Christopher Lord
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Christopher Lord has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Neil Winn
School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
5 shared publications - Johannes Pollak
Sigmund Freud Private University
4 shared publications - John Erik Fossum
ARENA Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Norway
1 shared publication Tatjana Evas
1 shared publicationUlrike Liebert
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 November 2026
- Published by Cogitatio in Politics and Governance
- Vol. 14
The European Union and the Challenge of Rescaling Representation
This article focuses on the challenges associated with scaling up representative democracy from the European Union’s (EU) member states to the EU level. We argue that the notion of scaling up, understood as copying nation-state representational arrangements to the EU level, provides an inaccurate depiction of what is going on and the main challenges facing the EU and its member states. A more apt depiction of what is going on is rescaling democracy. Representative democracy is not only about elections, parties, and parliaments; it operates within and is shaped by a broader ecology of civil society, public sphere and media, democratic community, rule of law, and constitutionalism. The article starts by outlining what is meant by scaling up, along with the ecology of nation-state democracy. Thereafter, the article outlines how representative democracy is configured in the multilevel EU and shows how that makes the EU a case of rescaling democracy.
- 12 November 2026
- Published by Cogitatio in Politics and Governance
- Vol. 14
Open AccessThe European Union and the Challenge of Rescaling Representation
This article focuses on the challenges associated with scaling up representative democracy from the European Union’s (EU) member states to the EU level. We argue that the notion of scaling up, understood as copying nation-state representational arrangements to the EU level, provides an inaccurate depiction of what is going on and the main challenges facing the EU and its member states. A more apt depiction of what is going on is rescaling democracy. Representative democracy is not only about elections, parties, and parliaments; it operates within and is shaped by a broader ecology of civil society, public sphere and media, democratic community, rule of law, and constitutionalism. The article starts by outlining what is meant by scaling up, along with the ecology of nation-state democracy. Thereafter, the article outlines how representative democracy is configured in the multilevel EU and shows how that makes the EU a case of rescaling democracy.
- 4 July 2024
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Politique européenne
- Vol. N° 83 (1) , 42-65
Reconciling the Interconnectedness and Autonomy of European Union Democracies
Comment les démocraties contemporaines peuvent-elles être « ordonnées au niveau international » de manière à combiner leur interdépendance avec une forme d’autonomie interne où leurs citoyens sont libres, égaux et efficaces dans l’utilisation de leurs démocraties pour s’accorder mutuellement des droits et des obligations, et contrôler leurs propres lois ? J’utilise deux justifications de l’autorité politique pour examiner cette question. L’une, associée à David Hume, suggère une justification instrumentale de l’autorité politique comme moyen de fournir des biens collectifs essentiels. L’autre, associée à Emmanuel Kant, considère que l’autorité politique est justifiée par des droits et des devoirs. J’utilise les deux pour suggérer comment l’Union peut être au service des démocraties membres en conciliant leur interdépendance avec leur autonomie.
- 4 July 2024
- Published by CAIRN.INFO in Politique européenne
- Vol. N° 83 (1) , 42-65
Reconciling the Interconnectedness and Autonomy of European Union Democracies
Comment les démocraties contemporaines peuvent-elles être « ordonnées au niveau international » de manière à combiner leur interdépendance avec une forme d’autonomie interne où leurs citoyens sont libres, égaux et efficaces dans l’utilisation de leurs démocraties pour s’accorder mutuellement des droits et des obligations, et contrôler leurs propres lois ? J’utilise deux justifications de l’autorité politique pour examiner cette question. L’une, associée à David Hume, suggère une justification instrumentale de l’autorité politique comme moyen de fournir des biens collectifs essentiels. L’autre, associée à Emmanuel Kant, considère que l’autorité politique est justifiée par des droits et des devoirs. J’utilise les deux pour suggérer comment l’Union peut être au service des démocraties membres en conciliant leur interdépendance avec leur autonomie.
- 7 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 23-45
Conflicting Sovereignties and the Sustainability of the Brexit State
- 7 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 23-45
Conflicting Sovereignties and the Sustainability of the Brexit State
- Open Access
- 6 August 2021
- Published by Wiley in Swiss Political Science Review
- Vol. 27 (3) , 546-562
Autonomy or Domination? Two Faces of Differentiated Integration
When is differentiated integration (DI) of the European Union a source of autonomy and when is it a source of domination? Much depends on what collective goods member state democracies seek through integration. Club goods often require member state democracies to form DIs of their choice. Public goods and common resource goods may, in contrast, require limits on DI if member state democracies are to meet their own obligations to their own publics to secure rights, justice, non‐domination and democracy itself. Those differences are important to understanding how European democracies should be ‘internationally ordered’ if they are to sustain internal forms of political autonomy. They also demonstrate the importance of DI to the autonomy of member state democracies in associating together beyond the state; in defining obligations within the state; and in securing the greatest autonomy of each European democracy compatible with the greatest possible autonomy of all European democracies.
- 6 August 2021
- Published by Wiley in Swiss Political Science Review
- Vol. 27 (3) , 546-562
Open AccessAutonomy or Domination? Two Faces of Differentiated Integration
When is differentiated integration (DI) of the European Union a source of autonomy and when is it a source of domination? Much depends on what collective goods member state democracies seek through integration. Club goods often require member state democracies to form DIs of their choice. Public goods and common resource goods may, in contrast, require limits on DI if member state democracies are to meet their own obligations to their own publics to secure rights, justice, non‐domination and democracy itself. Those differences are important to understanding how European democracies should be ‘internationally ordered’ if they are to sustain internal forms of political autonomy. They also demonstrate the importance of DI to the autonomy of member state democracies in associating together beyond the state; in defining obligations within the state; and in securing the greatest autonomy of each European democracy compatible with the greatest possible autonomy of all European democracies.
- 30 December 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 21-41
Legitimacy Crisis in the European Union
The European Union (EU) has experienced multiple crises since 2008. But has it experienced a legitimacy crisis, or, in other words, a crisis that calls into question its very ability to operate as a justifiable form of political power? Do we even know what it would be for the EU to experience a legitimacy crisis? Worse, might it even be a mistake to assume the EU belongs to that category of political order that can experience a legitimacy crisis?
- 30 December 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 21-41
Legitimacy Crisis in the European Union
The European Union (EU) has experienced multiple crises since 2008. But has it experienced a legitimacy crisis, or, in other words, a crisis that calls into question its very ability to operate as a justifiable form of political power? Do we even know what it would be for the EU to experience a legitimacy crisis? Worse, might it even be a mistake to assume the EU belongs to that category of political order that can experience a legitimacy crisis?
- Open Access
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Wiley in European Law Journal
- Vol. 26 (5-6) , 448-459
Democracy at the EU level: Folly or necessity? More work for a directly elected European Parliament
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Wiley in European Law Journal
- Vol. 26 (5-6) , 448-459
Open AccessDemocracy at the EU level: Folly or necessity? More work for a directly elected European Parliament
- Open Access
- 3 September 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in European Politics and Society
- Vol. 20 (1) , 1-15
No epistocracy without representation? The case of the European Central Bank
I argue the European Central Bank shows how mutually defining are i) the epistemic assumptions of independent central banking; ii) the powers of a central bank; iii) the political order in which it operates and iv) representative claims. I identify three ‘representative turns’ whose effects have cumulated over the history of the ECB: the first towards including representative claims in justifications for independent central banking; the second, towards a monetary dialogue between the ECB and the European Parliament; the third, towards providing the ECB with some means of discussing with parliaments how it should act in emergencies.
- 3 September 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in European Politics and Society
- Vol. 20 (1) , 1-15
Open AccessNo epistocracy without representation? The case of the European Central Bank
I argue the European Central Bank shows how mutually defining are i) the epistemic assumptions of independent central banking; ii) the powers of a central bank; iii) the political order in which it operates and iv) representative claims. I identify three ‘representative turns’ whose effects have cumulated over the history of the ECB: the first towards including representative claims in justifications for independent central banking; the second, towards a monetary dialogue between the ECB and the European Parliament; the third, towards providing the ECB with some means of discussing with parliaments how it should act in emergencies.
- 2 January 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Legislative Studies
- Vol. 24 (1) , 34-50
The European Parliament: a working parliament without a public?
This paper asks whether the distinction between a working and a debating parliament can help us understand how the European Parliament (EP) can contribute to the legitimacy of European Union (EU) law-making. The paper discusses normative standards, practical challenges and institutional choices the EP faces in developing as either a working or a debating parliament. It sketches the particular configuration of working and debating parliament the EP has developed. All this allows the paper to identify a predicament. Only by working alongside the Commission and Council in shaping the detail of legislation is the EP likely to provide the in-depth scrutiny needed for standards of public control and public justification where legislation is authored by complex modern bureaucracies with huge informational advantages over parliaments. On the other hand, the EP’s success in developing practices that allow it to work alongside the Commission and Council throughout the legislative process may have been at some cost to the development of its role as a visible forum of public debate which communicates the political system to the public, and explains and politicises political choices. The paper concludes with some broad lessons for how parliamentary participation in EU law-making should be distributed between the European and national parliaments.
- 2 January 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Legislative Studies
- Vol. 24 (1) , 34-50
The European Parliament: a working parliament without a public?
This paper asks whether the distinction between a working and a debating parliament can help us understand how the European Parliament (EP) can contribute to the legitimacy of European Union (EU) law-making. The paper discusses normative standards, practical challenges and institutional choices the EP faces in developing as either a working or a debating parliament. It sketches the particular configuration of working and debating parliament the EP has developed. All this allows the paper to identify a predicament. Only by working alongside the Commission and Council in shaping the detail of legislation is the EP likely to provide the in-depth scrutiny needed for standards of public control and public justification where legislation is authored by complex modern bureaucracies with huge informational advantages over parliaments. On the other hand, the EP’s success in developing practices that allow it to work alongside the Commission and Council throughout the legislative process may have been at some cost to the development of its role as a visible forum of public debate which communicates the political system to the public, and explains and politicises political choices. The paper concludes with some broad lessons for how parliamentary participation in EU law-making should be distributed between the European and national parliaments.
- 1 August 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 56 (3) , 512-528
An indirect legitimacy argument for a directly elected European Parliament
Can a directly elected European Parliament help deliver standards by which the European Union can be indirectly legitimated through its component national democracies? This article argues that the Union can be indirectly legitimate where it helps member state democracies meet their own obligations to their own publics. The Union can do just that by managing externalities in ways needed to secure core values of justice, democracy and freedom from arbitrary domination within member states. Yet that poses a predicament: for if any one member state has an interest in imposing negative externalities or in freeriding on positive externalities provided by another, then so may its voters and democratic institutions. The article argues a directly elected European Parliament can help manage that predicament both by identifying externalities and by ensuring their regulation meets standards of public control, political equality and justification owed to individual national democracies.
- 1 August 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 56 (3) , 512-528
An indirect legitimacy argument for a directly elected European Parliament
Can a directly elected European Parliament help deliver standards by which the European Union can be indirectly legitimated through its component national democracies? This article argues that the Union can be indirectly legitimate where it helps member state democracies meet their own obligations to their own publics. The Union can do just that by managing externalities in ways needed to secure core values of justice, democracy and freedom from arbitrary domination within member states. Yet that poses a predicament: for if any one member state has an interest in imposing negative externalities or in freeriding on positive externalities provided by another, then so may its voters and democratic institutions. The article argues a directly elected European Parliament can help manage that predicament both by identifying externalities and by ensuring their regulation meets standards of public control, political equality and justification owed to individual national democracies.