The ‘reactive’ model of antitrust enforcement: When private interests dictate enforcement actions – The Russian case
Authors:
- Svetlana AvdashevaSASvetlana Avdasheva
- Polina KryuchkovaPKPolina Kryuchkova
- 1 August 2015
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 43, 200-208
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
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