The frequency and magnitude of earnings management in China
Authors:
- 1 December 2008
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics
- Vol. 40 (24) , 3213-3225
Abstract
Earnings management is an indicator of the corporate governance quality and investor protection standard. We study the frequencies and magnitudes of earnings management under two different thresholds, zero earnings and prior earnings, in the Chinese market from 1997 to 2004. We model earnings as a mixed-normal distribution and obtain parameter estimators that measure the frequency and magnitude of earnings management. We show that the practice of earnings management has gone up both in frequency and magnitude during the post-2000 period. We also find that the frequency and magnitude of earnings management are higher when firms try to avoid negative earnings than when firms try to report earnings increase. Our findings reflect the current economic environment in China and caution investors on the low-disclosure quality in the Chinese stock market.Keywords
This publication has 23 references indexed in Scilit:
- Market Consequences of Earnings Management in Response to Security Regulations in China*Contemporary Accounting Research, 2005
- Earnings Management and Capital Resource Allocation: Evidence from China's Accounting-Based Regulation of Rights IssuesThe Accounting Review, 2004
- How Much Will Firms Pay for Earnings That Do Not Exist? Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent EarningsThe Accounting Review, 2004
- Financial Packaging of IPO Firms in ChinaJournal of Accounting Research, 2000
- Market Rewards Associated with Patterns of Increasing EarningsJournal of Accounting Research, 1999
- Earnings Management to Exceed ThresholdsThe Journal of Business, 1999
- Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and lossesJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1997
- Reversal of fortune dividend signaling and the disappearance of sustained earnings growthJournal of Financial Economics, 1996
- Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC*Contemporary Accounting Research, 1996
- Executive incentives and the horizon problemJournal of Accounting and Economics, 1991