IKInder K. Khurana

Inder K. Khurana

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Inder K. Khurana has a total of 33 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Using IFRS or U.S. GAAP in the United States: The Case of Audit Fees

    by Lucy Huajing Chen, Inder K. Khurana

    SUMMARY: We find that U.S.-listed foreign firms using IFRS pay higher audit fees than those that report using U.S. GAAP. Additional analyses reveal that our key inference is not due to the differences in the demand for Big 4 auditors, familiarity with IFRS, listing status, financial reporting quality, country composition, or adoption of IFRS in the home country. Moreover, using path analysis and a three-way comparison, we provide evidence that audit effort explains the association between the use of IFRS and audit fees beyond litigation and regulatory risk. Our findings are of potential interest to U.S. cross-listed firms contemplating the use of IFRS, investors interested in learning about the costs of using different accounting standards, regulators concerned about the audit cost of requiring IFRS in the U.S. audit market, and academics investigating audit fee differences. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; G15; M48.


  • Open Access

    SEC's Regulatory Oversight and Private Investor Monitoring: Evidence from Class-action Lawsuits against Cross-listed Foreign Firms

    by Inder Khurana, Hoyoun Kyung, Jingya Li

    We examine whether, and through what channels, enhanced regulatory oversight affects private investor monitoring. Using the staggered adoption of the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMoU) as a natural experiment and shareholder class-action lawsuits as a proxy for private monitoring, we find that stronger SEC oversight increases the likelihood of litigation for U.S. cross-listed foreign firms. This effect is weaker for firms already subject to intensive private scrutiny and stronger for firms headquartered in countries with greater regulatory cooperation with the SEC, consistent with oversight shifting the incentives that drive private monitoring. Our findings highlight the complementary relationship between public oversight and private monitoring, demonstrating that expansions in the SEC’s oversight reach can alter private monitoring equilibria. These results offer new insight into the broader consequences of cross-border regulatory cooperation and the channels through which the MMoU affects market discipline.

  • Open Access

    PCAOB international inspections and US companies' exports*

    by Inder Khurana, K. K. Raman, Byongwook Yun

    We examine the implications of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) international inspection program for US companies' exports. Our difference-indifferences analyses suggest that, following the release of the initial PCAOB inspection report in a country abroad, (1) US companies' exports to that country increased, and (2) US companies' major customers in that country reported higher accounts payable. Probing further, the effect on US exports is stronger for companies requiring more relationship-specific investments and for foreign countries with less transparency, weak auditor oversight, and low social trust. Our findings suggest that the release of the initial PCAOB inspection report in a country abroad serves as a public signal of oversight that increases trust in financial reporting integrity abroad, thereby facilitating growth in trade credit and an increase in US exports to companies in that country. Our findings suggest that stakeholders other than investors benefit from PCAOB international inspection reports and highlight a novel externality of the PCAOB international inspection regime benefiting US companies.

  • Open Access

    Financial Transparency, Labor Productivity, and Real Wages: Evidence from Mandatory IFRS Adoption

    by Nargess M. Golshan, Inder K. Khurana, Felipe B. G. Silva

    Financial transparency can affect labor markets directly by mitigating information asymmetries and optimizing the matching of heterogeneous firms and employees (matching efficiency channel) and indirectly through the effect of transparency on firms’ capital inputs (capital utilization channel). Exploiting the increase in financial transparency following the mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption by European Union countries, we perform a battery of tests that indicate subsequent increases in labor productivity and real wages for manufacturing industries in member countries. More importantly, we find evidence that both channels are economically relevant in explaining gains in labor productivity and real wages following the mandatory IFRS adoption. Collectively, our results underscore that the benefits of an increase in transparency go beyond the effects on capital markets and corporate investments, with implications for the allocation of human resources across corporations.


  • Open Access

    Internal Control and the Insider versus Outsider CEO Choice

    by Leah M. Baer, Inder K. Khurana, Hoyoun Kyung

    We examine whether the quality of a firm’s internal controls affects a board’s decision to hire an insider as CEO. We find that the board is less likely to select an insider as CEO following an internal control material weakness (ICMW) disclosure. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the adverse effect of weak internal controls on the likelihood of hiring an insider CEO is attenuated for firms that restate past misstatements and is pronounced when boards are more independent. We also find that audit fees are lower for ICMW firms when an outsider CEO is appointed, indicating that external auditors perceive lower audit risk. Taken together, our findings suggest that in the presence of a weak internal control environment, the board prefers an outsider CEO over an insider who may have been a part of the internal control issues, notwithstanding the fact that evaluating the outsider CEO can be challenging.


  • Accounting Estimation Intensity, Auditor Estimation Expertise, and Managerial Bias

    by Jeff P. Boone, Inder K. Khurana, K. K. Raman

    SYNOPSIS: We examine the relation between the accounting estimation intensity (AEI) ingrained in a company’s financial reports and the company’s propensity to meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts and whether this relation is attenuated by the auditor’s estimation expertise at the city-office or national level. Although we find a positive relation between AEI and the propensity to meet analyst forecasts, we find little evidence to suggest that the relation is weakened by auditor estimation expertise. Along the same lines, we find little evidence to suggest that the positive relation between AEI and audit fees is affected by auditor estimation expertise. Our findings are of potential interest to regulators concerned about insufficient auditor skepticism in the audit of accounting estimates, investors interested in better understanding managerial accounting judgments, and academics investigating audit quality. JEL Classifications: M41; M42.


  • Bank Audit Regulations and Reporting Quality

    by Inder K. Khurana, Rong (Irene) Zhong

    This study examines whether bank audit regulations impact bank reporting quality. Using a multi-country panel of publicly traded banks, we find that regulations targeting auditor qualifications and independence improve bank reporting quality. In contrast, regulations that impose greater supervisory oversight of external auditors have little or even an adverse effect on bank reporting quality. Cross-sectional analysis further shows that the effects of bank audit regulations are concentrated among banks where supervisory regime is less independent. Our results hold after controlling for bank regulations pertinent to financial reporting and disclosure, the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards, and time-varying country-level institutional characteristics. Overall, our findings suggest that audit regulations matter and their impact on bank reporting quality is sensitive to the type of audit regulation. JEL Classifications: G21; G38; M41; M42. Data Availability: The data used in this study are publicly available from the sources indicated in the text.


  • Does the JOBS Act Reduce Compliance Costs of Emerging Growth Companies? Theory and Evidence

    by Inder K. Khurana, Lei Zhao

    SUMMARY: In April 2012, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act was enacted to revitalize the initial public offering market by reducing regulatory burdens for small firms. We focus on audit fees, one directly observable and significant cost of complying with the JOBS Act. Specifically, we examine whether the exemption of emerging growth companies (EGCs) from SOX 404(b) auditor attestations of internal control over financial reporting and other disclosure requirements affected audit fees paid by EGCs. We find that EGCs paid higher audit fees than non-EGCs after IPOs. Moreover, we find that the positive relation between EGCs and audit fees is more pronounced for firms with high financial reporting risk. Collectively, our results reveal an unintended consequence of the JOBS Act: it failed to reduce audit fees, a major component of the compliance costs of EGCs.


  • Did the 2005 Deferred Prosecution Agreement Adversely Impact KPMG's Audit Practice?

    by Matthew Baugh, Jeff P. Boone, Inder K. Khurana, K. K. Raman

    SUMMARY: We examine the consequences of misconduct in a Big 4 firm's nonaudit practice for its audit practice. Specifically, we examine whether KPMG's audit practice suffered a loss of audit fees and clients and/or a decline in factual audit quality following the 2005 deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with the Department of Justice for marketing questionable tax shelters. We find little evidence that the DPA adversely impacted KPMG's audit practice by way of either audit fees or the likelihood of client gains/losses, suggesting little or no harm to KPMG's audit reputation. We also find that the DPA had no effect on the firm's factual audit quality, even for those audit clients that dropped KPMG as their tax service provider. Collectively, our findings suggest that there was no spillover effect from the DPA to KPMG's audit practice. Data Availability: All data are publicly available.


  • Debt Maturity Structure and Accounting Conservatism

    by Inder K. Khurana, Changjiang (John) Wang

    This study examines the association between debt maturity structure and accounting conservatism. Short‐maturity debt can mitigate agency costs of debt arising from information asymmetry and suboptimal investment problems inherent in debt financing. As such, debt‐contracting demand for accounting conservatism is expected to be lower in the presence of more short‐maturity debt. We find that short‐maturity debt is negatively associated with accounting conservatism. As firms could commit to more accounting conservatism to gain access to long‐maturity debt, we conduct lead‐lag tests of the direction of causality, and the results suggest that more short‐maturity debt leads to less conservative reporting, rather than the reverse. We also find the negative relation between short‐maturity debt and accounting conservatism is more pronounced among financially distressed firms, where ex ante severity of agency costs of debt are higher. Collectively, our results contribute to our understanding of the role of accounting conservatism in debt contracting and show how debt maturity, a key and pervasive feature of creditor protection in debt contracting, affects accounting conservatism.