Eric Hochstein
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Eric Hochstein has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Chris Letheby
The University of Western Australia
1 shared publication - Jaipreet Mattu
Western University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 15 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 127-154
How to End the Mysticism Wars in Psychedelic Science
- 15 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 127-154
How to End the Mysticism Wars in Psychedelic Science
- Open Access
- 23 March 2024
- Published by Copernicus Center Foundation in Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)
- No. 74,p. 57-98
Dimensions of explanation
Some argue that the term “explanation” in science is ambiguous, referring to at least three distinct concepts: a communicative concept, a representational concept, and an ontic concept. Each is defined in a different way with its own sets of norms and goals, and each of which can apply in contexts where the others do not. In this paper, I argue that such a view is false. Instead, I propose that a scientific explanation is a complex entity that can always be analyzed along a communicative dimension, a representational dimension, and an ontic dimension. But all three are always present within scientific explanations. I highlight what such an account looks like, and the potential problems it faces (namely that a single explanation can appear to have incompatible sets of norms and goals that govern it). I propose a solution to this problem and demonstrate how this account can help to dissolve current disputes in philosophy of science regarding debates between epistemic and ontic accounts of mechanistic explanations in the life sciences.
- 23 March 2024
- Published by Copernicus Center Foundation in Philosophical Problems in Science (Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce)
- No. 74,p. 57-98
Open AccessDimensions of explanation
Some argue that the term “explanation” in science is ambiguous, referring to at least three distinct concepts: a communicative concept, a representational concept, and an ontic concept. Each is defined in a different way with its own sets of norms and goals, and each of which can apply in contexts where the others do not. In this paper, I argue that such a view is false. Instead, I propose that a scientific explanation is a complex entity that can always be analyzed along a communicative dimension, a representational dimension, and an ontic dimension. But all three are always present within scientific explanations. I highlight what such an account looks like, and the potential problems it faces (namely that a single explanation can appear to have incompatible sets of norms and goals that govern it). I propose a solution to this problem and demonstrate how this account can help to dissolve current disputes in philosophy of science regarding debates between epistemic and ontic accounts of mechanistic explanations in the life sciences.
- 24 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 202 (3) , 1-25
Integration without integrated models or theories
- 24 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 202 (3) , 1-25
Integration without integrated models or theories
- 29 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 12 (2) , 1-22
Foregrounding and backgrounding: a new interpretation of “levels” in science
- 29 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 12 (2) , 1-22
Foregrounding and backgrounding: a new interpretation of “levels” in science
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 50 (6) , 801-813
Learning to Appreciate the Gray Areas: A Critical Notice of Anil Gupta’s “Conscious Experience”
Anil Gupta’s Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry provides an impressive and novel account of rational justification based on conscious experience which is used as a foundation for a new theory of empiricism. In this critical notice, I argue that Gupta’s project is fascinating, but is often hampered by a lack of sufficient philosophical justification and clarity regarding some essential features of his project, as well as a lack of engagement with relevant scientific domains that would directly bear on it, such as computational neuroscience, cognitive neuroscience, and cognitive psychology. This limits the sort of logical inquiry available to him in problematic ways.
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 50 (6) , 801-813
Learning to Appreciate the Gray Areas: A Critical Notice of Anil Gupta’s “Conscious Experience”
Anil Gupta’s Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry provides an impressive and novel account of rational justification based on conscious experience which is used as a foundation for a new theory of empiricism. In this critical notice, I argue that Gupta’s project is fascinating, but is often hampered by a lack of sufficient philosophical justification and clarity regarding some essential features of his project, as well as a lack of engagement with relevant scientific domains that would directly bear on it, such as computational neuroscience, cognitive neuroscience, and cognitive psychology. This limits the sort of logical inquiry available to him in problematic ways.
- 9 July 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in Theory & Psychology
- Vol. 29 (5) , 579-600
How metaphysical commitments shape the study of psychological mechanisms
The study of psychological mechanisms is an interdisciplinary endeavour, requiring insights from many different domains (from electrophysiology, to psychology, to theoretical neuroscience, to computer science). In this article, I argue that philosophy plays an essential role in this interdisciplinary project, and that effective scientific study of psychological mechanisms requires that working scientists be responsible metaphysicians. This means adopting deliberate metaphysical positions when studying mechanisms that go beyond what is empirically justified regarding the nature of the phenomenon being studied, the conditions of its occurrence, and its boundaries. Such metaphysical commitments are necessary in order to set up experimental protocols, determine which variables to manipulate under experimental conditions, and which conclusions to draw from different scientific models and theories. It is important for scientists to be aware of the metaphysical commitments they adopt, since they can easily be led astray if invoked carelessly.
- 9 July 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in Theory & Psychology
- Vol. 29 (5) , 579-600
How metaphysical commitments shape the study of psychological mechanisms
The study of psychological mechanisms is an interdisciplinary endeavour, requiring insights from many different domains (from electrophysiology, to psychology, to theoretical neuroscience, to computer science). In this article, I argue that philosophy plays an essential role in this interdisciplinary project, and that effective scientific study of psychological mechanisms requires that working scientists be responsible metaphysicians. This means adopting deliberate metaphysical positions when studying mechanisms that go beyond what is empirically justified regarding the nature of the phenomenon being studied, the conditions of its occurrence, and its boundaries. Such metaphysical commitments are necessary in order to set up experimental protocols, determine which variables to manipulate under experimental conditions, and which conclusions to draw from different scientific models and theories. It is important for scientists to be aware of the metaphysical commitments they adopt, since they can easily be led astray if invoked carelessly.
- 22 September 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Biology & Philosophy
- Vol. 32 (6) , 1105-1125
Why one model is never enough: a defense of explanatory holism
- 22 September 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Biology & Philosophy
- Vol. 32 (6) , 1105-1125
Why one model is never enough: a defense of explanatory holism
- 27 February 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Philosophical Quarterly
- Vol. 66 (265) , 745-759
Categorizing the Mental
A common view in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology is that there is an ideally correct way of categorizing the structures and operations of the mind, and that the goal of neuroscience and psychology is to find this correct categorizational scheme. Categories which cannot find a place within this correct framework ought to be eliminated from scientific practice. In this paper, I argue that this general idea runs counter to productive scientific practices. Such a view ignores the plurality of aims and goals that neuroscientists and psychologists have in studying mental phenomena, and the necessity of employing distinct classificatory frameworks to achieve them.
- 27 February 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Philosophical Quarterly
- Vol. 66 (265) , 745-759
Categorizing the Mental
A common view in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of psychology is that there is an ideally correct way of categorizing the structures and operations of the mind, and that the goal of neuroscience and psychology is to find this correct categorizational scheme. Categories which cannot find a place within this correct framework ought to be eliminated from scientific practice. In this paper, I argue that this general idea runs counter to productive scientific practices. Such a view ignores the plurality of aims and goals that neuroscientists and psychologists have in studying mental phenomena, and the necessity of employing distinct classificatory frameworks to achieve them.
- 12 August 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 193 (5) , 1387-1407
One mechanism, many models: a distributed theory of mechanistic explanation
- 12 August 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 193 (5) , 1387-1407
One mechanism, many models: a distributed theory of mechanistic explanation