The Impact of the Potential Entry of Copycats: Entry Conditions, Consumer Welfare, and Social Welfare
- 30 June 2016
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Decision Sciences
- Vol. 48 (4) , 594-624
Abstract
This article examines the implications of the potential entry of a copycat who produces and sells a copycat (i.e., imitation) product that competes with the incumbent product. By analyzing a two‐period dynamic noncooperative game between these two firms, we identify conditions under which the copycat can gain successful market entry. More importantly, we find that the potential entry of a copycat creates (implicit) pressure for the incumbent to lower its selling price; hence, it improves consumer welfare. Finally, we identify conditions under which the potential entry of a copycat can increase social welfare (i.e., consumer welfare and the profit of both firms).Keywords
This publication has 42 references indexed in Scilit:
- Fighting strategies in a market with counterfeitsAnnals of Operations Research, 2010
- Impacts of Entry by Counterfeiters*The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2008
- Analysis of monitoring and limiting of commercial cheating: a newsvendor modelJournal of the Operational Research Society, 2005
- Vertical product differentiation and entry deterrenceJournal of Economics, 1997
- Strategic Choice of Quality When Quality is Costly: The Persistence of the High-Quality AdvantageThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1997
- Counterfeit purchase intentions: Role of lawfulness attitudes and product traits as determinantsJournal of Business Research, 1996
- Trade-ins and Introductory Offers in a MonopolyThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1995
- Foreign Counterfeiting of Status GoodsThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1988
- Advertising and Entry Deterrence: An Exploratory ModelJournal of Political Economy, 1983
- Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic PricingThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1977