We examine how creativity incentives emphasizing novelty versus usefulness and sharing policies jointly affect employees’ willingness to share ideas and their subsequent collaboration. We predict that novelty incentives heighten evaluation apprehension relative to usefulness incentives because novelty invites greater comparison across ideas, reducing voluntary sharing. We further predict that mandating a minimum level of sharing can offset this effect by normalizing sharing. In our main experiment, participants each generate three slogans under novelty or usefulness incentives and either choose how many slogans to share or are required to share at least one. Novelty incentives reduce idea sharing when it is fully voluntary, but the minimum sharing requirement mitigates this effect by increasing both total sharing and sharing beyond the required minimum. We also find that under novelty incentives, participants collaborate more on a subsequent group task when sharing is voluntary than when it is mandatory. A supplemental experiment suggests that voluntary sharing increases perceptions of a collaborative culture, whereas higher sharing levels produced by mandates can heighten perceived competition. Together, our findings identify evaluation apprehension as a key barrier to idea sharing under novelty incentives and highlight an important tradeoff in designing idea sharing policies.