Credit Market Driven Acquisitions
Authors:
Preprint
- 15 April 2022
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Using a comprehensive sample of takeovers from 1983 to 2016, we show that credit market conditions drive takeover activity. A deterioration in the aggregate credit quality of corporate bond issuers is associated with a large increase in aggregate deal value for all takeovers, and the strongest effects are for all cash deals. When credit spreads are low in quarter t, junk bonds are disproportionately issued and aggregate credit quality deteriorates; debt-financed takeovers increase from quarter t+2, peak at quarter t+5, and subsequently subside as credit spreads widen. At the firm-level, buoyant credit market conditions are associated with an increase in debt-financed takeover activity, particularly when acquiring managers are overconfident. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that buoyant credit market conditions and managerial overconfidence coexist in credit market driven acquisitions.Keywords
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