Dishonest Signalling in a Variant of Pygmalion Game
- 15 November 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 10 (3) , 719-731
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Natural Science Foundation of China (31870357)
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