How metaphysical commitments shape the study of psychological mechanisms
- 9 July 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Theory & Psychology
- Vol. 29 (5) , 579-600
Abstract
The study of psychological mechanisms is an interdisciplinary endeavour, requiring insights from many different domains (from electrophysiology, to psychology, to theoretical neuroscience, to computer science). In this article, I argue that philosophy plays an essential role in this interdisciplinary project, and that effective scientific study of psychological mechanisms requires that working scientists be responsible metaphysicians. This means adopting deliberate metaphysical positions when studying mechanisms that go beyond what is empirically justified regarding the nature of the phenomenon being studied, the conditions of its occurrence, and its boundaries. Such metaphysical commitments are necessary in order to set up experimental protocols, determine which variables to manipulate under experimental conditions, and which conclusions to draw from different scientific models and theories. It is important for scientists to be aware of the metaphysical commitments they adopt, since they can easily be led astray if invoked carelessly.Keywords
This publication has 50 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Cognitive Atlas: Toward a Knowledge Foundation for Cognitive NeuroscienceFrontiers in Neuroinformatics, 2011
- Neural reuse: A fundamental organizational principle of the brainBehavioral and Brain Sciences, 2010
- Cross-cultural recognition of basic emotions through nonverbal emotional vocalizationsProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2010
- Why Cognitive Science Needs Philosophy and Vice VersaTopics in Cognitive Science, 2009
- Circuit sharing and the implementation of intelligent systemsConnection Science, 2008
- Evolution of Cognitive Function via Redeployment of Brain AreasThe Neuroscientist, 2007
- Noise characteristics and prior expectations in human visual speed perceptionNature Neuroscience, 2006
- Thinking about MechanismsPhilosophy of Science, 2000
- Functional Neuroimages Fail to Discover Pieces of Mind in the Parts of the BrainPhilosophy of Science, 1997
- Rise and fall of modular orthodoxyJournal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 1995