YWYue Wu

Yue Wu

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Yue Wu has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Welfare Implications of Democratization in Content Creation: Generative AI and Beyond

    by Tianxin Zou, Zijun (June) Shi, Yue Wu

    The rise of content-creation technologies such as generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) has reshaped the way people produce and consume content. These technologies democratize content creation, enabling inexperienced individuals to generate content that rivals the quality produced by professionals. This article adopts a game-theoretic model to study how the democratization of content creation affects welfare. While the content-democratization technology can assist low-quality creators in improving their content quality, it can precipitate a flood of such content in the market and crowd out high-quality content production, leading to welfare losses. An incremental technology development with a small reduction in the quality gap can hurt individual consumers and all creators, leading to a lose-lose market outcome. In contrast, a development with a high reduction in the quality gap benefits individual consumers and all creators, leading to a win-win outcome. Furthermore, when platforms can more effectively screen content and promote high-quality content, welfare rises, but the content-democratization technology is more likely to reduce welfare. The findings help explain the distinct impacts of content democratization in different industries.


  • Quality-Variety Tradeoffs in Recommendation Systems on Content Platforms

    by Tianxin Zou, Yue Wu, Miklos Sarvary

    User-generated content platforms use recommendation systems (RSs) to deliver content from a vast number of creators to a diverse audience based on content quality and its match to consumers’ tastes. Existing research has primarily examined their impact on demand-side factors, such as the quality and variety of content consumption. In contrast, less attention has been paid to their influence on supply-side factors, including creators’ entry and quality decisions and their interaction with users’ content diets. The literature has also largely overlooked the hit-driven nature of content production—where a few “trendy” items attract outsized interest in unpredictable ways. We address these omissions by explicitly modeling creators’ entry and quality decisions. We reveal a tradeoff between the equilibrium content quality and variety produced on a platform. Although increasing the recommended content’s fit to users’ preferences benefits consumers and the platform, emphasizing higher quality may reduce content variety and the emergence of trendy items, potentially lowering overall consumer valuation of the platform. We show that whether emphasizing the quality dimension is detrimental depends on consumers’ valuations for content match and trendiness, the heterogeneity level of their valuations, creators’ capabilities of flexibly choosing their content types, and their barrier to enter the platform. Additionally, consumption variety is a U-shaped function of the emphasis the recommendation system puts on content quality. This paper was accepted by Greg Shaffer, marketing. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2025.00300 .


  • Creation, Consumption, and Control of Sensitive Content

    by Yue Wu

    The paper studies whether and under what conditions policy interventions, such as strengthening censorship, can help a social planner reduce social harm caused by the consumption of sensitive content.


  • Regulating Probabilistic Selling of Counterfeits

    by Yuetao Gao, Yue Wu

    Counterfeits are available across many marketplaces. In emerging markets, in particular, consumers often observe a mix of counterfeits and authentic products sold by retailers. It is difficult for some consumers to distinguish between the two types of products. From these consumers’ perspective, the products can be considered as probabilistic goods, and we term retailers’ strategies probabilistic selling of counterfeits. Retailers who sell counterfeits are subject to a penalty by regulation. We develop a game-theoretical model to study this dishonest strategy under regulation. Our model offers the following insights. First, a higher penalty for selling counterfeits can lead to a smaller proportion of authentic products in the market. This finding is driven by a manufacturer’s strategic response: knowing that the penalty becomes higher, the manufacturer has greater incentives to raise the wholesale price of its authentic products. From the retailers’ point of view, this elevated procurement cost can, in turn, encourage them to lower the probability of their products being authentic. Second, manufacturer profit increases with the penalty, whereas retailer profit, consumer surplus, and social welfare do not, in general, exhibit a monotonic relationship with the penalty. This paper was accepted by Dmitri Kuksov, marketing. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4607 .


  • Open Access

    Welfare Implications of Democratization in Content Creation

    by Tianxin Zou, Zijun (June) Shi, Yue Wu

    The rise of content-creation technologies such as generative artificial intelligence (G-AI) has reshaped the way people produce and consume content. These technologies democratize content creation, enabling a broader array of inexperienced individuals to generate content that rivals the quality produced by professionals. In this paper, we adopt a game-theoretic model to study how the democratization of content creation affects consumer welfare. While the content-democratization technology can assist low-quality creators in improving their content quality or creation efficiency, it can precipitate a flood of low-quality content in the market and crowd out high-quality content, leading to a loss in consumer welfare. The welfare loss occurs when the content quality or creation efficiency of the low-quality creators is at a low level. We further show that it is more likely to observe such a welfare loss when the accessibility of the technology shrinks or when content platforms can screen content and push more high-quality content to consumers. Moreover, we investigate the welfare implications when the technology simultaneously uplifts the quality of all content. In addition, we find that if the content-democratization technology can learn from its usage or human-generated content in the past, consumer welfare may decline. Furthermore, we explore a specific content type (e.g., selfie posts on Instagram) for which high-quality content can yield a disutility for consumers.


  • Regulating Native Advertising

    by Yue Wu, Esther Gal-Or, Tansev Geylani

    Native advertising is not fully transparent to consumers because it bears similarity to editorial content. Increasing the opaqueness of native ads can raise publishers’ click-through rate, but can ...


  • The Welfare Impact of Targeted Advertising Technologies

    by Veronica Marotta, Yue Wu, Kaifu Zhang, Alessandro Acquisti

    We analyze the welfare implications of consumer data sharing, and restrictions to that sharing, in the context of online targeted advertising. Targeting technologies offer firms the ability to reach desired audiences through intermediary platforms. The platforms run auctions in real time to display ads on internet sites, leveraging consumers’ personal information collected online to personalize the ads. The online advertising industry posits that targeted advertising benefits advertising firms (that is, merchants who want to target ads to the desired consumers), consumers who see ads for preferred products, and the intermediary platforms that match consumers with firms. However, the claims that targeted advertising benefits all players involved have not been fully vetted in the literature. We develop an analytical model to analyze the economic and welfare implications of targeting technologies for those three players under alternative consumer information regimes. The regimes differ in the type and amount of consumer data available to the intermediary and to the advertising firms, and reflect the presence or absence of technological or regulatory restrictions to personal information flows. We find evidence of incentive misalignment among the players, as the intermediary prefers to share only a subset of consumer information with firms, whereas advertising firms prefer having complete information about the consumers. As such, a strategic intermediary with the ability to control which information is shared during the auction can have an incentive to use only the information that maximizes its payoff, overlooking the interests of both advertising firms and consumers. The information regimes that maximize consumer welfare vastly differ depending on consumers’ heterogeneity along two dimensions: a horizontal dimension, capturing consumer’s heterogeneity in product preferences; and a vertical dimension, capturing consumers’ heterogeneity in purchase power. Consumers prefer none of their personal information to be used for targeting only in limited circumstances. Otherwise, consumers are either indifferent or prefer only specific types of information to be used for targeting.


  • Regulating Deceptive Advertising: False Claims and Skeptical Consumers

    by Yue Wu, Tansev Geylani

    This paper studies interactions between dishonest firms, skeptical consumers, and regulations, and it finds that higher penalty for false statements can reduce consumer surplus, firm profits, and welfare.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Bad Greenwashing, Good Greenwashing: Corporate Social Responsibility and Information Transparency

    by Yue Wu, Kaifu Zhang, Jinhong Xie

    With the growing popularity of corporate social responsibility (CSR), critics point out that firms tend to focus on salient CSR activities while slacking off on the unobservable ones, using CSR as a marketing gimmick. Firms’ emphasis on observable aspects and negligence of the unobservable aspects are often labeled as greenwashing. This paper develops a game-theoretic model of CSR investment, in which consumers are socially minded, but they can observe only a subset of CSR initiatives. Two types of firms are considered: those that are driven solely by profit maximization and those that are socially responsible, motivated not only by profit, but also by a genuine concern for the social good. Our analysis examines how information transparency affects a firm’s strategies and the social welfare, and we identify both positive and negative aspects of greenwashing. First, low transparency incentivizes a profit-driven firm to engage in greenwashing through observable investment. Greenwashing prevents consumers from making informed purchase decisions but raises overall CSR spending. Second, sufficiently high transparency eliminates greenwashing and can motivate a socially responsible firm to make extra observable investment under the threat of greenwashing on the part of a profit-driven firm. However, when transparency further increases, this extra investment diminishes. In addition, our paper studies the impacts of firms’ budget constraint and consumers’ bargaining power: Raising the budget and increasing consumers’ bargaining power can both lead to an inferior social outcome. This paper was accepted by Juanjuan Zhang, marketing.


  • Matchmaker Competition and Technology Provision

    by Yue Wu, Kaifu Zhang, V. Padmanabhan

    Matchmaking is a complex process that requires considerable expertise. Matchmakers in various industries often advertise proprietary technologies that presumably help users find an ideal match in a short time. However, matchmakers may have incentives to provide suboptimal matchmaking services so that users remain clients longer and pay more fees. This article considers a matchmaking market with network effects and strategic consumers and analyzes under what conditions matchmakers would offer more effective versus less effective matchmaking services. The authors find that stronger pricing power paradoxically leads to lower technology provision when consumers have high valuation for the matchmaking service. Moreover, network effects typically encourage matchmakers to retain the users in the market to create positive externalities, which can result in less precise matchmaking. In addition, consumer patience prompts competing matchmakers to implement ineffective technology. In two extensions, the authors explore asymmetric two-sided markets and discuss the impacts of alternative pricing schemes on technology provision.