Wei Shi Lim
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Wei Shi Lim has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Christopher S. Tang
Anderson School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90095
3 shared publications - Ziqiu Ye3 shared publications
Shuguang Zhang
2 shared publications- Soo Jiuan Tan
National University of Singapore
2 shared publications - Geoffrey A. Chua
Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
1 shared publication - Joo Eng Lee-Partridge
Department of MIS, Central Connecticut State University, New Britain, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 45 (3) , 614-631
Strategic Capacity Commitment: A Channel Competition Perspective
This paper examines how capacity commitment shapes strategic interactions between asymmetric channels—one centralized and one decentralized—and reveals that a centralized manufacturer’s capacity commitment can mitigate price competition and benefit both channels.
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Marketing Science
- Vol. 45 (3) , 614-631
Strategic Capacity Commitment: A Channel Competition Perspective
This paper examines how capacity commitment shapes strategic interactions between asymmetric channels—one centralized and one decentralized—and reveals that a centralized manufacturer’s capacity commitment can mitigate price competition and benefit both channels.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Impact of Channel Role on the Outsourcing of After-Sales Service with Asymmetric Retailer Competition
After-sales service is support provided to a customer after purchase, which potentially leads to higher customer satisfaction and is demand-enhancing. Using a game-theoretic model in which a manufacturer determines its after-sales service and distribution channel strategies in the presence of two asymmetric retailers, we identify channel position as an important criterion in determining the outsourcing of after-sales service. Specifically, outsourcing to a third-party provider, due to its lack of channel interaction, is never an optimal choice for the manufacturer unless the third-party has a significant cost advantage in providing after-sales service. However, because of the channel role of the retailers, the manufacturer outsources to the large retailer rather than undertaking the after-sales service in-house, when the competing small retailer is less competitive and the cost of service provision is high. The trade-off between the manufacturer outsourcing the service and undertaking that in-house involves whether the manufacturer accommodates the small retailer in the market. When service provision is outsourced, the large retailer enjoys a lower wholesale price if the small retailer is present, and therefore the large retailer subsidizes the manufacturer to induce the manufacturer to accommodate the small retailer. However, the manufacturer, when undertaking the service by itself, forgoes the small retailer. Finally, we show that when the manufacturer adopts a multi-retailer distribution channel, the large retailer benefits because improved after-sales service increases demand and consumer valuation of the product. We also demonstrate the robustness of our key results in multiple extensions.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Impact of Channel Role on the Outsourcing of After-Sales Service with Asymmetric Retailer Competition
After-sales service is support provided to a customer after purchase, which potentially leads to higher customer satisfaction and is demand-enhancing. Using a game-theoretic model in which a manufacturer determines its after-sales service and distribution channel strategies in the presence of two asymmetric retailers, we identify channel position as an important criterion in determining the outsourcing of after-sales service. Specifically, outsourcing to a third-party provider, due to its lack of channel interaction, is never an optimal choice for the manufacturer unless the third-party has a significant cost advantage in providing after-sales service. However, because of the channel role of the retailers, the manufacturer outsources to the large retailer rather than undertaking the after-sales service in-house, when the competing small retailer is less competitive and the cost of service provision is high. The trade-off between the manufacturer outsourcing the service and undertaking that in-house involves whether the manufacturer accommodates the small retailer in the market. When service provision is outsourced, the large retailer enjoys a lower wholesale price if the small retailer is present, and therefore the large retailer subsidizes the manufacturer to induce the manufacturer to accommodate the small retailer. However, the manufacturer, when undertaking the service by itself, forgoes the small retailer. Finally, we show that when the manufacturer adopts a multi-retailer distribution channel, the large retailer benefits because improved after-sales service increases demand and consumer valuation of the product. We also demonstrate the robustness of our key results in multiple extensions.
- 19 November 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 322 (3) , 812-826
The Impact of channel role on the outsourcing of after-sales service with asymmetric retailer competition
- 19 November 2024
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 322 (3) , 812-826
The Impact of channel role on the outsourcing of after-sales service with asymmetric retailer competition
- 5 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 308 (2) , 709-721
Optimal channel strategy of luxury brands in the presence of online marketplace and copycats
- 5 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 308 (2) , 709-721
Optimal channel strategy of luxury brands in the presence of online marketplace and copycats
- 1 June 2021
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 291 (3) , 1062-1074
Partial refunds as a strategic price commitment device in advance selling in a service industry
- 1 June 2021
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 291 (3) , 1062-1074
Partial refunds as a strategic price commitment device in advance selling in a service industry
- Open Access
- 21 September 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Adopting Cost Transparency as a Marketing Strategy: Analytical and Experimental Exploration
Should sellers disclose their cost information to potential buyers? If yes, under what conditions should firms adopt this cost transparent strategy? We examine these questions by using an analytical approach followed by an experimental analysis. To begin, we develop a monopolistic model to show that the transparent strategy is optimum if and only if products are of low perceived quality and relatively high unit cost. This result implies that luxury goods firms (with high perceived quality and relatively low unit cost) should not disclose their cost information. Next, our analytical result reveals that the quality differentiation between firms in a duopoly is a key driver for predicting whether different firms should adopt the transparent strategy or not. Specifically, no firm should adopt the transparent strategy when the quality differentiation is high because different firms can set different selling price to segment the market. However, when the quality differentiation becomes less prominent, competitive pricing alone is not sufficient and the transparent strategy becomes the additional lever for firms to segment the market. Using a laboratory experiment, we validate our analytical results to show that as quality differentiation decreases, the adoption of the transparent strategy increases but the selling price decreases.
- 21 September 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAdopting Cost Transparency as a Marketing Strategy: Analytical and Experimental Exploration
Should sellers disclose their cost information to potential buyers? If yes, under what conditions should firms adopt this cost transparent strategy? We examine these questions by using an analytical approach followed by an experimental analysis. To begin, we develop a monopolistic model to show that the transparent strategy is optimum if and only if products are of low perceived quality and relatively high unit cost. This result implies that luxury goods firms (with high perceived quality and relatively low unit cost) should not disclose their cost information. Next, our analytical result reveals that the quality differentiation between firms in a duopoly is a key driver for predicting whether different firms should adopt the transparent strategy or not. Specifically, no firm should adopt the transparent strategy when the quality differentiation is high because different firms can set different selling price to segment the market. However, when the quality differentiation becomes less prominent, competitive pricing alone is not sufficient and the transparent strategy becomes the additional lever for firms to segment the market. Using a laboratory experiment, we validate our analytical results to show that as quality differentiation decreases, the adoption of the transparent strategy increases but the selling price decreases.
- 1 August 2016
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 252 (3) , 900-909
Market structure and the value of overselling under stochastic demands
- 1 August 2016
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 252 (3) , 900-909
Market structure and the value of overselling under stochastic demands
- 30 June 2016
- Published by Wiley in Decision Sciences
- Vol. 48 (4) , 594-624
The Impact of the Potential Entry of Copycats: Entry Conditions, Consumer Welfare, and Social Welfare
This article examines the implications of the potential entry of a copycat who produces and sells a copycat (i.e., imitation) product that competes with the incumbent product. By analyzing a two‐period dynamic noncooperative game between these two firms, we identify conditions under which the copycat can gain successful market entry. More importantly, we find that the potential entry of a copycat creates (implicit) pressure for the incumbent to lower its selling price; hence, it improves consumer welfare. Finally, we identify conditions under which the potential entry of a copycat can increase social welfare (i.e., consumer welfare and the profit of both firms).
- 30 June 2016
- Published by Wiley in Decision Sciences
- Vol. 48 (4) , 594-624
The Impact of the Potential Entry of Copycats: Entry Conditions, Consumer Welfare, and Social Welfare
This article examines the implications of the potential entry of a copycat who produces and sells a copycat (i.e., imitation) product that competes with the incumbent product. By analyzing a two‐period dynamic noncooperative game between these two firms, we identify conditions under which the copycat can gain successful market entry. More importantly, we find that the potential entry of a copycat creates (implicit) pressure for the incumbent to lower its selling price; hence, it improves consumer welfare. Finally, we identify conditions under which the potential entry of a copycat can increase social welfare (i.e., consumer welfare and the profit of both firms).
- 3 February 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 22 (3) , 571-587
Advance Selling in the Presence of Speculators and Forward‐Looking Consumers
This article examines the pricing policy of a monopolist seller who may sell in advance of consumption in a market that comprises of myopic consumers, forward‐looking consumers, and speculators. The latter group has no consumption value for the goods and is in the market with the sole objective of making a profit by reselling the purchased goods shortly after. Consumers, although homogeneous in terms of their valuations, are different with respect to their perspectives. We show that in an “upward” market where the expected valuation increases over time, the optimal pricing policy is an ex ante “static” one where the seller “prices into the future” and prices the myopic consumers out of the advance market. However, in a “downward” market where the expected valuation decreases over time, the seller adopts a dynamic pricing strategy except for the case when higher initial sales can trigger more demand subsequently and when the downward trend is not too high. In this case, the seller prefers an ex ante “static” pricing strategy and deliberately prices lower initially to sell to speculators. We identify the conditions under which the seller benefits from the existence of speculators in the market. Moreover, although the presence of entry costs is ineffective as an entry deterrence, we determine the conditions under which exit costs can rein in speculative purchase.
- 3 February 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 22 (3) , 571-587
Advance Selling in the Presence of Speculators and Forward‐Looking Consumers
This article examines the pricing policy of a monopolist seller who may sell in advance of consumption in a market that comprises of myopic consumers, forward‐looking consumers, and speculators. The latter group has no consumption value for the goods and is in the market with the sole objective of making a profit by reselling the purchased goods shortly after. Consumers, although homogeneous in terms of their valuations, are different with respect to their perspectives. We show that in an “upward” market where the expected valuation increases over time, the optimal pricing policy is an ex ante “static” one where the seller “prices into the future” and prices the myopic consumers out of the advance market. However, in a “downward” market where the expected valuation decreases over time, the seller adopts a dynamic pricing strategy except for the case when higher initial sales can trigger more demand subsequently and when the downward trend is not too high. In this case, the seller prefers an ex ante “static” pricing strategy and deliberately prices lower initially to sell to speculators. We identify the conditions under which the seller benefits from the existence of speculators in the market. Moreover, although the presence of entry costs is ineffective as an entry deterrence, we determine the conditions under which exit costs can rein in speculative purchase.
- 24 February 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Marketing Letters
- Vol. 20 (4) , 369-383
Using brand equity to counter outsourcing opportunism: A game theoretic approach
- 24 February 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Marketing Letters
- Vol. 20 (4) , 369-383
Using brand equity to counter outsourcing opportunism: A game theoretic approach