On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design
Author:
- 1 May 2009
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 144 (3) , 1320-1332
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
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