John H. Kagel
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
John H. Kagel has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David J. Cooper
Case Western Reserve University
2 shared publications - David J. Cooper
Florida State University
2 shared publications Massimo Morelli
2 shared publicationsAndrzej Baranski
Ohio State University, Columbus, USA
1 shared publicationDimitry Mezhvinsky
1 shared publication- Emel Filiz-Ozbay
University of Maryland, College Park
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2023
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 15 (4) , 114-145
Using Team Discussions to Understand Behavior in Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
- 1 November 2023
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 15 (4) , 114-145
Using Team Discussions to Understand Behavior in Indefinitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games
- 1 December 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the Economic Science Association
- Vol. 8 (1-2) , 45-55
Selling shares to budget-constrained bidders: an experimental study of the proportional auction
We explore the efficiency and revenue of proportional auctions (PA) compared to first price auction (FPA) for budget-constrained bidders. PA auctions have been used in privatization of Russian assets and in cryptocurrency sales, as they can achieve higher efficiency and revenue than FPAs when bidders face severe financial constraints. The experimental results support this in that under a tight budget constraint PA achieved higher revenue and efficiency than FPA, with these results reversed under a looser budget constraint. Detailed patterns of bidding are compared to the theoretical predictions for both PA and FPA.
- 1 December 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the Economic Science Association
- Vol. 8 (1-2) , 45-55
Selling shares to budget-constrained bidders: an experimental study of the proportional auction
We explore the efficiency and revenue of proportional auctions (PA) compared to first price auction (FPA) for budget-constrained bidders. PA auctions have been used in privatization of Russian assets and in cryptocurrency sales, as they can achieve higher efficiency and revenue than FPAs when bidders face severe financial constraints. The experimental results support this in that under a tight budget constraint PA achieved higher revenue and efficiency than FPA, with these results reversed under a looser budget constraint. Detailed patterns of bidding are compared to the theoretical predictions for both PA and FPA.
- 1 September 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 22 (3) , 735-752
Reference point effects in legislative bargaining: experimental evidence
Recent interest in reducing budget deficits raises questions regarding the impact on legislative bargaining of cuts versus increases in government spending. Using an experimental design where the outcomes are theoretically isomorphic results in significant differences in bargaining outcomes: There are longer delays in reaching agreement with cuts than with increases, along with which legislative types get their proposals passed. These results can be attributed to a change in agents’ reference point in conjunction with differential responses to gains versus losses.
- 1 September 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 22 (3) , 735-752
Reference point effects in legislative bargaining: experimental evidence
Recent interest in reducing budget deficits raises questions regarding the impact on legislative bargaining of cuts versus increases in government spending. Using an experimental design where the outcomes are theoretically isomorphic results in significant differences in bargaining outcomes: There are longer delays in reaching agreement with cuts than with increases, along with which legislative types get their proposals passed. These results can be attributed to a change in agents’ reference point in conjunction with differential responses to gains versus losses.
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 21 (3) , 650-672
The role of cognitive ability and personality traits for men and women in gift exchange outcomes
We examine the role of cognitive ability and personality traits in a gift exchange experiment. Controlling for cognitive ability and personality characteristics, men offer higher wages than women, and men and women with greater cognitive ability and greater agreeableness on the Big Five personality scale offer higher wages as well. Men provide greater effort than women do, and respond to higher wage rates with greater increases in effort. For both genders, one standard deviation increases in agreeableness and in wages generate similar increases in effort. Serious biases arise from omitting cognitive ability and pooling men and women.
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 21 (3) , 650-672
The role of cognitive ability and personality traits for men and women in gift exchange outcomes
We examine the role of cognitive ability and personality traits in a gift exchange experiment. Controlling for cognitive ability and personality characteristics, men offer higher wages than women, and men and women with greater cognitive ability and greater agreeableness on the Big Five personality scale offer higher wages as well. Men provide greater effort than women do, and respond to higher wage rates with greater increases in effort. For both genders, one standard deviation increases in agreeableness and in wages generate similar increases in effort. Serious biases arise from omitting cognitive ability and pooling men and women.
- 27 January 2017
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 83 (4) , 993-1011
Effects of a Management–Labor Context and Team Play on Ultimatum Game Outcomes
- 27 January 2017
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 83 (4) , 993-1011
Effects of a Management–Labor Context and Team Play on Ultimatum Game Outcomes
- 1 July 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the Economic Science Association
- Vol. 1 (1) , 59-71
Communication in legislative bargaining
We investigate the Baron-Ferejohn (The American Political Science Review 83(4): 1181–1206, 1989) model of legislative bargaining with cheap talk between the designated proposer and potential coalition partners. Communication results in substantially increased proposer power close to the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. This is achieved primarily through voters competing with each other to get the proposer to include them in the winning coalition, while arguing for a zero allocation for redundant voters. Voters typically follow through on their stated reservation shares, but proposers often fail to partner with voters making excessively low offers, as these are more likely to be reneged on.
- 1 July 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the Economic Science Association
- Vol. 1 (1) , 59-71
Communication in legislative bargaining
We investigate the Baron-Ferejohn (The American Political Science Review 83(4): 1181–1206, 1989) model of legislative bargaining with cheap talk between the designated proposer and potential coalition partners. Communication results in substantially increased proposer power close to the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. This is achieved primarily through voters competing with each other to get the proposer to include them in the winning coalition, while arguing for a zero allocation for redundant voters. Voters typically follow through on their stated reservation shares, but proposers often fail to partner with voters making excessively low offers, as these are more likely to be reneged on.
- 18 March 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 49 (3) , 779-800
Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework
- 18 March 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 49 (3) , 779-800
Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework
- 1 June 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 13 (2) , 167-188
Veto power in committees: an experimental study
Veto power consists of the right of one or more players to unilaterally block decisions but without the ability to unilaterally secure their preferred outcome. Our experiment shows that (i) committees with a veto player take longer to reach decisions (are less efficient) and generate less consensus than without a veto player, (ii) veto power substantially enhances proposer's power, and (iii) non-veto players are substantially more willing to compromise than veto players. We relate our results to the theoretical literature on the impact of veto power as well as to concerns about the impact of veto power in real-life committees.
- 1 June 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 13 (2) , 167-188
Veto power in committees: an experimental study
Veto power consists of the right of one or more players to unilaterally block decisions but without the ability to unilaterally secure their preferred outcome. Our experiment shows that (i) committees with a veto player take longer to reach decisions (are less efficient) and generate less consensus than without a veto player, (ii) veto power substantially enhances proposer's power, and (iii) non-veto players are substantially more willing to compromise than veto players. We relate our results to the theoretical literature on the impact of veto power as well as to concerns about the impact of veto power in real-life committees.
- 1 January 2010
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Why Are Two Heads Better than One?
- 1 January 2010
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Why Are Two Heads Better than One?
- 31 December 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Research in Economics
- Vol. 63 (4) , 216-224
Equilibrium selection in signaling games with teams: Forward induction or faster adaptive learning?
- 31 December 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Research in Economics
- Vol. 63 (4) , 216-224
Equilibrium selection in signaling games with teams: Forward induction or faster adaptive learning?