The expressive rationality of inaccurate perceptions
Author:
- 22 March 2017
- journal article
- editorial
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 40, e6
Abstract
This commentary uses the dynamic of identity-protective cognition to pose a friendly challenge to Jussim (2012). Like other forms of information processing, this one is too readily characterized as a bias. It is no mistake, however, to view identity-protective cognition as generating inaccurate perceptions. The “bounded rationality” paradigm incorrectly equates rationality with forming accurate beliefs. But so does Jussim's critique.Keywords
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