All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 18 (3) , 1023-1061
Abstract
For division problems with single‐peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy‐proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy‐proof. Although obvious strategy‐proofness is, in general, more restrictive than strategy‐proofness, this is not the case in this setting.Keywords
Funding Information
- Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación
- Universidad Nacional de San Luis
- Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas
- Agencia Nacional de Promoción de la Investigación, el Desarrollo Tecnológico y la Innovación
- Agencia Estatal de Investigación
- Generalitat de Catalunya
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