Optimal build-operate-transfer road contracts under information asymmetry and uncertainty
Authors:
- Shasha ShiSSShasha Shi
- Yafeng YinYYYafeng Yin
- Qingxian AnQAQingxian An
- Ke ChenKCKe Chen
- 1 October 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Transportation Research Part B: Methodological
- Vol. 152, 65-86
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (71701217, 71871223)
- National Science Foundation (1904575, CMMI-1854684)
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