Deception and reputation – An experimental test of reporting systems
- 1 March 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 71, 37-58
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Universitat Jaume I
- Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness
This publication has 39 references indexed in Scilit:
- Honest on Mondays: Honesty and the temporal separation between decisions and payoffsEuropean Economic Review, 2014
- Why do people tell the truth? Experimental evidence for pure lie aversionExperimental Economics, 2013
- Fairness and cheatingEuropean Economic Review, 2012
- Gender differences in lyingEconomics Letters, 2012
- Bare promises: An experimentEconomics Letters, 2010
- Disclosing conflicts of interest – Do experience and reputation matter?Accounting, Organizations and Society, 2010
- Enjoy the silence: an experiment on truth-tellingExperimental Economics, 2009
- Gender differences in deceptionEconomics Letters, 2008
- z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experimentsExperimental Economics, 2007
- Learning and communication in sender‐receiver games: an econometric investigationJournal of Applied Econometrics, 2002