Symmetric Tax Competition under Formula Apportionment
- 14 March 2003
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 5 (2) , 439-446
Abstract
This paper compares property taxation to a corporate income tax based on formula apportionment in a model where identical countries compete to attract capital. We find that if countries can pair a residence–based capital tax with a property tax (source tax on capital) the tax equilibrium is efficient. In contrast, the use of a 2–factor FA scheme based on sales and capital combined with a residence–based capital tax leads to an inefficient outcome.Keywords
This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
- Optimal Factor Income Taxation in the Presence of UnemploymentJournal of Public Economic Theory, 2002
- Pareto Efficiency in International TaxationSSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
- The Weighting Game: Formula Apportionment as an Instrument of Public PolicyNational Tax Journal, 2000
- Coveting thy neighbor’s manufacturing: the dilemma of state income apportionmentJournal of Public Economics, 2000
- Tax competition with two tax instrumentsRegional Science and Urban Economics, 1991
- An Examination of Multijurisdictional Corporate Income Taxation under Formula ApportionmentEconometrica, 1986