Stefano Rossi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Stefano Rossi has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Nicola Gennaioli
7 shared publicationsColin Mayer
6 shared publications- Marco Becht
Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management (ULB); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
4 shared publications - Hayong Yun
Michigan State University - Department of Finance
3 shared publications Julian Franks
3 shared publicationsJulian R. Franks
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 9 December 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
The Role of Lockups in Stock Mergers
We document the frequent use of stock lockup agreements in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) paid in stock and examine the corporate determinants and consequences of the use and duration of lockups. Lockup agreements prohibit target shareholders from selling shares issued by the acquirer as a means of payment for a prespecified period. We find support for the hypothesis that target shareholders agree to lockups to precommit to hold on to the acquirer’s stock if they believe the merger’s long-term fundamentals are strong. Consistent with our hypothesis, lockups come with larger acquirer announcement returns, particularly when acquirer valuations are high; ex ante, lockup adoption likelihood increases with acquirers’ valuation. Lockups also come with higher deal completion likelihood, shorter merger negotiations, and higher long-term operating performance. We conclude the market interprets lockups as a signal of strong fundamentals, particularly when acquirers’ valuations are high. This paper was accepted by Bo Becker, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00993 .
- 9 December 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
The Role of Lockups in Stock Mergers
We document the frequent use of stock lockup agreements in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) paid in stock and examine the corporate determinants and consequences of the use and duration of lockups. Lockup agreements prohibit target shareholders from selling shares issued by the acquirer as a means of payment for a prespecified period. We find support for the hypothesis that target shareholders agree to lockups to precommit to hold on to the acquirer’s stock if they believe the merger’s long-term fundamentals are strong. Consistent with our hypothesis, lockups come with larger acquirer announcement returns, particularly when acquirer valuations are high; ex ante, lockup adoption likelihood increases with acquirers’ valuation. Lockups also come with higher deal completion likelihood, shorter merger negotiations, and higher long-term operating performance. We conclude the market interprets lockups as a signal of strong fundamentals, particularly when acquirers’ valuations are high. This paper was accepted by Bo Becker, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.00993 .
- Open Access
- 5 September 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 37 (11) , 3335-3385
Credit Cycles, Expectations, and Corporate Investment
We provide a systematic empirical assessment of the Minsky hypothesis that business fluctuations stem from irrational swings in expectations. Using predictable firm-level forecast errors, we build an aggregate index of irrational expectations and use it to provide three sets of results. First, we show that our index predicts aggregate credit cycles. Next, we show that these predictable credit cycles drive cycles in firm-level debt issuance and investment and similar cycles between financially constrained and unconstrained firms, as Minsky predicts. Finally, we show more pronounced cycles in firm-level financing and investment for firms with ex ante more optimistic expectations. (JEL G31, G32, G40, E32, E44)
- 5 September 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 37 (11) , 3335-3385
Open AccessCredit Cycles, Expectations, and Corporate Investment
We provide a systematic empirical assessment of the Minsky hypothesis that business fluctuations stem from irrational swings in expectations. Using predictable firm-level forecast errors, we build an aggregate index of irrational expectations and use it to provide three sets of results. First, we show that our index predicts aggregate credit cycles. Next, we show that these predictable credit cycles drive cycles in firm-level debt issuance and investment and similar cycles between financially constrained and unconstrained firms, as Minsky predicts. Finally, we show more pronounced cycles in firm-level financing and investment for firms with ex ante more optimistic expectations. (JEL G31, G32, G40, E32, E44)
- 30 April 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 239
The political economy of municipal bankruptcy
- 30 April 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 239
The political economy of municipal bankruptcy
- 1 April 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (4) , 2209-2235
Financial Reform and Public Good Provision: Municipal Bankruptcy Law and the Financing of Hospitals
Does financial reform improve public good provision? We examine state-level adoption of municipal bankruptcy law. After reform, municipalities’ borrowing costs decrease and bonds’ issuance increase, particularly for bonds financing hospitals; hospitals’ investments increase, particularly when using such bonds; local firms’ investment and performance increase, particularly in the construction sector. Ex ante, reform occurs earlier in states with weaker unions, stronger bondholders’ interests, and better courts. Similar factors explain congressional voting on municipal bankruptcy law. These results support the hypothesis that financial reform destroys labor union rents and expands investment, highlighting a novel spillover channel from public finance to the real economy. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance. Funding: This work was supported by the Baffi-CAREFIN Research Center at Bocconi. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4800 .
- 1 April 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 70 (4) , 2209-2235
Financial Reform and Public Good Provision: Municipal Bankruptcy Law and the Financing of Hospitals
Does financial reform improve public good provision? We examine state-level adoption of municipal bankruptcy law. After reform, municipalities’ borrowing costs decrease and bonds’ issuance increase, particularly for bonds financing hospitals; hospitals’ investments increase, particularly when using such bonds; local firms’ investment and performance increase, particularly in the construction sector. Ex ante, reform occurs earlier in states with weaker unions, stronger bondholders’ interests, and better courts. Similar factors explain congressional voting on municipal bankruptcy law. These results support the hypothesis that financial reform destroys labor union rents and expands investment, highlighting a novel spillover channel from public finance to the real economy. This paper was accepted by Victoria Ivashina, finance. Funding: This work was supported by the Baffi-CAREFIN Research Center at Bocconi. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4800 .
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The VAT Trap: How Consumption Tax Hikes Make Firms Pay Out More and Invest Less
Using comprehensive firm-level data for 54 countries, we document that, contrary to standard economic theory, unanticipated and permanent value-added tax increases cause firms to permanently increase their cash payout to shareholders and reduce their corporate investment. One possible reconciliation is that agents have finite lives. Using an overlapping-generations model, we show after an unanticipated and permanent VAT increase, firms increase dividend payouts and reduce investment to attempt to maintain past consumption levels. Based on our theory, we empirically show that both dividend and investment responses to VAT changes are more pronounced in countries in which agents have more present-oriented preferences.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe VAT Trap: How Consumption Tax Hikes Make Firms Pay Out More and Invest Less
Using comprehensive firm-level data for 54 countries, we document that, contrary to standard economic theory, unanticipated and permanent value-added tax increases cause firms to permanently increase their cash payout to shareholders and reduce their corporate investment. One possible reconciliation is that agents have finite lives. Using an overlapping-generations model, we show after an unanticipated and permanent VAT increase, firms increase dividend payouts and reduce investment to attempt to maintain past consumption levels. Based on our theory, we empirically show that both dividend and investment responses to VAT changes are more pronounced in countries in which agents have more present-oriented preferences.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Coherence Side of Rationality: Theory and Evidence from Firm Plans
We develop a theory of forecast coherence in a firm production setting, which yields a normative ex ante benchmark of first-best coherent forecasts and statistical tests to detect incoherence ex post. Under the null, the forecast errors of output and inputs are "close" to one another. Using the Duke Survey of top executives of large US corporations, we reject the null of coherence for 55% of CFOs in our sample. In a positive version of our model, incoherence reflects intra-personal frictions in coordinating multiple forecasts, implying that some of the rules of thumb proposed by the managerial education literature to make contemporaneous forecasts may emerge as second-best optimal. Consistent with our model, we find that corporate performance correlates negatively with incoherence, being lowest for firms whose CFOs provide "narrow bracketing" forecasts–projecting past capital growth into the future while ignoring output and labor. We also find that the use of incoherent rules of thumb correlates negatively with corporate investment spending and positively with corporate leverage.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Coherence Side of Rationality: Theory and Evidence from Firm Plans
We develop a theory of forecast coherence in a firm production setting, which yields a normative ex ante benchmark of first-best coherent forecasts and statistical tests to detect incoherence ex post. Under the null, the forecast errors of output and inputs are "close" to one another. Using the Duke Survey of top executives of large US corporations, we reject the null of coherence for 55% of CFOs in our sample. In a positive version of our model, incoherence reflects intra-personal frictions in coordinating multiple forecasts, implying that some of the rules of thumb proposed by the managerial education literature to make contemporaneous forecasts may emerge as second-best optimal. Consistent with our model, we find that corporate performance correlates negatively with incoherence, being lowest for firms whose CFOs provide "narrow bracketing" forecasts–projecting past capital growth into the future while ignoring output and labor. We also find that the use of incoherent rules of thumb correlates negatively with corporate investment spending and positively with corporate leverage.
- Open Access
- 15 April 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Credit Market Driven Acquisitions
Using a comprehensive sample of takeovers from 1983 to 2016, we show that credit market conditions drive takeover activity. A deterioration in the aggregate credit quality of corporate bond issuers is associated with a large increase in aggregate deal value for all takeovers, and the strongest effects are for all cash deals. When credit spreads are low in quarter t, junk bonds are disproportionately issued and aggregate credit quality deteriorates; debt-financed takeovers increase from quarter t+2, peak at quarter t+5, and subsequently subside as credit spreads widen. At the firm-level, buoyant credit market conditions are associated with an increase in debt-financed takeover activity, particularly when acquiring managers are overconfident. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that buoyant credit market conditions and managerial overconfidence coexist in credit market driven acquisitions.
- 15 April 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCredit Market Driven Acquisitions
Using a comprehensive sample of takeovers from 1983 to 2016, we show that credit market conditions drive takeover activity. A deterioration in the aggregate credit quality of corporate bond issuers is associated with a large increase in aggregate deal value for all takeovers, and the strongest effects are for all cash deals. When credit spreads are low in quarter t, junk bonds are disproportionately issued and aggregate credit quality deteriorates; debt-financed takeovers increase from quarter t+2, peak at quarter t+5, and subsequently subside as credit spreads widen. At the firm-level, buoyant credit market conditions are associated with an increase in debt-financed takeover activity, particularly when acquiring managers are overconfident. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that buoyant credit market conditions and managerial overconfidence coexist in credit market driven acquisitions.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Information Content of Dividends: Safer Profits, Not Higher Profits
Contrary to the central prediction of signaling models, changes in profits do not empirically follow changes in dividends. We show both theoretically and empirically that dividends signal safer, rather than higher, future profits. Using the Campbell (1991) decomposition, we are able to estimate expected cash flows from data on stock returns. Consistent with our model’s predictions, cash-flow volatility changes in the opposite direction from that of dividend changes and larger changes in volatility come with larger announcement returns. We find similar results for share repurchases. Crucially, the data supports the prediction - unique to our model - that the cost of the signal is foregone investment opportunities. We conclude that payout policy conveys information about future cash flow volatility. Our methodology can be applied more generally to overcoming empirical problems in testing theories of corporate financing.
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Information Content of Dividends: Safer Profits, Not Higher Profits
Contrary to the central prediction of signaling models, changes in profits do not empirically follow changes in dividends. We show both theoretically and empirically that dividends signal safer, rather than higher, future profits. Using the Campbell (1991) decomposition, we are able to estimate expected cash flows from data on stock returns. Consistent with our model’s predictions, cash-flow volatility changes in the opposite direction from that of dividend changes and larger changes in volatility come with larger announcement returns. We find similar results for share repurchases. Crucially, the data supports the prediction - unique to our model - that the cost of the signal is foregone investment opportunities. We conclude that payout policy conveys information about future cash flow volatility. Our methodology can be applied more generally to overcoming empirical problems in testing theories of corporate financing.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Information Content of Dividends: Safer Profits, Not Higher Profits
Contrary to signaling models’ central predictions, changes in profits do not empirically follow changes in dividends, and firms with the least need to signal pay the bulk of dividends. We show both theoretically and empirically that dividends signal safer, rather than higher, future profits. Using the Campbell (1991) decomposition we find that cash-flow-volatility changes follow dividend and repurchase changes (in opposite direction), and that larger volatility changes come with larger announcement returns consistent with our model's predictions. The data support the prediction that the signaling cost is foregone investment opportunities. We conclude payout policy conveys information about future cash-flow volatility.
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Information Content of Dividends: Safer Profits, Not Higher Profits
Contrary to signaling models’ central predictions, changes in profits do not empirically follow changes in dividends, and firms with the least need to signal pay the bulk of dividends. We show both theoretically and empirically that dividends signal safer, rather than higher, future profits. Using the Campbell (1991) decomposition we find that cash-flow-volatility changes follow dividend and repurchase changes (in opposite direction), and that larger volatility changes come with larger announcement returns consistent with our model's predictions. The data support the prediction that the signaling cost is foregone investment opportunities. We conclude payout policy conveys information about future cash-flow volatility.
- 1 July 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 29 (11) , 3035-3067
Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions?
Shareholder voting on corporate acquisitions is controversial. In most countries, acquisition decisions are delegated to boards, and shareholder approval is discretionary, which makes existing empirical studies inconclusive. We study the U.K. setting in which shareholder approval is imposed exogenously via a threshold test that provides strong identification. U.K. shareholders gain 8 cents per dollar at announcement with mandatory voting, or $\$13.6$ billion over 1992–2010 in aggregate; without voting, U.K. shareholders lost $\$3$ billion. Multidimensional regression discontinuity analysis supports a causal interpretation. The evidence suggests that mandatory voting imposes a binding constraint on acquirer chief executive officers.- 1 July 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Review of Financial Studies
- Vol. 29 (11) , 3035-3067
Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad Acquisitions?
Shareholder voting on corporate acquisitions is controversial. In most countries, acquisition decisions are delegated to boards, and shareholder approval is discretionary, which makes existing empirical studies inconclusive. We study the U.K. setting in which shareholder approval is imposed exogenously via a threshold test that provides strong identification. U.K. shareholders gain 8 cents per dollar at announcement with mandatory voting, or $\$13.6$ billion over 1992–2010 in aggregate; without voting, U.K. shareholders lost $\$3$ billion. Multidimensional regression discontinuity analysis supports a causal interpretation. The evidence suggests that mandatory voting imposes a binding constraint on acquirer chief executive officers.