Valuing talent: Do CEOs' ability and discretion unambiguously increase firm performance
Authors:
- Kwok Tong Samuel CheungKCKwok Tong Samuel Cheung
- Dharmendra NaiduDNDharmendra Naidu
- Farshid NavissiFNFarshid Navissi
- Kumari RanjeeniKRKumari Ranjeeni
- 1 February 2017
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Corporate Finance
- Vol. 42, 15-35
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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