Responsibility
Author:
- 25 February 2025
- book chapter
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 115-140
Abstract
We often take received advice into consideration when we judge an agent for an act they did, but there is no established position about how we should factor it in. This chapter sets out, explicates, and defends an account of advice’s implications for moral responsibility. The core claims are that, provided that the norms of advice are adhered to, advisees remain accountable for advised acts, but that received advice can be relevant to how they are judged and responded to. Advisors are accountable for the advice they give and can be judged accordingly. Norm violations can render an advisor (partially) accountable for an advised act. The adverse consequences of the prevailing ambiguity about responsibility for advised acts are explored, and it is argued that apportioning responsibility as defended here supports the defining purpose of advice as help with practical reasoning.Keywords
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