Markus Schmid
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Markus Schmid has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Felix von Meyerinck
University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance
3 shared publications Felix von Meyerinck
Univ Zurich, Dept Finance, Plattenstr 14, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland
2 shared publications- Heinz Zimmermann
Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
2 shared publications - Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi
University of Mannheim
1 shared publication - Andreas Kaufmann
Department of Computer Science, Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen Nürnberg, Erlangen, Germany
1 shared publication David M. Rey
University of Basel
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Empirical Finance
- Vol. 86
Bankruptcy prediction of privately held SMEs using feature selection methods
- 19 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Empirical Finance
- Vol. 86
Open AccessBankruptcy prediction of privately held SMEs using feature selection methods
- Open Access
- 14 March 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 60 (7) , 3412-3442
Competition and the Reputational Costs of Litigation
We study the role of competition in customers’ reactions to litigation against firms, using anonymized mobile phone location data. A class action lawsuit filing is followed by a 4% average reduction in customer visits to target firms’ outlets in the following months. The effect strongly depends on competition. Outlets facing more competition experience significantly larger negative effects. Closer competition matters more, both in terms of geographic and industry proximity. Announcement returns and quarterly accounting revenues around lawsuit filings also strongly depend on competition. Our results suggest that competition is an important component in customers’ ability to discipline firms for misbehavior.
- 14 March 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 60 (7) , 3412-3442
Open AccessCompetition and the Reputational Costs of Litigation
We study the role of competition in customers’ reactions to litigation against firms, using anonymized mobile phone location data. A class action lawsuit filing is followed by a 4% average reduction in customer visits to target firms’ outlets in the following months. The effect strongly depends on competition. Outlets facing more competition experience significantly larger negative effects. Closer competition matters more, both in terms of geographic and industry proximity. Announcement returns and quarterly accounting revenues around lawsuit filings also strongly depend on competition. Our results suggest that competition is an important component in customers’ ability to discipline firms for misbehavior.
- Open Access
- 23 November 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 163
CEO turnover and director reputation
- 23 November 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 163
Open AccessCEO turnover and director reputation
- Open Access
- 7 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Financial Markets and Portfolio Management
- Vol. 38 (2) , 163-164
Editorial
- 7 June 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Financial Markets and Portfolio Management
- Vol. 38 (2) , 163-164
Open AccessEditorial
- Open Access
- 3 December 2023
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
CEO Turnover and Director Reputation
This paper analyzes the reputational effects of forced CEO turnovers on outside directors. We find that directors interlocked to a forced CEO turnover experience large and persistent increases in withheld votes at subsequent re-elections relative to non-turnover-interlocked directors. Directors are not penalized for an involvement in a turnover per se but for forced CEO turnovers that are related to governance failures by the board. Our results challenge the widespread view that forcing out a CEO can generally be understood as a sign of a well-functioning corporate governance.
- 3 December 2023
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessCEO Turnover and Director Reputation
This paper analyzes the reputational effects of forced CEO turnovers on outside directors. We find that directors interlocked to a forced CEO turnover experience large and persistent increases in withheld votes at subsequent re-elections relative to non-turnover-interlocked directors. Directors are not penalized for an involvement in a turnover per se but for forced CEO turnovers that are related to governance failures by the board. Our results challenge the widespread view that forcing out a CEO can generally be understood as a sign of a well-functioning corporate governance.
- 23 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Financial Markets and Portfolio Management
- Vol. 37 (1) , 119-120
Report of the Editor 2022
- 23 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Financial Markets and Portfolio Management
- Vol. 37 (1) , 119-120
Report of the Editor 2022
- 2 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Financial Markets and Portfolio Management
- Vol. 36 (1) , 123-124
Report of the Editor 2021
- 2 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Financial Markets and Portfolio Management
- Vol. 36 (1) , 123-124
Report of the Editor 2021
- Open Access
- 13 September 2021
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
As California Goes, so Goes the Nation? Board Gender Quotas and Shareholders' Distaste of Government Interventions
In 2018, California set a precedent by enacting a mandatory gender quota for corporate boards, only to become the first state to repeal it in 2022. Our analysis reveals significant variation in the stock market responses of California firms to both the implementation and subsequent repeal of the board gender quota as well as significant spillover effects for non-California firms. Our results show that director labor market frictions are not the only driver of these stock market reactions. Instead, two novel factors emerge as key drivers: the sensitivity of firms to policy changes and their orientation towards Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) principles. Specifically, firms sensitive to policy changes reacted negatively to the quota's introduction and positively to its repeal, reflecting their regulatory uncertainty aversion. In contrast, firms with strong ESG commitments reacted positively to its introduction, indicating that these firms value gender diversity on boards beyond compliance with legal mandates. These findings underline the importance of considering broader regulatory and corporate governance factors in understanding stock market responses to gender quotas.
- 13 September 2021
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessAs California Goes, so Goes the Nation? Board Gender Quotas and Shareholders' Distaste of Government Interventions
In 2018, California set a precedent by enacting a mandatory gender quota for corporate boards, only to become the first state to repeal it in 2022. Our analysis reveals significant variation in the stock market responses of California firms to both the implementation and subsequent repeal of the board gender quota as well as significant spillover effects for non-California firms. Our results show that director labor market frictions are not the only driver of these stock market reactions. Instead, two novel factors emerge as key drivers: the sensitivity of firms to policy changes and their orientation towards Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) principles. Specifically, firms sensitive to policy changes reacted negatively to the quota's introduction and positively to its repeal, reflecting their regulatory uncertainty aversion. In contrast, firms with strong ESG commitments reacted positively to its introduction, indicating that these firms value gender diversity on boards beyond compliance with legal mandates. These findings underline the importance of considering broader regulatory and corporate governance factors in understanding stock market responses to gender quotas.
- 4 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Financial Markets and Portfolio Management
- Vol. 35 (1) , 149-150
Report of the Editor 2020
- 4 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Financial Markets and Portfolio Management
- Vol. 35 (1) , 149-150
Report of the Editor 2020
- 1 October 2019
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 65 (10) , 4813-4840
Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers?
We study the effects of cartel participation on top corporate managers. Although a strong public interest exists in regulating price fixing, we find little evidence that either corporate governance or the legal system holds managers of cartel firms accountable. Instead, managers of cartel firms enjoy greater job security, receive higher cash bonuses, and more aggressively take profits from appreciated stock option awards. Legal sanctions against individual managers are infrequent, with enforcement actions focused on corporations rather than their officers. Managers seem to use concealment strategies actively to limit detection of cartel membership by their boards and auditors. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.
- 1 October 2019
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 65 (10) , 4813-4840
Does Price Fixing Benefit Corporate Managers?
We study the effects of cartel participation on top corporate managers. Although a strong public interest exists in regulating price fixing, we find little evidence that either corporate governance or the legal system holds managers of cartel firms accountable. Instead, managers of cartel firms enjoy greater job security, receive higher cash bonuses, and more aggressively take profits from appreciated stock option awards. Legal sanctions against individual managers are infrequent, with enforcement actions focused on corporations rather than their officers. Managers seem to use concealment strategies actively to limit detection of cartel membership by their boards and auditors. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.