Iván Barreda-Tarrazona
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Iván Barreda-Tarrazona has a total of 54 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Aurora García-Gallego
Laboratori d'Economia Experimental and Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón de la Plana, Valencian Community, 12071, Spain
7 shared publications - Nikolaos Georgantzis
Burgundy School of Business, Dijon, Bourgogne-Franche-Comté, France
6 shared publications Gerardo Sabater-Grande
LEE and Economics Department, Universitat Jaume ICastellón, Spain
4 shared publications- Marina Pavan
Affiliation Laboratory for Experimental Economics & Economics Department, Jaume I University, Castellón de la Plana, Castellón, Spain
3 shared publications - Adriana Breaban
Chapman University
2 shared publications Ainhoa Jaramillo-Gutiérrez
LEE and Economics Department, Universitat Jaume ICastellón, Spain
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 125
Myopic behaviour in the laboratory: Backward reasoning limitations or strategic uncertainty?
- 19 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 125
Open AccessMyopic behaviour in the laboratory: Backward reasoning limitations or strategic uncertainty?
- Open Access
- 12 February 2025
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 20 (2) , e0317886
Gender differences in dictator giving: A high-power laboratory test
We gather information from a large laboratory sample comprising 1,161 subjects and study gender differences in altruism using a dual-role dictator game. We control for factors potentially affecting the role of gender in dictator giving, such as the subject’s age, cognitive ability, and personality traits, together with the dictator’s self-reported emotions motivating the decision, and response time. We find that women behave in a significantly more generous way than men: after controlling for the factors mentioned above, females transfer 7.5 percentage points (about 40%) more of their endowment than males, on average. Moreover, we find that gender differences in giving are mediated by reasoning ability, personality traits and emotions.
- 12 February 2025
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 20 (2) , e0317886
Open AccessGender differences in dictator giving: A high-power laboratory test
We gather information from a large laboratory sample comprising 1,161 subjects and study gender differences in altruism using a dual-role dictator game. We control for factors potentially affecting the role of gender in dictator giving, such as the subject’s age, cognitive ability, and personality traits, together with the dictator’s self-reported emotions motivating the decision, and response time. We find that women behave in a significantly more generous way than men: after controlling for the factors mentioned above, females transfer 7.5 percentage points (about 40%) more of their endowment than males, on average. Moreover, we find that gender differences in giving are mediated by reasoning ability, personality traits and emotions.
- Open Access
- 12 March 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance
- Vol. 42
Voluntary insurance vs. stabilization funds: An experimental analysis on bank runs
- 12 March 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance
- Vol. 42
Open AccessVoluntary insurance vs. stabilization funds: An experimental analysis on bank runs
- Open Access
- 11 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 90
A gender bias in reporting expected ranks when performance feedback is at stake
- 11 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 90
Open AccessA gender bias in reporting expected ranks when performance feedback is at stake
- Open Access
- 3 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Economics & Finance
- Vol. 80, 552-568
Market risk aversion under volatility shifts: An experimental study
- 3 March 2022
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Economics & Finance
- Vol. 80, 552-568
Open AccessMarket risk aversion under volatility shifts: An experimental study
- Open Access
- 1 March 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Regional Science and Urban Economics
- Vol. 87
On rational forward-looking behavior in economic geography: An experimental analysis
- 1 March 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Regional Science and Urban Economics
- Vol. 87
Open AccessOn rational forward-looking behavior in economic geography: An experimental analysis
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 110
Should I default on my mortgage even if I can pay? Experimental evidence
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 110
Should I default on my mortgage even if I can pay? Experimental evidence
- 1 March 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 71, 37-58
Deception and reputation – An experimental test of reporting systems
- 1 March 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 71, 37-58
Deception and reputation – An experimental test of reporting systems
- Open Access
- 10 October 2018
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 13 (10) , e0205420
Punishing liars—How monitoring affects honesty and trust
Previous experiments have shown that the possibility to punish liars does not per se increase honesty in principal-agent relationships. In this study, we first establish a punishment mechanism that substantially enhances honest behavior and trust in a sender-receiver game: the possibility to impose severe sanctions that are cost-free for enforcers. Adopting this effective mechanism, we investigate how variations in the probability of detecting lies affect sender and receiver. We find that high honesty levels persist under such punishment mechanism even when the detection probability is significantly reduced. Furthermore, the relationship between monitoring and honesty does not follow a linear trend, as a moderate monitoring level proves to be less effective in enhancing honesty than high or very low levels. The punishment mechanism has an even more robust effect on receivers, showing similarly high levels of trust independently of the detection probability. Our analysis of subjects’ beliefs provides further insights into the mechanics behind these behavioral patterns.
- 10 October 2018
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 13 (10) , e0205420
Open AccessPunishing liars—How monitoring affects honesty and trust
Previous experiments have shown that the possibility to punish liars does not per se increase honesty in principal-agent relationships. In this study, we first establish a punishment mechanism that substantially enhances honest behavior and trust in a sender-receiver game: the possibility to impose severe sanctions that are cost-free for enforcers. Adopting this effective mechanism, we investigate how variations in the probability of detecting lies affect sender and receiver. We find that high honesty levels persist under such punishment mechanism even when the detection probability is significantly reduced. Furthermore, the relationship between monitoring and honesty does not follow a linear trend, as a moderate monitoring level proves to be less effective in enhancing honesty than high or very low levels. The punishment mechanism has an even more robust effect on receivers, showing similarly high levels of trust independently of the detection probability. Our analysis of subjects’ beliefs provides further insights into the mechanics behind these behavioral patterns.
- 1 October 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 155, 435-444
Market games as social dilemmas
- 1 October 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 155, 435-444
Market games as social dilemmas