CEO Turnover and Director Reputation
Authors:
- Felix von MeyerinckFMFelix von Meyerinck
- Jonas RomerJRJonas Romer
- Markus SchmidMSMarkus Schmid
Preprint
- 3 December 2023
- preprint
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Abstract
This paper analyzes the reputational effects of forced CEO turnovers on outside directors. We find that directors interlocked to a forced CEO turnover experience large and persistent increases in withheld votes at subsequent re-elections relative to non-turnover-interlocked directors. Directors are not penalized for an involvement in a turnover per se but for forced CEO turnovers that are related to governance failures by the board. Our results challenge the widespread view that forcing out a CEO can generally be understood as a sign of a well-functioning corporate governance.Keywords
All Related Versions
- Published version: Journal of Financial Economics, 163.