Abstract
Despite the emergence of strong international norms against the use of weapons of mass destruction, individuals in population surveys frequently express attitudes that seem to contradict the expectations of the social constructivist scholarship on nuclear and chemical “taboos.” In this paper, we aim to provide empirical evidence for the theory that nuclear and chemical nonuse norms are primarily “elite taboos.” This theory builds on the claim that, compared to the general public, political elites are substantially more likely to perceive the nonuse of nuclear and chemical weapons as a categorical proscription in international politics. To test whether there is a public-elite gap, we designed an original survey investigating attitudes toward nuclear and chemical use and fielded it to representative samples of British citizens and members of the UK parliament. The survey included an experimental part, which varied the type of unconventional weapon available as a militarily more effective alternative to the conventional strike. Our results provide strong support for the theory of elite taboos, with the parliamentarians expressing a significantly stronger aversion to the use of weapons of mass destruction than the respondents in the public sample. These findings help us to resolve one of the longstanding puzzles in contemporary scholarship on the nonuse of nuclear and chemical weapons in world politics by showing that taboo-like thinking likely prevails among political elites but not the general public.

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