Alessandro Cigno
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Alessandro Cigno has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Anna Pettini
Dipartimento di Studi sullo Stato, Università di Firenze, Firenze, Italy
2 shared publications Annalisa Luporini
University of Florence
1 shared publication- Annalisa Luporini
Dipartimento di Scienze economiche, Università di Firenze, Firenze, Italy
1 shared publication - Annalisa Luporini
Università di Trieste, Trieste, Italy
1 shared publication - Daniela Vuri
University of Rome Tor Vergata; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
1 shared publication - Furio Camillio Rosati
University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 26 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Population Economics
- Vol. 37 (3) , 1-15
Can a ban on child labour be self-enforcing, and would it be efficient?
- 26 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Population Economics
- Vol. 37 (3) , 1-15
Can a ban on child labour be self-enforcing, and would it be efficient?
- 23 August 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development
- Vol. 27 (3) , 267-292
The role of trade and offshoring in the determination of relative wages and child labour
Incorporating family decisions in a two-period model of the world economy, we predict that trade liberalization raises the skill premium and reduces child labour in developing countries where the adult labour force is sufficiently well educated to attract production activities from abroad that will increase the demand for skilled relative to unskilled labour. Elsewhere, liberalization will reduce the skill premium, but it will not necessarily raise child labour. Our prediction is not rejected by the data, and it explains why child labour is negatively associated with trade openness in those developing countries where the labour force was relatively well educated when the liberalization took place, but not elsewhere.
- 23 August 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development
- Vol. 27 (3) , 267-292
The role of trade and offshoring in the determination of relative wages and child labour
Incorporating family decisions in a two-period model of the world economy, we predict that trade liberalization raises the skill premium and reduces child labour in developing countries where the adult labour force is sufficiently well educated to attract production activities from abroad that will increase the demand for skilled relative to unskilled labour. Elsewhere, liberalization will reduce the skill premium, but it will not necessarily raise child labour. Our prediction is not rejected by the data, and it explains why child labour is negatively associated with trade openness in those developing countries where the labour force was relatively well educated when the liberalization took place, but not elsewhere.
- 1 March 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Population Economics
- Vol. 30 (3) , 805-834
Self-enforcing family rules, marriage and the (non)neutrality of public intervention
- 1 March 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Population Economics
- Vol. 30 (3) , 805-834
Self-enforcing family rules, marriage and the (non)neutrality of public intervention
- 11 July 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in CESifo Economic Studies
- Vol. 60 (3) , 599-612
Is Marriage as Good as a Contract?
Neither marriage nor a legally enforceable contract serves any useful purpose if the parties have access to a perfect credit market. In the presence of credit rationing, the parties may not reach an agreement. If they do, the agreement will be inefficient and give one party more utility than the other. Efficiency and utility equalization are guaranteed only by a legally enforceable contract. Separate-property marriage may reduce, and community-property marriage actually eliminate inefficiency, but neither of them guarantees utility equalization. (JEL codes: C78, J12, K36)
- 11 July 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in CESifo Economic Studies
- Vol. 60 (3) , 599-612
Is Marriage as Good as a Contract?
Neither marriage nor a legally enforceable contract serves any useful purpose if the parties have access to a perfect credit market. In the presence of credit rationing, the parties may not reach an agreement. If they do, the agreement will be inefficient and give one party more utility than the other. Efficiency and utility equalization are guaranteed only by a legally enforceable contract. Separate-property marriage may reduce, and community-property marriage actually eliminate inefficiency, but neither of them guarantees utility equalization. (JEL codes: C78, J12, K36)
- Open Access
- 1 April 2013
- Published by Firenze University Press
Debito pubblico, ricchezza privata e politiche per la famiglia
Firenze University Press - Università degli Studi di Firenze - Che relazione c'è fra debito pubblico e ricchezza privata? E cosa c'entrano le politiche per la famiglia con questi aggregati finanziari? Vedremo che un nesso c'è, ma chiariamoci innanzi tutto cosa s'intende per famiglia. Nell'accezione comune la famiglia include ascendenti, discendenti e collaterali. Ma quando si parla di politiche per la famiglia si pensa soltanto a genitori potenziali o con bambini in età prescolare.
- 1 April 2013
- Published by Firenze University Press
Open AccessDebito pubblico, ricchezza privata e politiche per la famiglia
Firenze University Press - Università degli Studi di Firenze - Che relazione c'è fra debito pubblico e ricchezza privata? E cosa c'entrano le politiche per la famiglia con questi aggregati finanziari? Vedremo che un nesso c'è, ma chiariamoci innanzi tutto cosa s'intende per famiglia. Nell'accezione comune la famiglia include ascendenti, discendenti e collaterali. Ma quando si parla di politiche per la famiglia si pensa soltanto a genitori potenziali o con bambini in età prescolare.
- 18 February 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economics of the Household
- Vol. 10 (2) , 193-213
Marriage as a commitment device
- 18 February 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economics of the Household
- Vol. 10 (2) , 193-213
Marriage as a commitment device
- 26 July 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The World Bank Economic Review
- Vol. 26 (1) , 61-77
How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
Because credit and insurance markets are imperfect and intrafamily transfers and how children use their time outside school hours are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labor below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need- and merit-based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute, and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.
- 26 July 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The World Bank Economic Review
- Vol. 26 (1) , 61-77
How to Deal with Covert Child Labor and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
Because credit and insurance markets are imperfect and intrafamily transfers and how children use their time outside school hours are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labor below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need- and merit-based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute, and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.
- 6 April 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in CESifo Economic Studies
- Vol. 57 (2) , 305-331
Agency in Family Policy: A Survey
Given that a child's birth and lifetime earning capacity are the result of actions undertaken by the child's own parents, if the government has an interest in the welfare or tax-paying capacity of its future citizens, it has no option but to condition the decisions of its present citizens. Parents are then, in the ordinary sense of the word, the government's agents. They are agents also in the technical sense of Principal-Agent theory if a parental action or personal characterisic of concern to the government is private information. Modelling family policy as an agency problem gives rise to a wealth of new results, and casts doubt on some established ones. (JEL codes: D13, D82, H24, H31, J13, J24)
- 6 April 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in CESifo Economic Studies
- Vol. 57 (2) , 305-331
Agency in Family Policy: A Survey
Given that a child's birth and lifetime earning capacity are the result of actions undertaken by the child's own parents, if the government has an interest in the welfare or tax-paying capacity of its future citizens, it has no option but to condition the decisions of its present citizens. Parents are then, in the ordinary sense of the word, the government's agents. They are agents also in the technical sense of Principal-Agent theory if a parental action or personal characterisic of concern to the government is private information. Modelling family policy as an agency problem gives rise to a wealth of new results, and casts doubt on some established ones. (JEL codes: D13, D82, H24, H31, J13, J24)
- 5 October 2009
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in CESifo Economic Studies
- Vol. 56 (1) , 21-37
How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design
Conventional pension systems suffer from a design defect, which makes them financially unsustainable, and a source of inefficiency for the economy as a whole. The article outlines a second-best policy which includes a public pension system made up of two parallel schemes, a Bismarckian one allowing individuals to qualify for a pension by working and paying contributions in the usual way, and an unconventional one allowing them to qualify for a pension by having children, and investing time and money in their upbringing. (JEL codes: D13, D64, H55, J13, J14 and J26)
- 5 October 2009
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in CESifo Economic Studies
- Vol. 56 (1) , 21-37
How to Avoid a Pension Crisis: A Question of Intelligent System Design
Conventional pension systems suffer from a design defect, which makes them financially unsustainable, and a source of inefficiency for the economy as a whole. The article outlines a second-best policy which includes a public pension system made up of two parallel schemes, a Bismarckian one allowing individuals to qualify for a pension by working and paying contributions in the usual way, and an unconventional one allowing them to qualify for a pension by having children, and investing time and money in their upbringing. (JEL codes: D13, D64, H55, J13, J14 and J26)
- 1 September 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economics of the Household
- Vol. 4 (3) , 183-204
Is there such a thing as a family constitution? A test based on credit rationing
- 1 September 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Economics of the Household
- Vol. 4 (3) , 183-204
Is there such a thing as a family constitution? A test based on credit rationing