Effects of a Management–Labor Context and Team Play on Ultimatum Game Outcomes
Authors:
- Hal R. ArkesHAHal R. Arkes
- John H. KagelJKJohn H. Kagel
- Dimitry MezhvinskyDMDimitry Mezhvinsky
- 27 January 2017
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 83 (4) , 993-1011
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Science Foundation (SES‐1226460)
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