Luoyuan Gan
Research Subjects
Luoyuan Gan has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Herbert Dawid
1 shared publication- Xingang Wen
Xi’an Jiaotong University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 4 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Capacity Expansion Investment under Financing Constraint
This research studies a monopoly firm’s timing and size decisions to introduce a new and partially substitutable product under demand uncertainty and financing constraint. Accessible financing resources for the investment are positively related to firm’s revenues from the existing product. We find the firm’s optimal investment decision is influenced by the cannibalization effect that delays investment, the revenue effect that advances investment, and the financingeffect that allows for a larger investment in case of more financing resources. In particular, the financing constraint is only binding for intermediate levels of demand uncertainty. Under the non-binding financing constraint, a larger old market revenue makes the firm invest later and less due to the dominant cannibalization effect. Under the binding financing constraint, a larger old market revenue can make the firm invest earlier and more because of the dominant revenue and financing effects. Furthermore, the socially optimal investment is more susceptible to the binding financing constraint because the investment size is larger than that maximizes firm’s profits.
- 4 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCapacity Expansion Investment under Financing Constraint
This research studies a monopoly firm’s timing and size decisions to introduce a new and partially substitutable product under demand uncertainty and financing constraint. Accessible financing resources for the investment are positively related to firm’s revenues from the existing product. We find the firm’s optimal investment decision is influenced by the cannibalization effect that delays investment, the revenue effect that advances investment, and the financingeffect that allows for a larger investment in case of more financing resources. In particular, the financing constraint is only binding for intermediate levels of demand uncertainty. Under the non-binding financing constraint, a larger old market revenue makes the firm invest later and less due to the dominant cannibalization effect. Under the binding financing constraint, a larger old market revenue can make the firm invest earlier and more because of the dominant revenue and financing effects. Furthermore, the socially optimal investment is more susceptible to the binding financing constraint because the investment size is larger than that maximizes firm’s profits.