Commitment timing in coalitional bargaining
- 14 March 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 27 (1) , 130-154
Abstract
Most multilateral bargaining models predict bargaining power to emanate from pivotality—a party’s ability to form different majority coalitions. However, this prediction contrasts with the empirical observation that negotiations in parliamentary democracies typically result in payoffs proportional to parties’ vote shares. Proportionate profits suggest equality rather than pivotality drives results. We design an experiment to study when bargaining outcomes reflect pivotality versus proportionality. We find that commitment timing is a crucial institutional factor moderating bargaining power. Payoffs are close to proportional if bargainers can commit to majority coalitions before committing to how to share the pie, but pivotality dictates outcomes otherwise. Our results help explain Gamson’s Law, a long-standing puzzle in the legislative bargaining literature.Keywords
This publication has 58 references indexed in Scilit:
- Proportional Payoffs in Majority GamesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2008
- The Logic of Gamson's Law: Pre‐election Coalitions and Portfolio AllocationsAmerican Journal of Political Science, 2007
- Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating OffersEconometrica, 2005
- Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargainingJournal of Public Economics, 2005
- Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition GovernmentsAmerican Journal of Political Science, 2005
- Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition GovernmentsBritish Journal of Political Science, 2001
- Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945–83British Journal of Political Science, 1985
- Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of the Evidence from Cabinet Coalition SituationsAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1980
- Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary DemocraciesAmerican Political Science Review, 1973
- A Theory of Coalition FormationAmerican Sociological Review, 1961