Study of the ex-post moral hazard of laboratory services in Iran
Authors:
Open Access
- 1 December 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Health Policy OPEN
- Vol. 2, 100031
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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- OVERINSURANCE AND PUBLIC PROVISION OF INSURANCE: THE ROLES OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION **I would like to thank R. Kihlstrom, G. Goldstein, J. Green, and the referee for helpful comments. Research support was provided in part by the Health Services Research Center of Northwestern University and the American Hospital Association.1978