Ondrej Rosendorf
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Ondrej Rosendorf has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Marek Vranka
Charles University
5 shared publications Michal Smetana
5 shared publicationsMarek Vranka
Charles University
4 shared publications- Michal Smetana
Charles University
4 shared publications Isabelle Haynes
2 shared publications- Lauren Sukin
University of Oxford
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Let’s Get Reel: The Limits of AI Video for Experimental International Relations
Generative AI tools promise to make IR survey experiments more immersive by delivering treatments through realistic videos. But would these novel designs offer real methodological gains over traditional text-based vignettes? To address this question, we conducted a preregistered experiment testing the relative effectiveness of four “communication modalities”: an AI-generated video, long text with AI-generated images, plain long text, and a short-text vignette. Contrary to our expectations, the AI-generated video did not elicit the strongest affective responses nor the largest shifts in policy preferences; its effects were statistically indistinguishable from plain long-form text and even marginally weaker than the text-with-images treatment. All three long-form modalities outperformed the short vignette across all measures except attentiveness. The findings suggest that we should be cautious about the promise of AI-generated videos for IR experiments, whereas designs combining engaging text-based descriptions with AI-generated images may offer a cost-effective alternative to the traditional short plain-text vignettes.
- 2 September 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Open AccessLet’s Get Reel: The Limits of AI Video for Experimental International Relations
Generative AI tools promise to make IR survey experiments more immersive by delivering treatments through realistic videos. But would these novel designs offer real methodological gains over traditional text-based vignettes? To address this question, we conducted a preregistered experiment testing the relative effectiveness of four “communication modalities”: an AI-generated video, long text with AI-generated images, plain long text, and a short-text vignette. Contrary to our expectations, the AI-generated video did not elicit the strongest affective responses nor the largest shifts in policy preferences; its effects were statistically indistinguishable from plain long-form text and even marginally weaker than the text-with-images treatment. All three long-form modalities outperformed the short vignette across all measures except attentiveness. The findings suggest that we should be cautious about the promise of AI-generated videos for IR experiments, whereas designs combining engaging text-based descriptions with AI-generated images may offer a cost-effective alternative to the traditional short plain-text vignettes.
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Does Public Opinion Shape Elite Support for Defending Allies Evidence on the Microfoundations of Collective Defense from the British Parliament
Prominent theories of alliance politics rest on assumptions about the public’s role in shaping democratic states’ decisions to honor collective defense commitments. However, we still lack evidence on whether public and elite views on collective defense diverge and how voter preferences influence the decision-making of their elected representatives. To address this gap, we conducted a mixed-methods study in the United Kingdom, combining a paired pre-/post- intervention survey with members of the British Parliament (N = 100) and the British public (N = 1029), an elite survey of British parliamentarians with open-ended responses (N = 102), and in-depth semi-structured interviews with former and sitting British MPs (N = 13). We find substantial elite–public gaps, with parliamentarians more willing to defend a NATO ally under attack than the public. We also demonstrate that counter-attitudinal public cues shift elite preferences on defending allies, although the effect is substantively modest. Qualitative evidence suggests heterogeneity in elite approaches toward public opinion in defense issues and the latent nature of public influence: it can become politically consequential when military commitments are costly, sustained, morally salient, or linked to mobilized constituencies. Our findings provide important micro-level evidence on the public-elite linkage for scholarship on collective defense and allied solidarity, amid growing polarization and disinformation campaigns targeting NATO publics.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDoes Public Opinion Shape Elite Support for Defending Allies Evidence on the Microfoundations of Collective Defense from the British Parliament
Prominent theories of alliance politics rest on assumptions about the public’s role in shaping democratic states’ decisions to honor collective defense commitments. However, we still lack evidence on whether public and elite views on collective defense diverge and how voter preferences influence the decision-making of their elected representatives. To address this gap, we conducted a mixed-methods study in the United Kingdom, combining a paired pre-/post- intervention survey with members of the British Parliament (N = 100) and the British public (N = 1029), an elite survey of British parliamentarians with open-ended responses (N = 102), and in-depth semi-structured interviews with former and sitting British MPs (N = 13). We find substantial elite–public gaps, with parliamentarians more willing to defend a NATO ally under attack than the public. We also demonstrate that counter-attitudinal public cues shift elite preferences on defending allies, although the effect is substantively modest. Qualitative evidence suggests heterogeneity in elite approaches toward public opinion in defense issues and the latent nature of public influence: it can become politically consequential when military commitments are costly, sustained, morally salient, or linked to mobilized constituencies. Our findings provide important micro-level evidence on the public-elite linkage for scholarship on collective defense and allied solidarity, amid growing polarization and disinformation campaigns targeting NATO publics.
- Open Access
- 7 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Retrenchment Signaling and the Erosion of NATO Credibility under Trump 2.0
Has Trump’s confrontational stance toward U.S. allies undermined NATO’s credibility? To address this critical question, we conducted a large, survey-based longitudinal study investigating changes in perceptions of NATO’s collective defense commitments across selected allied states (the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, and Canada), the Russian Federation, and in the British and German parliaments. In line with our theory of retrenchment signaling, we found a dramatic decline in the credibility of the U.S. commitments to NATO during the first year of Trump’s second administration (first-order effect), accompanied by a more modest increase in the credibility of non-U.S. allies (second-order effect). We demonstrate that the net impact on NATO’s overall credibility has been negative, showing asymmetric alliances suffer from a “substitution deficit” in credibility signaling. Furthermore, our investigation in Russia suggests that U.S. retrenchment signaling has even more negative consequences for allied deterrence than assurance due to the “strongest-link bias,” in which adversaries tend to overidentify the credibility of asymmetric alliances with that of their leading power. Finally, we show that political elites across allied states have been at least as skeptical about the U.S. commitment to defend its allies as the general population. Our longitudinal study provides the first systematic empirical evidence of the erosion of NATO’s credibility under “Trump 2.0” and contributes to scholarship on the dynamics of military alliances and the impact of great power retrenchment on world politics.
- 7 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessRetrenchment Signaling and the Erosion of NATO Credibility under Trump 2.0
Has Trump’s confrontational stance toward U.S. allies undermined NATO’s credibility? To address this critical question, we conducted a large, survey-based longitudinal study investigating changes in perceptions of NATO’s collective defense commitments across selected allied states (the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, and Canada), the Russian Federation, and in the British and German parliaments. In line with our theory of retrenchment signaling, we found a dramatic decline in the credibility of the U.S. commitments to NATO during the first year of Trump’s second administration (first-order effect), accompanied by a more modest increase in the credibility of non-U.S. allies (second-order effect). We demonstrate that the net impact on NATO’s overall credibility has been negative, showing asymmetric alliances suffer from a “substitution deficit” in credibility signaling. Furthermore, our investigation in Russia suggests that U.S. retrenchment signaling has even more negative consequences for allied deterrence than assurance due to the “strongest-link bias,” in which adversaries tend to overidentify the credibility of asymmetric alliances with that of their leading power. Finally, we show that political elites across allied states have been at least as skeptical about the U.S. commitment to defend its allies as the general population. Our longitudinal study provides the first systematic empirical evidence of the erosion of NATO’s credibility under “Trump 2.0” and contributes to scholarship on the dynamics of military alliances and the impact of great power retrenchment on world politics.
- 9 January 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 70 (1)
Mind over Metal: Public Opinion on Autonomous Weapons in the United States, Brazil, Germany, and China
Autonomous weapons exemplify the tension between technology and ethics in modern warfare. While observational studies suggest that the public holds negative attitudes toward the use of these weapons, experimental evidence from the United States shows that their acceptance is context dependent. This suggests that Americans may hold only a weak preference for “mind over metal,” and the aversion observed in polls may not reflect deeply held moral convictions. Yet, prior experimental research has focused exclusively on the American public, often relying on hypothetical scenarios featuring “terrorist” targets, which may inflate support. Consequently, it is unclear whether contextual factors such as the risk of target misidentification or enemy identity influence attitudes similarly in other countries. To address this gap, we conducted a preregistered survey experiment in the United States, Brazil, Germany, and China. Our results indicate that the public responds similarly to risk-based primes across countries, while enemy identity—terrorist group or aggressive state—has no significant effect. Notably, Chinese respondents expressed higher overall support than Americans, Brazilians, or Germans. These findings contribute to the literature on public attitudes toward emerging technologies and the cross-national generalizability of survey experiments.
- 9 January 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 70 (1)
Mind over Metal: Public Opinion on Autonomous Weapons in the United States, Brazil, Germany, and China
Autonomous weapons exemplify the tension between technology and ethics in modern warfare. While observational studies suggest that the public holds negative attitudes toward the use of these weapons, experimental evidence from the United States shows that their acceptance is context dependent. This suggests that Americans may hold only a weak preference for “mind over metal,” and the aversion observed in polls may not reflect deeply held moral convictions. Yet, prior experimental research has focused exclusively on the American public, often relying on hypothetical scenarios featuring “terrorist” targets, which may inflate support. Consequently, it is unclear whether contextual factors such as the risk of target misidentification or enemy identity influence attitudes similarly in other countries. To address this gap, we conducted a preregistered survey experiment in the United States, Brazil, Germany, and China. Our results indicate that the public responds similarly to risk-based primes across countries, while enemy identity—terrorist group or aggressive state—has no significant effect. Notably, Chinese respondents expressed higher overall support than Americans, Brazilians, or Germans. These findings contribute to the literature on public attitudes toward emerging technologies and the cross-national generalizability of survey experiments.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Elite Taboos: New Evidence on Public-Elite Gaps in Support for Nuclear and Chemical Strikes
Despite the emergence of strong international norms against the use of weapons of mass destruction, individuals in population surveys frequently express attitudes that seem to contradict the expectations of the social constructivist scholarship on nuclear and chemical “taboos.” In this paper, we aim to provide empirical evidence for the theory that nuclear and chemical nonuse norms are primarily “elite taboos.” This theory builds on the claim that, compared to the general public, political elites are substantially more likely to perceive the nonuse of nuclear and chemical weapons as a categorical proscription in international politics. To test whether there is a public-elite gap, we designed an original survey investigating attitudes toward nuclear and chemical use and fielded it to representative samples of British citizens and members of the UK parliament. The survey included an experimental part, which varied the type of unconventional weapon available as a militarily more effective alternative to the conventional strike. Our results provide strong support for the theory of elite taboos, with the parliamentarians expressing a significantly stronger aversion to the use of weapons of mass destruction than the respondents in the public sample. These findings help us to resolve one of the longstanding puzzles in contemporary scholarship on the nonuse of nuclear and chemical weapons in world politics by showing that taboo-like thinking likely prevails among political elites but not the general public.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessElite Taboos: New Evidence on Public-Elite Gaps in Support for Nuclear and Chemical Strikes
Despite the emergence of strong international norms against the use of weapons of mass destruction, individuals in population surveys frequently express attitudes that seem to contradict the expectations of the social constructivist scholarship on nuclear and chemical “taboos.” In this paper, we aim to provide empirical evidence for the theory that nuclear and chemical nonuse norms are primarily “elite taboos.” This theory builds on the claim that, compared to the general public, political elites are substantially more likely to perceive the nonuse of nuclear and chemical weapons as a categorical proscription in international politics. To test whether there is a public-elite gap, we designed an original survey investigating attitudes toward nuclear and chemical use and fielded it to representative samples of British citizens and members of the UK parliament. The survey included an experimental part, which varied the type of unconventional weapon available as a militarily more effective alternative to the conventional strike. Our results provide strong support for the theory of elite taboos, with the parliamentarians expressing a significantly stronger aversion to the use of weapons of mass destruction than the respondents in the public sample. These findings help us to resolve one of the longstanding puzzles in contemporary scholarship on the nonuse of nuclear and chemical weapons in world politics by showing that taboo-like thinking likely prevails among political elites but not the general public.
- Open Access
- 25 September 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Security Studies
- Vol. 33 (1) , 115-145
Algorithmic Aversion? Experimental Evidence on the Elasticity of Public Attitudes to “Killer Robots”
- 25 September 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Security Studies
- Vol. 33 (1) , 115-145
Open AccessAlgorithmic Aversion? Experimental Evidence on the Elasticity of Public Attitudes to “Killer Robots”
- Open Access
- 22 June 2023
- Published by Institute of International Relations Prague in Czech Journal of International Relations
- Vol. 58 (3) , 7-41
Alliance Complements or Substitutes? Explaining Bilateral Intergovernmental Strategic Partnership Ties
Since the end of the Cold War, informal security cooperation has been on the rise. Besides formal alliances, states are increasingly establishing so-called “strategic partnerships”. This new form of security cooperation is currently under-researched, although governments consider it an important foreign policy tool. We do not yet know whether security interests are the basis of these arrangements or whether strategic partnerships function as substitutes for or complements to formal alliances. This article addresses both issues by analyzing a new dataset on strategic partnerships with the involvement of G20 countries. I find that two or more states are most likely to be tied by partnerships when the presence of a common threat coincides with the absence of their joint membership in a formal alliance. However, states parties to a formal alliance with a lower commitment, such as a consultation, neutrality, or non-aggression pact, are also likely to be tied to each other by partnerships when they face a common threat.
- 22 June 2023
- Published by Institute of International Relations Prague in Czech Journal of International Relations
- Vol. 58 (3) , 7-41
Open AccessAlliance Complements or Substitutes? Explaining Bilateral Intergovernmental Strategic Partnership Ties
Since the end of the Cold War, informal security cooperation has been on the rise. Besides formal alliances, states are increasingly establishing so-called “strategic partnerships”. This new form of security cooperation is currently under-researched, although governments consider it an important foreign policy tool. We do not yet know whether security interests are the basis of these arrangements or whether strategic partnerships function as substitutes for or complements to formal alliances. This article addresses both issues by analyzing a new dataset on strategic partnerships with the involvement of G20 countries. I find that two or more states are most likely to be tied by partnerships when the presence of a common threat coincides with the absence of their joint membership in a formal alliance. However, states parties to a formal alliance with a lower commitment, such as a consultation, neutrality, or non-aggression pact, are also likely to be tied to each other by partnerships when they face a common threat.
- 5 September 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
- Vol. 40 (1) , 3-21
The lesser evil? Experimental evidence on the strength of nuclear and chemical weapon “taboos”
We present findings of a survey experiment on a sample of 2350 American and British citizens, in which we examined attitudes towards nuclear and chemical strikes. Our findings demonstrate that even though the public accurately judges nuclear weapons as more destructive and indiscriminate, it is still more averse to the use of chemical than nuclear weapons. Our follow up study has shown that individuals are significantly more likely to associate chemical weapons with “rogue states” and terrorists, and associate nuclear weapons with modern powers. The findings contribute to scholarship on the “taboos” surrounding the (non-)use of WMDs in world politics.
- 5 September 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Conflict Management and Peace Science
- Vol. 40 (1) , 3-21
The lesser evil? Experimental evidence on the strength of nuclear and chemical weapon “taboos”
We present findings of a survey experiment on a sample of 2350 American and British citizens, in which we examined attitudes towards nuclear and chemical strikes. Our findings demonstrate that even though the public accurately judges nuclear weapons as more destructive and indiscriminate, it is still more averse to the use of chemical than nuclear weapons. Our follow up study has shown that individuals are significantly more likely to associate chemical weapons with “rogue states” and terrorists, and associate nuclear weapons with modern powers. The findings contribute to scholarship on the “taboos” surrounding the (non-)use of WMDs in world politics.
- 2 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Survival
- Vol. 63 (6) , 183-200
Disarming Arguments: Public Opinion and Nuclear Abolition
While many consider the threat posed by nuclear weapons to be greater than ever, the general public has largely lost interest in the issue of nuclear disarmament. To reinvigorate public support for a nuclear-weapons-free world, disarmament advocates have presented a range of arguments about the necessity of nuclear abolition. This article presents original data from a public-opinion survey of US citizens to examine the relative effectiveness of the most common pro-disarmament arguments. The study found that the least persuasive arguments had to do with the costs of maintaining a nuclear arsenal, the humanitarian impact of nuclear-weapons use, and the threats of nuclear terrorism and nuclear war. The most persuasive arguments related to nuclear-armed ‘rogue states’ and the possibility of nuclear accidents. Political stakeholders and civil-society actors might use these findings to more effectively frame their public messaging.
- 2 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Survival
- Vol. 63 (6) , 183-200
Disarming Arguments: Public Opinion and Nuclear Abolition
While many consider the threat posed by nuclear weapons to be greater than ever, the general public has largely lost interest in the issue of nuclear disarmament. To reinvigorate public support for a nuclear-weapons-free world, disarmament advocates have presented a range of arguments about the necessity of nuclear abolition. This article presents original data from a public-opinion survey of US citizens to examine the relative effectiveness of the most common pro-disarmament arguments. The study found that the least persuasive arguments had to do with the costs of maintaining a nuclear arsenal, the humanitarian impact of nuclear-weapons use, and the threats of nuclear terrorism and nuclear war. The most persuasive arguments related to nuclear-armed ‘rogue states’ and the possibility of nuclear accidents. Political stakeholders and civil-society actors might use these findings to more effectively frame their public messaging.