Conflict and the Social Contract*
- 31 July 2006
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 108 (2) , 231-249
Abstract
We consider social contracts for resolving conflicts between two agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict. We show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information about each other.Keywords
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