Monique Jonas
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Monique Jonas has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kathryn Peri
School of Nursing, Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, The University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
3 shared publications - Ngaire Kerse
Department of General Practice and Primary Health Care, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
3 shared publications - Stephanie. M. Garratt
Monash University
3 shared publications - Jonathan Hughes
University of Manchester
2 shared publications Amanda Evans
Victorian Pediatric Palliative Care Programme, Melbourne, Australia
1 shared publicationAnne Kolbe
Faculty of Medical and Health Sciences, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 182-208
Professional Advice
Professional advisors face particular challenges in gaining the trust of advisees, due to the possible absence of personal ties between advisor and advisee and the constraints that professional obligations can place upon advising. This chapter examines how advisors should balance professional responsibleness and responsiveness to advisees in three contexts: advice to a person in public office, law, and medical advice. In different ways in each of these contexts, professional responsibilities constrain how responsive to an advisee’s goals, preferences, and values an advisor can be. The chapter concludes with a discussion of conflicts of interest within the financial advice industry. Empirical evidence about how declarations of conflicts of interest affect advisee decision-making is presented, and it is argued that the only way to prevent conflicts of interest from compromising professional advice is to remove them.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 182-208
Professional Advice
Professional advisors face particular challenges in gaining the trust of advisees, due to the possible absence of personal ties between advisor and advisee and the constraints that professional obligations can place upon advising. This chapter examines how advisors should balance professional responsibleness and responsiveness to advisees in three contexts: advice to a person in public office, law, and medical advice. In different ways in each of these contexts, professional responsibilities constrain how responsive to an advisee’s goals, preferences, and values an advisor can be. The chapter concludes with a discussion of conflicts of interest within the financial advice industry. Empirical evidence about how declarations of conflicts of interest affect advisee decision-making is presented, and it is argued that the only way to prevent conflicts of interest from compromising professional advice is to remove them.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 97-114
Power and Manipulation
This chapter examines concerns about advisors improperly exercising power through their framing and delivery of advice, and reveals how power dynamics can compromise the safety of advice relationships. Section 4.1 considers worries about the use of manipulative techniques and concludes that thinking in terms of manipulation only serves to muddy the ethical waters when it comes to advice. There is more to be gained by focusing on whether the norms of advice are adhered to. The discussion then turns to the challenge of navigating power relations. Disparities of power between advisor and advisee can threaten the prospects of advice being received as such, even when the advisor’s conduct, intentions, and attitudes are norm-compliant. I canvass a range of relationships in which status issues pose challenges for advising and consider what makes it possible to safely advise those whom we rely upon, or who rely upon us.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 97-114
Power and Manipulation
This chapter examines concerns about advisors improperly exercising power through their framing and delivery of advice, and reveals how power dynamics can compromise the safety of advice relationships. Section 4.1 considers worries about the use of manipulative techniques and concludes that thinking in terms of manipulation only serves to muddy the ethical waters when it comes to advice. There is more to be gained by focusing on whether the norms of advice are adhered to. The discussion then turns to the challenge of navigating power relations. Disparities of power between advisor and advisee can threaten the prospects of advice being received as such, even when the advisor’s conduct, intentions, and attitudes are norm-compliant. I canvass a range of relationships in which status issues pose challenges for advising and consider what makes it possible to safely advise those whom we rely upon, or who rely upon us.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 1-6
Introduction
Advice plays an important role in our social and moral lives. We sometimes feel compelled to advise even when we know it will be resented and may not be followed. At other times we sense that we should withhold advice we desperately want to give. As advisees, we can be grateful for challenging advice and resentful of advice we agree with. We sometimes accept advice from strangers but find it presumptuous on other occasions. We can want, but also feel aggrieved by, advice from the people closest to us. It is all rather perplexing. This introduction unpacks the complex relational and ethical dynamics of advising that are explored in this book and sets out the plan of attack for the following chapters.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 1-6
Introduction
Advice plays an important role in our social and moral lives. We sometimes feel compelled to advise even when we know it will be resented and may not be followed. At other times we sense that we should withhold advice we desperately want to give. As advisees, we can be grateful for challenging advice and resentful of advice we agree with. We sometimes accept advice from strangers but find it presumptuous on other occasions. We can want, but also feel aggrieved by, advice from the people closest to us. It is all rather perplexing. This introduction unpacks the complex relational and ethical dynamics of advising that are explored in this book and sets out the plan of attack for the following chapters.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 209-212
Conclusion
Chapter 1 examined the philosophical literature on advising via six key questions: What is advice? Why take advice? Why give advice? How should one advise? What are the qualities of a good advisor? and What should the advice relationship be like? It also collected several largely unexamined questions along the way: Should advice be tailored to what an advisee can do? What does it mean for advice to be practical? How discretionary must advice be? and Can advice aim at rousing an advisee to action? This chapter presents the outputs of the theory of advising presented in previous chapters by succinctly expressing them as answers to these questions.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 209-212
Conclusion
Chapter 1 examined the philosophical literature on advising via six key questions: What is advice? Why take advice? Why give advice? How should one advise? What are the qualities of a good advisor? and What should the advice relationship be like? It also collected several largely unexamined questions along the way: Should advice be tailored to what an advisee can do? What does it mean for advice to be practical? How discretionary must advice be? and Can advice aim at rousing an advisee to action? This chapter presents the outputs of the theory of advising presented in previous chapters by succinctly expressing them as answers to these questions.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 9-34
What Is Advice?
Advice is a ubiquitous social practice, and one that raises complex ethical challenges in our personal and professional lives. Despite this, few contemporary philosophers have paid it serious attention. One must dig deep into the archives, and think laterally about contemporary scholarship, to find a body of ethical reflections on advising. This chapter provides a critical overview of philosophical treatments of advice from antiquity to the modern day. It explores how thinkers have approached six key questions: What is advice? Why take advice? Why give advice? How should one advise? What are the qualities of a good advisor? and What should the advice relationship be like? It identifies foundations for a theory of the ethics of advising and several questions that such a theory should resolve.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 9-34
What Is Advice?
Advice is a ubiquitous social practice, and one that raises complex ethical challenges in our personal and professional lives. Despite this, few contemporary philosophers have paid it serious attention. One must dig deep into the archives, and think laterally about contemporary scholarship, to find a body of ethical reflections on advising. This chapter provides a critical overview of philosophical treatments of advice from antiquity to the modern day. It explores how thinkers have approached six key questions: What is advice? Why take advice? Why give advice? How should one advise? What are the qualities of a good advisor? and What should the advice relationship be like? It identifies foundations for a theory of the ethics of advising and several questions that such a theory should resolve.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 115-140
Responsibility
We often take received advice into consideration when we judge an agent for an act they did, but there is no established position about how we should factor it in. This chapter sets out, explicates, and defends an account of advice’s implications for moral responsibility. The core claims are that, provided that the norms of advice are adhered to, advisees remain accountable for advised acts, but that received advice can be relevant to how they are judged and responded to. Advisors are accountable for the advice they give and can be judged accordingly. Norm violations can render an advisor (partially) accountable for an advised act. The adverse consequences of the prevailing ambiguity about responsibility for advised acts are explored, and it is argued that apportioning responsibility as defended here supports the defining purpose of advice as help with practical reasoning.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 115-140
Responsibility
We often take received advice into consideration when we judge an agent for an act they did, but there is no established position about how we should factor it in. This chapter sets out, explicates, and defends an account of advice’s implications for moral responsibility. The core claims are that, provided that the norms of advice are adhered to, advisees remain accountable for advised acts, but that received advice can be relevant to how they are judged and responded to. Advisors are accountable for the advice they give and can be judged accordingly. Norm violations can render an advisor (partially) accountable for an advised act. The adverse consequences of the prevailing ambiguity about responsibility for advised acts are explored, and it is argued that apportioning responsibility as defended here supports the defining purpose of advice as help with practical reasoning.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 35-63
What Advice Is
Philosophers have envisioned quite different characteristic purposes—or illocutionary points—for advising. Some see advice as a way of getting a person to do something, others see it as a way of getting a person to think about something. This chapter explains the significance of advice’s illocutionary point for the ethics of advising and explores the contrasting accounts offered by J. L. Austin, John Searle, Mark Lance and Rebecca Kukla, and Stephen Darwall. It then presents a new account of the illocutionary point of advice as a form of help with practical reasoning. Advice is analysed not as a member of a broader illocutionary class, but as a distinctive practice with essentially connected illocutionary and relational components. Searle’s dimensions of illocutionary force provide a framework for explicating what is required for a speech act to be received as an act of advice.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 35-63
What Advice Is
Philosophers have envisioned quite different characteristic purposes—or illocutionary points—for advising. Some see advice as a way of getting a person to do something, others see it as a way of getting a person to think about something. This chapter explains the significance of advice’s illocutionary point for the ethics of advising and explores the contrasting accounts offered by J. L. Austin, John Searle, Mark Lance and Rebecca Kukla, and Stephen Darwall. It then presents a new account of the illocutionary point of advice as a form of help with practical reasoning. Advice is analysed not as a member of a broader illocutionary class, but as a distinctive practice with essentially connected illocutionary and relational components. Searle’s dimensions of illocutionary force provide a framework for explicating what is required for a speech act to be received as an act of advice.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 64-94
The Norms of Advice
We have ethical expectations of advisors, but it is not easy to say what they are. This chapter offers the first contemporary account of the norms of advice. The ethical dimensions of advising, and its susceptibility to resentment, cannot be fully appreciated unless one sees advice as an act of help, with all the implications for dignity that brings. The chapter begins with an exploration of dignity, before presenting five norms of advice: that advice should address the advisee as a practical reasoner; be discretionary; other-regarding; sincere; and based upon the advisor’s best knowledge and reasoning. The ways in which each norm upholds advice’s illocutionary point (to help an advisee see how to proceed) and preserves its distinctive illocutionary force (which allows us to recognize speech as advice) are explained via a series of cases.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 64-94
The Norms of Advice
We have ethical expectations of advisors, but it is not easy to say what they are. This chapter offers the first contemporary account of the norms of advice. The ethical dimensions of advising, and its susceptibility to resentment, cannot be fully appreciated unless one sees advice as an act of help, with all the implications for dignity that brings. The chapter begins with an exploration of dignity, before presenting five norms of advice: that advice should address the advisee as a practical reasoner; be discretionary; other-regarding; sincere; and based upon the advisor’s best knowledge and reasoning. The ways in which each norm upholds advice’s illocutionary point (to help an advisee see how to proceed) and preserves its distinctive illocutionary force (which allows us to recognize speech as advice) are explained via a series of cases.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 164-181
Personal Advice
Although the norms of advice apply across the board, their demands are context sensitive. This chapter examines the ethics of advising outside of professional exchanges. Drawing on the concept of role obligations, the ethical contours of advising strangers are traced. It is concluded that there are ways in which strangers can be better placed to advise than friends and family, if the role of ‘facework’ in upholding an advisee’s standing is attended to. However, we generally regard close friends and family as the proper people to deliver challenging advice. A case provides a basis for assessing when unwelcome advice should be given despite predicted resentment and likely futility. The chapter culminates in a summary of principles about when advice should be given or withheld in personal contexts.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 164-181
Personal Advice
Although the norms of advice apply across the board, their demands are context sensitive. This chapter examines the ethics of advising outside of professional exchanges. Drawing on the concept of role obligations, the ethical contours of advising strangers are traced. It is concluded that there are ways in which strangers can be better placed to advise than friends and family, if the role of ‘facework’ in upholding an advisee’s standing is attended to. However, we generally regard close friends and family as the proper people to deliver challenging advice. A case provides a basis for assessing when unwelcome advice should be given despite predicted resentment and likely futility. The chapter culminates in a summary of principles about when advice should be given or withheld in personal contexts.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 143-163
The Advice Relationship
Advice can be used for purposes other than help with practical reasoning, some of which strain trust within an advice relationship. This chapter examines ethical expectations of advisors and advisees that go beyond the norms of advice. Two cases are presented in which advice is sought for strategic purposes, to reduce the advisee’s exposure to blame or criticism. Next, a case of strategic advising is examined, in which advice serves as a poor substitute for the practical help that an advisor owes. The implications of strategic deployments of advising for trust within advice relationships are drawn out, and then a different threat is introduced: advisor over-identification with an advisee’s practical project. Eric Wiland’s reading of a controversial legal case serves as a basis for exploring the limits of advice as a form of help. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the relational dynamics of helping relationships.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 143-163
The Advice Relationship
Advice can be used for purposes other than help with practical reasoning, some of which strain trust within an advice relationship. This chapter examines ethical expectations of advisors and advisees that go beyond the norms of advice. Two cases are presented in which advice is sought for strategic purposes, to reduce the advisee’s exposure to blame or criticism. Next, a case of strategic advising is examined, in which advice serves as a poor substitute for the practical help that an advisor owes. The implications of strategic deployments of advising for trust within advice relationships are drawn out, and then a different threat is introduced: advisor over-identification with an advisee’s practical project. Eric Wiland’s reading of a controversial legal case serves as a basis for exploring the limits of advice as a form of help. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the relational dynamics of helping relationships.