How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design
- 5 October 2009
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in CESifo Economic Studies
- Vol. 56 (1) , 21-37
Abstract
Conventional pension systems suffer from a design defect, which makes them financially unsustainable, and a source of inefficiency for the economy as a whole. The article outlines a second-best policy which includes a public pension system made up of two parallel schemes, a Bismarckian one allowing individuals to qualify for a pension by working and paying contributions in the usual way, and an unconventional one allowing them to qualify for a pension by having children, and investing time and money in their upbringing. (JEL codes: D13, D64, H55, J13, J14 and J26)Keywords
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