Abstract
We examine whether, and through what channels, enhanced regulatory oversight affects private investor monitoring. Using the staggered adoption of the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU) as a natural experiment and shareholder class-action lawsuits as a proxy for private monitoring, we find that stronger SEC oversight increases the likelihood of litigation for U.S. cross-listed foreign firms. This effect is weaker for firms already subject to intensive private scrutiny and stronger for firms headquartered in countries with greater regulatory cooperation with the SEC, consistent with oversight shifting the incentives that drive private monitoring. Our findings highlight the complementary relationship between public oversight and private monitoring, demonstrating that expansions in the SEC’s oversight reach can alter private monitoring equilibria. These results offer new insight into the broader consequences of cross-border regulatory cooperation and the channels through which the MMoU affects market discipline.

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