SSSimon Siegenthaler

Simon Siegenthaler

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Simon Siegenthaler has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Linguistic Intervention Unlocks the Economic Gains of Diversity

    by Sheen S. Levine, Simon Siegenthaler, Bart Wilson

    Gains from trade generate prosperity, yet interpersonal exchange can falter along racial lines. We study incentivized experimental economies where participants must spontaneously initiate and sustain trading relationships with others whose race is visible. When the highest gains from trade require cross-race exchange, diverse economies underperform: welfare and specialization suffer as many retreat to autarky. This underperformance reflects not segregation into racial trading blocs, but a collapse in exchange. Opportunities for contact alone do not close the performance gap, which persists and even widens over time. To understand why, we turn to communication itself. Lower welfare is associated with less communication, fewer expressions of affiliation and achievement, and less explicit signaling of needs, deficits, and surpluses. We call this communicative misalignment: differences in shared-language use that raise search, bargaining, and coordination costs. A brief linguistic intervention equips participants with a communicative toolkit. It increases communication volume and the frequency of motivational and state-signaling language. Crucially, when gains depend on cross-race exchange, the intervention restores specialization and cross-race trade, closing the performance gap. Its effects are minimal when efficient trade need not cross race, indicating specificity rather than generic skill training. Language thus operates bidirectionally, both revealing the state of cooperation and causally shaping it. Although we examine racial boundaries, the mechanism may operate along other fault lines where interactional norms diverge, including hierarchy, geography, or culture. Language, a primary conduit of culture, can impede exchange when misaligned and facilitate it when aligned. This suggests a scalable micro-governance tool for reducing transaction costs. trade | language | race/ethnicity | segregation Significance Racially diverse communities can generate gains from specialization and trade, yet these gains often go unrealized. In experimental economies that mirror everyday exchange, participants struggle when the highest returns require cross-race trade. The shortfall reflects not segregation (sorting into same-race trading blocs) but stagnation: participants retreat from interaction and produce for themselves. We design a brief intervention encouraging motivational language and explicit signaling of needs and surpluses. By shifting how participants talk, it changes their trading behavior, increasing cross-race exchange and, consequently, welfare. Crucially, the intervention operates only where diversity impedes gains, confirming that it targets the barrier itself. These results suggest that language, not only preferences or sorting, can introduce transaction costsor reduce them.

  • Open Access

    Linguistic intervention unlocks the economic gains of diversity

    by Sheen S. Levine, Simon Siegenthaler, Bart J. Wilson

    Gains from trade generate prosperity, yet interpersonal exchange can falter along racial lines. We study incentivized experimental economies where participants must spontaneously initiate and sustain trading relationships with others whose race is visible. When the highest gains from trade require cross-race exchange, diverse economies underperform: welfare and specialization suffer as many retreat to autarky. This underperformance reflects not segregation into racial trading blocs, but a collapse in exchange. Opportunities for contact alone do not close the performance gap, which persists and even widens over time. To understand why, we turn to communication itself. Lower welfare is associated with less communication, fewer expressions of affiliation and achievement, and less explicit signaling of needs, deficits, and surpluses. We call this communicative misalignment: differences in shared-language use that raise search, bargaining, and coordination costs. A brief linguistic intervention equips participants with a communicative toolkit. It increases communication volume and the frequency of motivational and state-signaling language. Crucially, when gains depend on cross-race exchange, the intervention restores specialization and cross-race trade, closing the performance gap. Its effects are minimal when efficient trade need not cross race, indicating specificity rather than generic skill training. Language thus operates bidirectionally, both revealing the state of cooperation and causally shaping it. Although we examine racial boundaries, the mechanism may operate along other fault lines where interactional norms diverge, including hierarchy, geography, or culture. Language, a primary conduit of culture, can impede exchange when misaligned and facilitate it when aligned. This suggests a scalable micro-governance tool for reducing transaction costs.

  • Commitment timing in coalitional bargaining

    by Aaron Kamm, Simon Siegenthaler

    Most multilateral bargaining models predict bargaining power to emanate from pivotality—a party’s ability to form different majority coalitions. However, this prediction contrasts with the empirical observation that negotiations in parliamentary democracies typically result in payoffs proportional to parties’ vote shares. Proportionate profits suggest equality rather than pivotality drives results. We design an experiment to study when bargaining outcomes reflect pivotality versus proportionality. We find that commitment timing is a crucial institutional factor moderating bargaining power. Payoffs are close to proportional if bargainers can commit to majority coalitions before committing to how to share the pie, but pivotality dictates outcomes otherwise. Our results help explain Gamson’s Law, a long-standing puzzle in the legislative bargaining literature.


  • Open Access

    Leadership, Inequality, and Coordination: an Experimental Investigation

    by Aurelie Dariel, Nikos Nikiforakis, Simon Siegenthaler

    How do pay inequality and risk inequality affect the willingness of teams to follow their leaders? We explore this question in a setting where leaders lead by example to mitigate the strategic uncertainty surrounding a decision. Using a simple model, we predict that pay inequality between leaders and team members undermines the effectiveness of leaders in coordinating their teams. Risk inequality can offset the negative impact of pay inequality if the leader is exposed to sufficiently more risk than the team members. We confirm both hypotheses in a large online experiment that varies the degree of pay inequality and risk inequality. Risk-averse team members and individuals who believe that their teammates are inequality-averse are the most responsive to both pay inequality and risk inequality. We obtain similar results in a lab experiment with larger teams and greater financial incentives.

  • Open Access

    Pathways to Prosocial Leadership: An Online Experiment on the Effects of External Subsidies and the Relative Price of Giving

    by Blaine G Robbins, Daniel Karell, Simon Siegenthaler, Aaron Kamm

    Leaders are a part of virtually every group and organization, and while they help solve the various collective action problems that groups face, they can also be unprincipled and incompetent, pursuing their own interests over those of the group. What types of circumstances foster prosocial leadership and motivate leaders to pursue group interests? In a modified dictator game (N = 798), we examine the effects of piece-rate subsidies (or pay per unit of work performed) and the relative price of giving (or the size of the benefit to others for giving) on prosocial behavior and norms about giving. We find that subsidies increase giving by leaders, that the relative price of giving is unrelated to prosocial behavior, and that neither affects norms about giving. Furthermore, the introduction and removal of a subsidy does not undermine giving over time. Our results imply that subsidies increase group welfare by motivating leaders to allocate a larger share of resources to group members.

  • With Risk Comes Reward

    by Simon Siegenthaler, Nikos Nikiforakis, Aurelie Dariel

  • Market exchange and diversity

    by Simon Siegenthaler, Sheen Levine, Bart Wilson

  • Open Access

    Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection

    by Aurelie Dariel, Arno Riedl, Simon Siegenthaler


  • Competition and Price Transparency in the Market for Lemons: Experimental Evidence

    by Olivier Bochet, Simon Siegenthaler

    In markets with asymmetric information, where equilibria are often inefficient, bargaining can help promote welfare. We design an experiment to examine the impact of competition and price transparency in such settings. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that competition promotes efficiency if bargainers cannot observe each other's price offers. Contrary to the predictions, however, the efficiency-enhancing effect of competition persists even when offers are observable. We explore different behavioral explanations for the absence of a detrimental effect of price transparency. Remarkably, implementing the strategy method improves subjects' conditional reasoning, delivering the predicted loss in efficiency when offers are observable.