Abstract
Academic and anecdotal evidence has consistently shown that incentive systems often provide short-term payouts without regard for long-term risk. To prevent managers from exploiting the potential horizon mismatch between outcomes of performance and risk taking, the owners of the firm must be able to measure and contract upon an accepted level of risk. In this study, we investigate whether firms differentially reward managers who incur less risk to achieve their financial goals. The new detailed disclosures mandated by FIN No. 48 enable us to use a tax setting to investigate whether firms acknowledge the mismatched horizon of risk and performance. Specifically, we use manager bonuses to determine whether firms compensate for tax avoidance and whether the effect of tax avoidance on bonuses depends on the level of tax risk incurred. We find an effect of tax performance on manager bonus compensation; however this effect is moderated by tax risk only in a subset of tax sensitive firms. This result is robust to considering the other components of the manager’s compensation contract (i.e., equity). Together, these results indicate that firms most highly value tax avoidance achieved through low risk methods.