Jordi Massó
Research Subjects
Jordi Massó has a total of 32 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Alejandro Neme
16 shared publications- Gustavo Bergantiños
ECOBAS, Universidade de Vigo, ECOSOT, Vigo, Spain
11 shared publications - Alejandro Neme
Universidad Nacional de San Luis and CONICET
10 shared publications Jorge Oviedo
5 shared publications- R. Pablo Arribillaga
Instituto de Matemática Aplicada San Luis Queen' University Belfast University of Edinburgh Universidad Nacional de San Luis CONICET GENG ZHAO University of California Berkeley
4 shared publications Ruth Martínez
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 3 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 161
Obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition
- 3 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 161
Obvious strategy-proofness with respect to a partition
- Open Access
- 25 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 97 (2) , 391-408
False-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences
We consider the problem of a society that uses a voting rule to choose a subset from a given set of objects (candidates, binary issues, or alike). We assume that voters’ preferences over subsets of objects are separable: adding an object to a set leads to a better set if and only if the object is good (as a singleton set, the object is better than the empty set). A voting rule is strategy-proof if no voter benefits by not revealing its preferences truthfully and it is false-name-proof if no voter benefits by submitting several votes under other identities. We characterize all voting rules that satisfy false-name-proofness, strategy-proofness, and ontoness as the class of voting rules in which an object is chosen if it has either at least one vote in every society or a unanimous vote in every society. To do this, we first prove that if a voting rule is false-name-proof, strategy-proof, and onto, then the identities of the voters are not important.
- 25 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 97 (2) , 391-408
Open AccessFalse-name-proof and strategy-proof voting rules under separable preferences
We consider the problem of a society that uses a voting rule to choose a subset from a given set of objects (candidates, binary issues, or alike). We assume that voters’ preferences over subsets of objects are separable: adding an object to a set leads to a better set if and only if the object is good (as a singleton set, the object is better than the empty set). A voting rule is strategy-proof if no voter benefits by not revealing its preferences truthfully and it is false-name-proof if no voter benefits by submitting several votes under other identities. We characterize all voting rules that satisfy false-name-proofness, strategy-proofness, and ontoness as the class of voting rules in which an object is chosen if it has either at least one vote in every society or a unanimous vote in every society. To do this, we first prove that if a voting rule is false-name-proof, strategy-proof, and onto, then the identities of the voters are not important.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 18 (3) , 1023-1061
All sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
For division problems with single‐peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy‐proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy‐proof. Although obvious strategy‐proofness is, in general, more restrictive than strategy‐proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 18 (3) , 1023-1061
Open AccessAll sequential allotment rules are obviously strategy‐proof
For division problems with single‐peaked preferences, we show that all sequential allotment rules, a large subfamily of strategy‐proof and efficient rules, are also obviously strategy‐proof. Although obvious strategy‐proofness is, in general, more restrictive than strategy‐proofness, this is not the case in this setting.
- 29 November 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 23 (2) , 376-401
Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous
We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and efficient families of rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric single‐peaked on the set of possible allotments. Rules in the two families are in addition envy‐free, but they differ on whether envy‐freeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (a) the family of constrained equal losses rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy justified envy‐freeness on losses and (b) the family of constrained equal awards rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy envy‐freeness on awards.
- 29 November 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 23 (2) , 376-401
Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous
We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and efficient families of rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric single‐peaked on the set of possible allotments. Rules in the two families are in addition envy‐free, but they differ on whether envy‐freeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (a) the family of constrained equal losses rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy justified envy‐freeness on losses and (b) the family of constrained equal awards rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy envy‐freeness on awards.
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 124, 219-238
On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
- 1 November 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 124, 219-238
On strategy-proofness and semilattice single-peakedness
- Open Access
- 1 March 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 186
On obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
- 1 March 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 186
Open AccessOn obvious strategy-proofness and single-peakedness
- Open Access
- 4 December 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 84 (1) , 83-97
On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
- 4 December 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 84 (1) , 83-97
Open AccessOn societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: internal stability and consistency
- Open Access
- 28 November 2017
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 59 (1) , 163-189
ON STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS
- 28 November 2017
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 59 (1) , 163-189
Open AccessON STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS
- Open Access
- 1 November 2017
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 9 (4) , 74-107
Comparing Voting by Committees According to Their Manipulability
We consider the class of voting by committees to be used by a society to collectively choose a subset from a given set of objects. We offer a simple criterion to compare two voting by committees without dummy agents according to their manipulability. This criterion is based on the set-inclusion relationships between the two corresponding pairs of sets of objects, those at which each agent is decisive and those at which each agent is vetoer. We show that the binary relation “to be as manipulable as” endows the set of equivalence classes of anonymous voting by committees (i.e., voting by quotas) with a complete upper semilattice structure, whose supremum is the equivalence class containing all voting by quotas with the property that the quota of each object is strictly larger than one and strictly lower than the number of agents. Finally, we extend the comparability criterion to the full class of all voting by committees. (JEL D71, D72)
- 1 November 2017
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 9 (4) , 74-107
Open AccessComparing Voting by Committees According to Their Manipulability
We consider the class of voting by committees to be used by a society to collectively choose a subset from a given set of objects. We offer a simple criterion to compare two voting by committees without dummy agents according to their manipulability. This criterion is based on the set-inclusion relationships between the two corresponding pairs of sets of objects, those at which each agent is decisive and those at which each agent is vetoer. We show that the binary relation “to be as manipulable as” endows the set of equivalence classes of anonymous voting by committees (i.e., voting by quotas) with a complete upper semilattice structure, whose supremum is the equivalence class containing all voting by quotas with the property that the quota of each object is strictly larger than one and strictly lower than the number of agents. Finally, we extend the comparability criterion to the full class of all voting by committees. (JEL D71, D72)
- Open Access
- 22 March 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 48 (4) , 857-875
On societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness
- 22 March 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 48 (4) , 857-875
Open AccessOn societies choosing social outcomes, and their memberships: strategy-proofness