The European Union and the political economy of enforcing international trade rules
- 24 March 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 22 (3) , 377-400
Abstract
The European Commission keeps track of foreign trade barriers through its Market Access Strategy. In this study, we examine some of the key political-economic conditions under which the European Union decides whether and how to address these trade issues. Drawing on an original dataset of (allegedly) illegal foreign trade barriers faced by European Union businesses, we show that industries dominated by a few large companies are more successful in gaining the support of the Commission to challenge these foreign trade barriers. Moreover, we find that the European Commission’s strategy depends on the economic power relationship with the trading partner: the European Union privileges negotiations when seeking to enforce international trade rules against economically weaker states, while it prefers to use litigation against stronger trading partners.Keywords
Funding Information
- Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (G057018N)
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