Shan Sun
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Shan Sun has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jan Rychtář
Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, USA
6 shared publications - Dewey Taylor
Department of Mathematics and Applied Mathematics, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, USA
2 shared publications - Igor V. Erovenko
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, USA
2 shared publications - Changming Zhao
State Key Laboratory of Herbage Improvement and Grassland Agro-ecosystems, College of Ecology, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou, China
1 shared publication - Chun Han
Lanzhou University
1 shared publication - Hong Wu
School of Mathematics, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, PR China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- p. 1-2
Correction to: Signals Concealing Positive Information Can Coexist in the General Beer-and-Quiche Type Games
- 19 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- p. 1-2
Open AccessCorrection to: Signals Concealing Positive Information Can Coexist in the General Beer-and-Quiche Type Games
- Open Access
- 15 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- p. 1-23
Signals Concealing Positive Information Can Coexist in the General Beer-and-Quiche Type Games
The beer-quiche game has been used to study interactions involving bluffing. In this paper, we use a four-by-four strategic-form representation of the beer-quiche game to demonstrate five Nash equilibria of three different kinds, including pooling and hybrid equilibria. Our results show how receiver response strategies can maintain bluffing signals within communication systems. Critically, we identify a novel pooling equilibrium in which all senders use a single signal, effectively concealing positive information about themselves. This provides a plausible explanation for the strategic concealment of quality. Our findings suggest that signals conveying concealed information can exist in a wide range of interactive situations with asymmetric information, contributing to a broader understanding of signalling beyond traditional costly signalling models.
- 15 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- p. 1-23
Open AccessSignals Concealing Positive Information Can Coexist in the General Beer-and-Quiche Type Games
The beer-quiche game has been used to study interactions involving bluffing. In this paper, we use a four-by-four strategic-form representation of the beer-quiche game to demonstrate five Nash equilibria of three different kinds, including pooling and hybrid equilibria. Our results show how receiver response strategies can maintain bluffing signals within communication systems. Critically, we identify a novel pooling equilibrium in which all senders use a single signal, effectively concealing positive information about themselves. This provides a plausible explanation for the strategic concealment of quality. Our findings suggest that signals conveying concealed information can exist in a wide range of interactive situations with asymmetric information, contributing to a broader understanding of signalling beyond traditional costly signalling models.
- Open Access
Effects of Tree Species and Soil Enzyme Activities on Soil Nutrients in Dryland Plantations
Long-term afforestation strongly changes the soil’s physicochemical and biological properties. However, the underlying mechanism of different tree species driving change in soil nutrients is still unclear in the long-term dryland plantations of the Loess Plateau, China. In this study, samples of surface soil (0–20 cm) and woody litter were collected from five plantations (≥50 years) of Caragana korshinskii, Armeniaca sibirica, Populus hopeiensis, Platycladus orientalis, and Pinus tabulaeformis and a natural grassland, and tested for the carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium contents, as well as the soil sucrase (SC), urease (UE), and alkaline phosphorus (ALP) activities. We found that soil nutrients, enzyme activities, and the litter’s chemical properties obviously varied among five tree species. C. korshinskii significantly increased the soil’s TC, organic carbon (OC), total nitrogen (TN), available nitrogen (AN), and available potassium (AK) by 28.42%, 56.08%, 57.41%, 107.25%, and 10.29%, respectively, and also increased the soil’s available phosphorus (AP) by 18.56%; while P. orientalis significantly decreased soil TN (38.89%), TP (30.58%), AP (76.39%), TK (8.25%), and AK (8.33%), and also decreased soil OC (18.01%) and AN (1.09%), compared with those in grassland. The C. korshinskii plantation had higher quality litter and soil enzyme activities than the P. orientalis plantation. Moreover, 62.2% of the total variation in soil nutrients was explained by the litter’s chemical properties and soil enzyme activities, and the litter phosphorus (LP) and soil ALP had a more significant and positive impact on soil nutrients. Therefore, tree species, LP, and soil ALP were key factors driving soil nutrient succession in dryland plantations. The significantly positive nitrogen–phosphorus coupling relationship in the “litter–enzyme–soil” system revealed that the improving nitrogen level promoted the phosphorus cycle of the plantation ecosystem. Our results suggest that leguminous tree species are more suitable for dryland afforestation through the regulation of litter quality and soil enzyme activities.
Open AccessEffects of Tree Species and Soil Enzyme Activities on Soil Nutrients in Dryland Plantations
Long-term afforestation strongly changes the soil’s physicochemical and biological properties. However, the underlying mechanism of different tree species driving change in soil nutrients is still unclear in the long-term dryland plantations of the Loess Plateau, China. In this study, samples of surface soil (0–20 cm) and woody litter were collected from five plantations (≥50 years) of Caragana korshinskii, Armeniaca sibirica, Populus hopeiensis, Platycladus orientalis, and Pinus tabulaeformis and a natural grassland, and tested for the carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium contents, as well as the soil sucrase (SC), urease (UE), and alkaline phosphorus (ALP) activities. We found that soil nutrients, enzyme activities, and the litter’s chemical properties obviously varied among five tree species. C. korshinskii significantly increased the soil’s TC, organic carbon (OC), total nitrogen (TN), available nitrogen (AN), and available potassium (AK) by 28.42%, 56.08%, 57.41%, 107.25%, and 10.29%, respectively, and also increased the soil’s available phosphorus (AP) by 18.56%; while P. orientalis significantly decreased soil TN (38.89%), TP (30.58%), AP (76.39%), TK (8.25%), and AK (8.33%), and also decreased soil OC (18.01%) and AN (1.09%), compared with those in grassland. The C. korshinskii plantation had higher quality litter and soil enzyme activities than the P. orientalis plantation. Moreover, 62.2% of the total variation in soil nutrients was explained by the litter’s chemical properties and soil enzyme activities, and the litter phosphorus (LP) and soil ALP had a more significant and positive impact on soil nutrients. Therefore, tree species, LP, and soil ALP were key factors driving soil nutrient succession in dryland plantations. The significantly positive nitrogen–phosphorus coupling relationship in the “litter–enzyme–soil” system revealed that the improving nitrogen level promoted the phosphorus cycle of the plantation ecosystem. Our results suggest that leguminous tree species are more suitable for dryland afforestation through the regulation of litter quality and soil enzyme activities.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2020
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Discrete and Continuous Dynamical Systems - S
- Vol. 13 (11) , 3213-3229
Bifurcations in a pollination-mutualism system with nectarless flowers
This paper considers a pollination-mutualism system in which flowering plants have strategies of secreting and cheating: secretors produce a substantial volume of nectar in flowers but cheaters produce none. Accordingly, floral visitors have strategies of neglecting and selecting: neglectors enter any flower encountered but selectors only enter full flowers since they can discriminate between secretors and cheaters. By combination of replicator equations and two-species dynamical systems, the games are described by a mathematical model in this paper. Dynamics of the model demonstrate mechanisms by which nectarless flowers can invade the secretor-pollinator system and by which a cyclic game between nectarless flowers and pollinators could occur. Criteria for the persistence of nectarless flowers are derived in terms of the given parameters (factors), including the nectar-producing cost and cheaters' efficiency. Numerical simulations show that when parameters vary, cheaters would vary among extinction, persistence in periodic oscillations, and persistence without secretors (i.e., cheaters spread widely). We also consider the evolution of plants in a constant state of pollinator population, and the evolution of pollinators in a constant state of plant population. Dynamics of the models demonstrate conditions under which nectarless flowers (resp. selectors) could persist.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by American Institute of Mathematical Sciences (AIMS) in Discrete and Continuous Dynamical Systems - S
- Vol. 13 (11) , 3213-3229
Open AccessBifurcations in a pollination-mutualism system with nectarless flowers
This paper considers a pollination-mutualism system in which flowering plants have strategies of secreting and cheating: secretors produce a substantial volume of nectar in flowers but cheaters produce none. Accordingly, floral visitors have strategies of neglecting and selecting: neglectors enter any flower encountered but selectors only enter full flowers since they can discriminate between secretors and cheaters. By combination of replicator equations and two-species dynamical systems, the games are described by a mathematical model in this paper. Dynamics of the model demonstrate mechanisms by which nectarless flowers can invade the secretor-pollinator system and by which a cyclic game between nectarless flowers and pollinators could occur. Criteria for the persistence of nectarless flowers are derived in terms of the given parameters (factors), including the nectar-producing cost and cheaters' efficiency. Numerical simulations show that when parameters vary, cheaters would vary among extinction, persistence in periodic oscillations, and persistence without secretors (i.e., cheaters spread widely). We also consider the evolution of plants in a constant state of pollinator population, and the evolution of pollinators in a constant state of plant population. Dynamics of the models demonstrate conditions under which nectarless flowers (resp. selectors) could persist.
- 15 November 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 10 (3) , 719-731
Dishonest Signalling in a Variant of Pygmalion Game
- 15 November 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Dynamic Games and Applications
- Vol. 10 (3) , 719-731
Dishonest Signalling in a Variant of Pygmalion Game
- 4 May 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Theoretical Ecology
- Vol. 13 (1) , 85-92
Costly signalling theory and dishonest signalling
- 4 May 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Theoretical Ecology
- Vol. 13 (1) , 85-92
Costly signalling theory and dishonest signalling
- Open Access
- 27 April 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 8 (1) , 6686
The signalling game between plants and pollinators
Plants can send floral signals to advertise their reward for pollinators. Based on the presence or absents of such signals, pollinators can determine whether to visit plants. Plants can send dishonest signals but foraging behaviours of pollinators can limit the cheating strategies of plants. We model the plant-pollinator interactions by the two-type Spence signalling game and investigate the conditions under which honest signalling can be established. In our model, plants either send costly signal or they do not. The cost of signal is dependent on the quality of plant. Pollinators can learn from the interactions with plants and can update their willingness to visit plants’ flowers to maximize their foraging efficiency. We find three general conditions that are required for the evolutionary stability of honest signaling. Those conditions are satisfied if there is (a) a high frequency of high-yield signalling plants in the population, (b) the balance between cost and benefit of signalling, and (c) high cost of dishonest signalling. Our model also predicts that other factors contributing to the establishment of honest signaling are the low abundance of pollinators, and the positive density-dependent and positive frequency-dependent relationship between plants and pollinators.
- 27 April 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 8 (1) , 6686
Open AccessThe signalling game between plants and pollinators
Plants can send floral signals to advertise their reward for pollinators. Based on the presence or absents of such signals, pollinators can determine whether to visit plants. Plants can send dishonest signals but foraging behaviours of pollinators can limit the cheating strategies of plants. We model the plant-pollinator interactions by the two-type Spence signalling game and investigate the conditions under which honest signalling can be established. In our model, plants either send costly signal or they do not. The cost of signal is dependent on the quality of plant. Pollinators can learn from the interactions with plants and can update their willingness to visit plants’ flowers to maximize their foraging efficiency. We find three general conditions that are required for the evolutionary stability of honest signaling. Those conditions are satisfied if there is (a) a high frequency of high-yield signalling plants in the population, (b) the balance between cost and benefit of signalling, and (c) high cost of dishonest signalling. Our model also predicts that other factors contributing to the establishment of honest signaling are the low abundance of pollinators, and the positive density-dependent and positive frequency-dependent relationship between plants and pollinators.
- 20 September 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Evolutionary Ecology
- Vol. 30 (6) , 1023-1030
Evolutionary correlation of heterodichogamy and floral longevity
- 20 September 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Evolutionary Ecology
- Vol. 30 (6) , 1023-1030
Evolutionary correlation of heterodichogamy and floral longevity
- 16 May 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Evolutionary Ecology
- Vol. 29 (3) , 323-340
Passive partner choice through exploitation barriers
- 16 May 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Evolutionary Ecology
- Vol. 29 (3) , 323-340
Passive partner choice through exploitation barriers
- 16 April 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Evolutionary Ecology
- Vol. 29 (4) , 479-487
The screening game in plant–pollinator interactions
- 16 April 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Evolutionary Ecology
- Vol. 29 (4) , 479-487
The screening game in plant–pollinator interactions