Capital Costs, Reinsurance, and the Price of Climate Risk

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Abstract
In catastrophe-exposed insurance markets, a large share of what homeowners pay reflects the cost of correlated tail risk. Local insurers cannot diversify these losses on their own and instead transfer them to globally diversified reinsurers, but reinsurance is expensive and volatile. We study a regulatory reform that decreased the capital cost of reinsuring tail risk. After the cost decrease, reinsurance use expanded by 25%, the reinsurance market became less concentrated, and the model-implied price of reinsurance fell by a third. By reducing required capital, the reform also increased insurers' exposure to reinsurer non-payment risk. We show this dramatically impacted the primary insurance market in hurricane-exposed areas of Florida: additional insurers entered and the cost of insuring wind risk fell sharply. To quantify welfare, we estimate an equilibrium model of the Florida wind-insurance market. The model implies that the reform reduced treated insurers' marginal cost of supplying wind coverage by about 10% and lowered equilibrium premiums by about 14%. Counterfactual simulations imply consumer-surplus gains of $186 per household per year, split roughly equally across direct cost pass-through, strategic markup adjustment, and expanded product availability. Our results imply that capital costs required to cover tail events, over and above average losses, meaningfully contribute to consumers' premiums and that policies that reduce those capital costs can decrease prices and improve availability for homeowners insurance.