Brian J. White
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Brian J. White has a total of 42 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
W. Brooke Elliott
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign
7 shared publications- Ben W. Van Landuyt
University of Arizona
5 shared publications Kristina M. Rennekamp
Cornell University
3 shared publications- Lisa Koonce
The University of Texas at Austin Austin Texas USA
3 shared publications Shannon Garavaglia
University of Pittsburgh - Accounting Group
3 shared publications- Cassie Mongold
University of Illinois at Urbana‐Champaign
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 5 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Standardized but Not Comparable: Effects of Standardized ESG Metrics on Retail Investors' Perceived Competence and Delegation in Investment Decisions
Regulators and standard setters promote standardized ESG metrics to improve investor decisions. We distinguish standardization from substantive comparability, the extent to which differences on a common scale reflect differences in underlying performance. We argue that a standardized metric with low substantive comparability makes retail investors feel more capable of evaluating ESG performance because it seems easy to use, despite ambiguity in what differences mean. This inflated perceived competence reduces willingness to delegate investment decisions to professional advisors, who could help resolve the ambiguity. Using employee well-being as our setting, a preliminary experiment shows that investors overweight a standardized per-employee spending metric relative to richer, less standardized disclosures and interpret higher spending favorably despite its ambiguity. In a main experiment, the metric reduces delegation and increases self-investment among sustainability-focused but not conventional investors. These findings reveal an unintended consequence of standardization, informing standard-setting and disclosure design.
- 5 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessStandardized but Not Comparable: Effects of Standardized ESG Metrics on Retail Investors' Perceived Competence and Delegation in Investment Decisions
Regulators and standard setters promote standardized ESG metrics to improve investor decisions. We distinguish standardization from substantive comparability, the extent to which differences on a common scale reflect differences in underlying performance. We argue that a standardized metric with low substantive comparability makes retail investors feel more capable of evaluating ESG performance because it seems easy to use, despite ambiguity in what differences mean. This inflated perceived competence reduces willingness to delegate investment decisions to professional advisors, who could help resolve the ambiguity. Using employee well-being as our setting, a preliminary experiment shows that investors overweight a standardized per-employee spending metric relative to richer, less standardized disclosures and interpret higher spending favorably despite its ambiguity. In a main experiment, the metric reduces delegation and increases self-investment among sustainability-focused but not conventional investors. These findings reveal an unintended consequence of standardization, informing standard-setting and disclosure design.
- Open Access
- 13 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Effect of R&D Capitalization on Managerial Effort and Investor Expectations
We examine whether the accounting treatment of research and development (R&D) costs affects how much effort managers devote to R&D and investors' expectations of that effort. In an incentivized laboratory market, we hold R&D costs fixed, while managers choose how to divide their unobservable effort between a routine operating project that generates certain, immediate returns and an uncertain R&D project for which additional effort increases the probability of success. We manipulate whether R&D costs are expensed or capitalized, with capitalized R&D subject to impairment testing, and whether managers are compensated based on investor-assessed market value or realized intrinsic value. We find that capitalization increases managers' R&D effort, but only when their compensation is based on investor-assessed market value, consistent with managers strategically responding to the reporting consequences of their effort choices. Investors, however, expect less managerial R&D effort under capitalization than expensing. This divergence creates systematic estimation errors, with investors overestimating R&D effort under expensing and underestimating it under capitalization. Overall, our findings show that R&D accounting interacts with managerial incentives to shape the effort managers devote to making R&D investments productive, while simultaneously biasing investors' expectations of that effort.
- 13 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Effect of R&D Capitalization on Managerial Effort and Investor Expectations
We examine whether the accounting treatment of research and development (R&D) costs affects how much effort managers devote to R&D and investors' expectations of that effort. In an incentivized laboratory market, we hold R&D costs fixed, while managers choose how to divide their unobservable effort between a routine operating project that generates certain, immediate returns and an uncertain R&D project for which additional effort increases the probability of success. We manipulate whether R&D costs are expensed or capitalized, with capitalized R&D subject to impairment testing, and whether managers are compensated based on investor-assessed market value or realized intrinsic value. We find that capitalization increases managers' R&D effort, but only when their compensation is based on investor-assessed market value, consistent with managers strategically responding to the reporting consequences of their effort choices. Investors, however, expect less managerial R&D effort under capitalization than expensing. This divergence creates systematic estimation errors, with investors overestimating R&D effort under expensing and underestimating it under capitalization. Overall, our findings show that R&D accounting interacts with managerial incentives to shape the effort managers devote to making R&D investments productive, while simultaneously biasing investors' expectations of that effort.
- Open Access
- 6 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Effects of Incentivizing Novelty vs. Usefulness and Idea Sharing Policies on Idea Sharing and Subsequent Collaboration
We examine how creativity incentives emphasizing novelty versus usefulness and sharing policies jointly affect employees’ willingness to share ideas and their subsequent collaboration. We predict that novelty incentives heighten evaluation apprehension relative to usefulness incentives because novelty invites greater comparison across ideas, reducing voluntary sharing. We further predict that mandating a minimum level of sharing can offset this effect by normalizing sharing. In our main experiment, participants each generate three slogans under novelty or usefulness incentives and either choose how many slogans to share or are required to share at least one. Novelty incentives reduce idea sharing when it is fully voluntary, but the minimum sharing requirement mitigates this effect by increasing both total sharing and sharing beyond the required minimum. We also find that under novelty incentives, participants collaborate more on a subsequent group task when sharing is voluntary than when it is mandatory. A supplemental experiment suggests that voluntary sharing increases perceptions of a collaborative culture, whereas higher sharing levels produced by mandates can heighten perceived competition. Together, our findings identify evaluation apprehension as a key barrier to idea sharing under novelty incentives and highlight an important tradeoff in designing idea sharing policies.
- 6 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessEffects of Incentivizing Novelty vs. Usefulness and Idea Sharing Policies on Idea Sharing and Subsequent Collaboration
We examine how creativity incentives emphasizing novelty versus usefulness and sharing policies jointly affect employees’ willingness to share ideas and their subsequent collaboration. We predict that novelty incentives heighten evaluation apprehension relative to usefulness incentives because novelty invites greater comparison across ideas, reducing voluntary sharing. We further predict that mandating a minimum level of sharing can offset this effect by normalizing sharing. In our main experiment, participants each generate three slogans under novelty or usefulness incentives and either choose how many slogans to share or are required to share at least one. Novelty incentives reduce idea sharing when it is fully voluntary, but the minimum sharing requirement mitigates this effect by increasing both total sharing and sharing beyond the required minimum. We also find that under novelty incentives, participants collaborate more on a subsequent group task when sharing is voluntary than when it is mandatory. A supplemental experiment suggests that voluntary sharing increases perceptions of a collaborative culture, whereas higher sharing levels produced by mandates can heighten perceived competition. Together, our findings identify evaluation apprehension as a key barrier to idea sharing under novelty incentives and highlight an important tradeoff in designing idea sharing policies.
- 1 February 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (2) , 836-852
The Effect of Uncertainty About Future Accounting Standards on Financial Reporting Quality
Financial statement preparers frequently trade off the benefit of reporting biased estimates with potential penalties for misreporting. In making this trade-off, preparers often face uncertainty about potential changes to accounting standards (“standard-setting uncertainty”) that could affect the future benefits of biased reporting. Our experiment documents two novel behavioral effects of standard-setting uncertainty on preparers’ estimates. First, standard-setting uncertainty causes preparers to make less biased estimates, even though reduced bias conflicts with their financial incentives in our setting. Second, standard-setting uncertainty increases preparers’ sensitivity to measurement imprecision, which is important for high-quality financial reporting. Although standard-setting uncertainty is often criticized, our theory and results suggest that increased financial reporting quality can be an unanticipated benefit of the uncertainty that naturally arises from a measured and deliberative standard-setting process. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Funding: Research funding was provided by The University of Arizona, The University of Texas at Austin, and Cornell University. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01469 .
- 1 February 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (2) , 836-852
The Effect of Uncertainty About Future Accounting Standards on Financial Reporting Quality
Financial statement preparers frequently trade off the benefit of reporting biased estimates with potential penalties for misreporting. In making this trade-off, preparers often face uncertainty about potential changes to accounting standards (“standard-setting uncertainty”) that could affect the future benefits of biased reporting. Our experiment documents two novel behavioral effects of standard-setting uncertainty on preparers’ estimates. First, standard-setting uncertainty causes preparers to make less biased estimates, even though reduced bias conflicts with their financial incentives in our setting. Second, standard-setting uncertainty increases preparers’ sensitivity to measurement imprecision, which is important for high-quality financial reporting. Although standard-setting uncertainty is often criticized, our theory and results suggest that increased financial reporting quality can be an unanticipated benefit of the uncertainty that naturally arises from a measured and deliberative standard-setting process. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Funding: Research funding was provided by The University of Arizona, The University of Texas at Austin, and Cornell University. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.01469 .
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (12) , 10624-10641
Business Acquisition Disclosures: The Effect of Identifying Intangible Assets on Investors’ Judgments
Disclosures about a business acquisition help investors understand what assets are acquired and how the acquiring company plans to benefit from the transaction. However, in practice, these disclosures exhibit significant variation and often fall short of providing meaningful information to investors. Our experiment provides evidence that separately identifying intangible assets acquired in a business combination (i.e., what was acquired) can compensate for shortcomings in an acquirer’s disclosures about how the transaction will benefit the acquiring firm. An additional experiment indicates that the benefits of separately identifying acquired assets do not extend to tangible assets, suggesting our insights may be unique to intangibles. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Funding: Z. Leitter acknowledges funding from the Eugene and Dora Bonham Endowment Fund. L. Koonce acknowledges funding from the Deloitte Foundation. B. White acknowledges funding from a Clifford H. Whitcomb Faculty Fellowship. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.02673 .
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (12) , 10624-10641
Business Acquisition Disclosures: The Effect of Identifying Intangible Assets on Investors’ Judgments
Disclosures about a business acquisition help investors understand what assets are acquired and how the acquiring company plans to benefit from the transaction. However, in practice, these disclosures exhibit significant variation and often fall short of providing meaningful information to investors. Our experiment provides evidence that separately identifying intangible assets acquired in a business combination (i.e., what was acquired) can compensate for shortcomings in an acquirer’s disclosures about how the transaction will benefit the acquiring firm. An additional experiment indicates that the benefits of separately identifying acquired assets do not extend to tangible assets, suggesting our insights may be unique to intangibles. This paper was accepted by Ranjani Krishnan, accounting. Funding: Z. Leitter acknowledges funding from the Eugene and Dora Bonham Endowment Fund. L. Koonce acknowledges funding from the Deloitte Foundation. B. White acknowledges funding from a Clifford H. Whitcomb Faculty Fellowship. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.02673 .
- 5 March 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 142-166
A Theory-Based Synthesis of Experimental Research on Accounting Standard Setting
This chapter presents a comprehensive review of experimental research on accounting standard setting organized around theories tested in previous studies. Much of this research tests predictions based on theories from psychology, including theories of heuristic judgment, interpersonal judgment, explanation-based judgment, causal reasoning, individual differences, and goal-directed reasoning. The remaining research makes predictions based on financial or other economic incentives or provides evidence that is descriptive in nature. Taking a theory-based approach, as we do in this chapter, highlights theories that may be particularly well-aligned with standard-setting issues, as well as theories that may warrant greater attention. As such, this approach should help researchers identify opportunities to provide meaningful insights into standard-setting issues. Overall, we expect this chapter to provide a foundation for those who plan to conduct accounting standard-setting research that is of interest to standard-setters in the United States and internationally.
- 5 March 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 142-166
A Theory-Based Synthesis of Experimental Research on Accounting Standard Setting
This chapter presents a comprehensive review of experimental research on accounting standard setting organized around theories tested in previous studies. Much of this research tests predictions based on theories from psychology, including theories of heuristic judgment, interpersonal judgment, explanation-based judgment, causal reasoning, individual differences, and goal-directed reasoning. The remaining research makes predictions based on financial or other economic incentives or provides evidence that is descriptive in nature. Taking a theory-based approach, as we do in this chapter, highlights theories that may be particularly well-aligned with standard-setting issues, as well as theories that may warrant greater attention. As such, this approach should help researchers identify opportunities to provide meaningful insights into standard-setting issues. Overall, we expect this chapter to provide a foundation for those who plan to conduct accounting standard-setting research that is of interest to standard-setters in the United States and internationally.
- 3 October 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Accounting, Organizations and Society
- Vol. 112
Experimental research on standard-setting issues in financial reporting
- 3 October 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Accounting, Organizations and Society
- Vol. 112
Experimental research on standard-setting issues in financial reporting
- 23 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 29 (4) , 3534-3563
Asymmetric motivated reasoning in investor judgment
- 23 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 29 (4) , 3534-3563
Asymmetric motivated reasoning in investor judgment
- Open Access
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Layoffs or Reduced Hours? Effects of the Performance Measurement System
Firms facing financial distress must decide how to reduce costs, which often involves choosing between laying off some employees or reducing hours for a larger number. We investigate two questions related to this choice. First, how does the precision of a firm's performance measurement system influence managers’ decision to institute layoffs or reduced hours? Second, how do employees react to this choice? An interactive experiment indicates that the effect of performance measurement precision on managers’ cost reduction decision is moderated by overall workforce performance. Specifically, under a precise system, managers are more likely to choose layoffs when overall workforce performance has been poor, but they are more likely to reduce hours when performance has been strong. However, under an imprecise system, managers rely less on the observed performance information when deciding their cost reduction strategy, and instead appear to resort to their personal preferences. When managers choose layoffs, retained workers reward managers with higher reciprocal effort and performance under an imprecise system compared to a precise system, consistent with theory on reference-dependent reciprocity, but inconsistent with workers’ perceptions of the decision’s fairness. When managers reduce hours, workers respond with similar performance under the two systems. Overall, our study documents important environmental and behavioral factors that influence managers’ choice of labor cost reduction measures and the consequences for employee performance.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessLayoffs or Reduced Hours? Effects of the Performance Measurement System
Firms facing financial distress must decide how to reduce costs, which often involves choosing between laying off some employees or reducing hours for a larger number. We investigate two questions related to this choice. First, how does the precision of a firm's performance measurement system influence managers’ decision to institute layoffs or reduced hours? Second, how do employees react to this choice? An interactive experiment indicates that the effect of performance measurement precision on managers’ cost reduction decision is moderated by overall workforce performance. Specifically, under a precise system, managers are more likely to choose layoffs when overall workforce performance has been poor, but they are more likely to reduce hours when performance has been strong. However, under an imprecise system, managers rely less on the observed performance information when deciding their cost reduction strategy, and instead appear to resort to their personal preferences. When managers choose layoffs, retained workers reward managers with higher reciprocal effort and performance under an imprecise system compared to a precise system, consistent with theory on reference-dependent reciprocity, but inconsistent with workers’ perceptions of the decision’s fairness. When managers reduce hours, workers respond with similar performance under the two systems. Overall, our study documents important environmental and behavioral factors that influence managers’ choice of labor cost reduction measures and the consequences for employee performance.
- Open Access
- 25 May 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The ESG Stopping Effect: Do Investor Reactions Differ Across the Lifecycle of ESG Initiatives?
In general, investors respond favorably to firms’ ongoing ESG initiatives. In three experiments, we examine whether their reactions differ across the lifecycle of ESG initiatives. In particular, we predict and find evidence of an “ESG stopping effect.” Even when investors react similarly to the launch of new initiatives that are ESG-related versus non-ESG-related (i.e., general business initiatives), they react more negatively when companies stop ESG initiatives versus when they stop general business initiatives. Our theory and evidence suggest that this more pronounced negative response to stopping ESG initiatives stems from investors’ sensitivity to the ethical considerations inherent to ESG. That is, ethical implications of a firm’s initiatives loom larger for investors’ judgments when initiatives are stopped compared to when they are started. We also find that investors’ negative reactions to stopping are exacerbated when ESG initiatives are relatively more effective, and are reduced but not eliminated when firms provide financial justification for ending the ESG initiative.
- 25 May 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe ESG Stopping Effect: Do Investor Reactions Differ Across the Lifecycle of ESG Initiatives?
In general, investors respond favorably to firms’ ongoing ESG initiatives. In three experiments, we examine whether their reactions differ across the lifecycle of ESG initiatives. In particular, we predict and find evidence of an “ESG stopping effect.” Even when investors react similarly to the launch of new initiatives that are ESG-related versus non-ESG-related (i.e., general business initiatives), they react more negatively when companies stop ESG initiatives versus when they stop general business initiatives. Our theory and evidence suggest that this more pronounced negative response to stopping ESG initiatives stems from investors’ sensitivity to the ethical considerations inherent to ESG. That is, ethical implications of a firm’s initiatives loom larger for investors’ judgments when initiatives are stopped compared to when they are started. We also find that investors’ negative reactions to stopping are exacerbated when ESG initiatives are relatively more effective, and are reduced but not eliminated when firms provide financial justification for ending the ESG initiative.