Abstract
This research studies a monopoly firm’s timing and size decisions to introduce a new and partially substitutable product under demand uncertainty and financing constraint. Accessible financing resources for the investment are positively related to firm’s revenues from the existing product. We find the firm’s optimal investment decision is influenced by the cannibalization effect that delays investment, the revenue effect that advances investment, and the financingeffect that allows for a larger investment in case of more financing resources. In particular, the financing constraint is only binding for intermediate levels of demand uncertainty. Under the non-binding financing constraint, a larger old market revenue makes the firm invest later and less due to the dominant cannibalization effect. Under the binding financing constraint, a larger old market revenue can make the firm invest earlier and more because of the dominant revenue and financing effects. Furthermore, the socially optimal investment is more susceptible to the binding financing constraint because the investment size is larger than that maximizes firm’s profits.

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