The political theory and practice of parliamentary participation in the Common Security and Defence Policy
- 21 November 2011
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 18 (8) , 1133-1150
Abstract
This contribution develops normative arguments for the democratic and parliamentary control of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, on the Kantian assumption that ‘ought implies can’, it also tries to make a case for parliamentary control in the face of scepticism about parliamentary politics in general, the capacities of the European Parliament (EP) and national parliaments to exercise satisfactory levels of public control over Union decisions, and the participation of parliaments in security decisions.Keywords
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