Abstract
The rise of content-creation technologies such as generative artificial intelligence (G-AI) has reshaped the way people produce and consume content. These technologies democratize content creation, enabling a broader array of inexperienced individuals to generate content that rivals the quality produced by professionals. In this paper, we adopt a game-theoretic model to study how the democratization of content creation affects consumer welfare. While the content-democratization technology can assist low-quality creators in improving their content quality or creation efficiency, it can precipitate a flood of low-quality content in the market and crowd out high-quality content, leading to a loss in consumer welfare. The welfare loss occurs when the content quality or creation efficiency of the low-quality creators is at a low level. We further show that it is more likely to observe such a welfare loss when the accessibility of the technology shrinks or when content platforms can screen content and push more high-quality content to consumers. Moreover, we investigate the welfare implications when the technology simultaneously uplifts the quality of all content. In addition, we find that if the content-democratization technology can learn from its usage or human-generated content in the past, consumer welfare may decline. Furthermore, we explore a specific content type (e.g., selfie posts on Instagram) for which high-quality content can yield a disutility for consumers.

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