivocally conscious, is ill-grounded. Distinguishing between reflexive awareness and phenomenal consciousness, and relying on a careful comparison between thought insertion and other pathologies of agency, I propose a novel account of the symptom which is compatible with the Cartesian principle and which allows to take the patient's reports seriously. This account, I conclude, opens up novel perspectives on the comprehension of schizophrenia, and reveals a common confusion between two different dimensions of the mind.Keywords
This publication has 41 references indexed in Scilit:
- Differences and similarities in the sensory and cognitive signatures of voice-hearing, intrusions and thoughtsSchizophrenia Research, 2008
- The Phenomenology of Cognition OrWhat Is It Like to Think That P?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2004
- Consciousness and Self-ConsciousnessThe Monist, 2004
- Re-examining thought insertionThe British Journal of Psychiatry, 2003
- The Ownership of ThoughtsPhilosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 2002
- Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error Through MisidentificationPhilosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 2002
- Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons, and Thinking as a Motor ProcessThe Monist, 1999
- The Prevalence and Diagnostic Significance of Schneiderian First-Rank Symptoms in a Random Sample of Acute Psychiatric In-patientsThe British Journal of Psychiatry, 1990
- Obsessional-compulsive problems: A cognitive-behavioural analysisBehaviour Research and Therapy, 1985
- Abnormal and normal obsessionsBehaviour Research and Therapy, 1978