Dirk De Bièvre
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Dirk De Bièvre has a total of 36 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Arlo Poletti
Department of Sociology and Social Research, University of Trento, Trento, Italy
3 shared publications- Emile van Ommeren
University of Trento
3 shared publications - Arlo Poletti
University of Trento
2 shared publications - Arlo Poletti
University of Trento
2 shared publications - Peter Bursens
University of Antwerp
2 shared publications - Arlo Poletti
Universiteit Antwerpen Antwerpen Belgium
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 July 2025
- Published by Cogitatio in Politics and Governance
- Vol. 13
Bootleggers, Baptists, and Policymakers: Domestic Discourse Coalitions in EU–Mercosur Negotiations
This article examines the dynamics of coalition formation in the context of the EU–Mercosur negotiations, utilizing the “Bootleggers and Baptists” analogy to understand how diverse actors—such as import‐competing sectors, civil society organizations, and policymakers—engage in issue‐linkage in public debates surrounding preferential trade agreement negotiations. The framework explores three types of coalition formation: opportunistic framing, strategic alliance, and mediated convergence, each representing varying degrees of coordination between moral and economic actors. The findings suggest that active coordination between such groups is rare, yet de facto coalitions are quite important. The empirical analysis uses quantitative text analysis of online debates in France and Ireland to show that coalitions are formed through opportunistic framing, rather than strategic alliance or mediated convergence. The findings are corroborated through a congruence analysis of discourse networks demonstrating that Bootleggers and Baptists represent distinct communities, each primarily engaging with their own narratives and borrowing from the other only when it serves a strategic purpose. These findings suggest that policy outcomes are shaped more by the overlap of win‐sets and the de facto coalitions necessary for ratification, rather than deliberate issue‐linkage by policymakers or the formation of alliances across groups. The results have important implications for understanding how environmental, labour, and human rights concerns become intertwined with trade policy. We demonstrate that, even when there is a confluence of interests between actors, discourse coalitions tend to grow across actor types as a result of discursive opportunism rather than strategic alliances.
- 30 July 2025
- Published by Cogitatio in Politics and Governance
- Vol. 13
Open AccessBootleggers, Baptists, and Policymakers: Domestic Discourse Coalitions in EU–Mercosur Negotiations
This article examines the dynamics of coalition formation in the context of the EU–Mercosur negotiations, utilizing the “Bootleggers and Baptists” analogy to understand how diverse actors—such as import‐competing sectors, civil society organizations, and policymakers—engage in issue‐linkage in public debates surrounding preferential trade agreement negotiations. The framework explores three types of coalition formation: opportunistic framing, strategic alliance, and mediated convergence, each representing varying degrees of coordination between moral and economic actors. The findings suggest that active coordination between such groups is rare, yet de facto coalitions are quite important. The empirical analysis uses quantitative text analysis of online debates in France and Ireland to show that coalitions are formed through opportunistic framing, rather than strategic alliance or mediated convergence. The findings are corroborated through a congruence analysis of discourse networks demonstrating that Bootleggers and Baptists represent distinct communities, each primarily engaging with their own narratives and borrowing from the other only when it serves a strategic purpose. These findings suggest that policy outcomes are shaped more by the overlap of win‐sets and the de facto coalitions necessary for ratification, rather than deliberate issue‐linkage by policymakers or the formation of alliances across groups. The results have important implications for understanding how environmental, labour, and human rights concerns become intertwined with trade policy. We demonstrate that, even when there is a confluence of interests between actors, discourse coalitions tend to grow across actor types as a result of discursive opportunism rather than strategic alliances.
- Open Access
- 19 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Political Research Exchange
- Vol. 6 (1)
Studying the influence of interest groups on non-decisionmaking: challenges and tools in research design
- 19 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Political Research Exchange
- Vol. 6 (1)
Open AccessStudying the influence of interest groups on non-decisionmaking: challenges and tools in research design
- 11 November 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International Spectator
- Vol. 58 (1) , 23-37
Time for a New Atlanticism: The EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment and the International Order
There has been no shortage of critiques of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) signed on 30 December 2020. Many have perceived the CAI as a snub in the face of the Biden administration, which has the potential to jeopardise one of the most important strategic goals of the transatlantic alliance: setting aside four years of Trump’s populist economic policy and working in close coordination with a view to developing a united front to contain China. While the CAI does indeed indicate that the EU considers itself a fully autonomous international economic player, however, such a display of autonomy need not be incompatible with a stronger transatlantic alliance. In fact, the CAI may be an opportunity for the transatlantic alliance to evolve into a partnership among equals that is necessary to successfully navigate the uncharted waters of the coming global (dis)order.
- 11 November 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International Spectator
- Vol. 58 (1) , 23-37
Time for a New Atlanticism: The EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment and the International Order
There has been no shortage of critiques of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) signed on 30 December 2020. Many have perceived the CAI as a snub in the face of the Biden administration, which has the potential to jeopardise one of the most important strategic goals of the transatlantic alliance: setting aside four years of Trump’s populist economic policy and working in close coordination with a view to developing a united front to contain China. While the CAI does indeed indicate that the EU considers itself a fully autonomous international economic player, however, such a display of autonomy need not be incompatible with a stronger transatlantic alliance. In fact, the CAI may be an opportunity for the transatlantic alliance to evolve into a partnership among equals that is necessary to successfully navigate the uncharted waters of the coming global (dis)order.
- 8 July 2022
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 175-190
Escalation, economic coverage and institutional scope in trade wars
Trade conflict, dispute or war - what is in a word? In this chapter, we construct a typology of trade conflicts based on two key dimensions of trade policy: the economic coverage and institutional scope of the policy instruments. Along the first dimension, conflicts range from from small, product-specific disagreements to large, across the board conflicts, affecting entire economies, while the second dimension captures variation in the number and type of actors that are involved in the decision-making process. In four case studies, we illustrate how trade wars can be classified based on varying degrees of intensity and we provide insights into how a conflict can move up the ladder of escalation. Finally, we review some of the classical explanations for containment and escalation of trade conflicts.
- 8 July 2022
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 175-190
Escalation, economic coverage and institutional scope in trade wars
Trade conflict, dispute or war - what is in a word? In this chapter, we construct a typology of trade conflicts based on two key dimensions of trade policy: the economic coverage and institutional scope of the policy instruments. Along the first dimension, conflicts range from from small, product-specific disagreements to large, across the board conflicts, affecting entire economies, while the second dimension captures variation in the number and type of actors that are involved in the decision-making process. In four case studies, we illustrate how trade wars can be classified based on varying degrees of intensity and we provide insights into how a conflict can move up the ladder of escalation. Finally, we review some of the classical explanations for containment and escalation of trade conflicts.
- 22 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1503-1508
World Trade Organization (WTO)
- 24 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Regional & Federal Studies
- Vol. 33 (1) , 113-132
Seizing the moment: Regional opportunity structures and Wallonia’s temporary veto of the EU–Canada bilateral trade agreement
Constitutionally, Belgium represents the most extreme case of regional entities wielding power over EU external trade policymaking. Formally, the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels regions can wield veto power over Belgian positions. Yet, only once has a Belgian region actually made use of this capacity, when Wallonia temporarily blocked the conclusion of the EU trade agreement with Canada in 2016 (CETA). We show that political actors – legislative and executive – could only activate this constitutional possibility in conjunction with other necessary conditions: a high degree of societal mobilization and, above all, inter-party competition across different levels of government. As the Walloon Parti Socialiste seized the moment, it reinforced the paradox of weakness and strengthened the EU’s trade bargaining power towards Canada. We finish by discussing the spill-over effects of the 2016 CETA episode into the shaping of future EU trade policies, as well as into future intra-Belgian EU policymaking.
- 24 November 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Regional & Federal Studies
- Vol. 33 (1) , 113-132
Seizing the moment: Regional opportunity structures and Wallonia’s temporary veto of the EU–Canada bilateral trade agreement
Constitutionally, Belgium represents the most extreme case of regional entities wielding power over EU external trade policymaking. Formally, the Flemish, Walloon and Brussels regions can wield veto power over Belgian positions. Yet, only once has a Belgian region actually made use of this capacity, when Wallonia temporarily blocked the conclusion of the EU trade agreement with Canada in 2016 (CETA). We show that political actors – legislative and executive – could only activate this constitutional possibility in conjunction with other necessary conditions: a high degree of societal mobilization and, above all, inter-party competition across different levels of government. As the Walloon Parti Socialiste seized the moment, it reinforced the paradox of weakness and strengthened the EU’s trade bargaining power towards Canada. We finish by discussing the spill-over effects of the 2016 CETA episode into the shaping of future EU trade policies, as well as into future intra-Belgian EU policymaking.
- Open Access
- 1 May 2021
- Published by Wiley in Global Policy
- Vol. 12 (S4) , 14-24
Multilateralism, Bilateralism and Institutional Choice: The Political Economy of Regime Complexes in International Trade Policy
- 1 May 2021
- Published by Wiley in Global Policy
- Vol. 12 (S4) , 14-24
Open AccessMultilateralism, Bilateralism and Institutional Choice: The Political Economy of Regime Complexes in International Trade Policy
- 24 March 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 22 (3) , 377-400
The European Union and the political economy of enforcing international trade rules
The European Commission keeps track of foreign trade barriers through its Market Access Strategy. In this study, we examine some of the key political-economic conditions under which the European Union decides whether and how to address these trade issues. Drawing on an original dataset of (allegedly) illegal foreign trade barriers faced by European Union businesses, we show that industries dominated by a few large companies are more successful in gaining the support of the Commission to challenge these foreign trade barriers. Moreover, we find that the European Commission’s strategy depends on the economic power relationship with the trading partner: the European Union privileges negotiations when seeking to enforce international trade rules against economically weaker states, while it prefers to use litigation against stronger trading partners.
- 24 March 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in European Union Politics
- Vol. 22 (3) , 377-400
The European Union and the political economy of enforcing international trade rules
The European Commission keeps track of foreign trade barriers through its Market Access Strategy. In this study, we examine some of the key political-economic conditions under which the European Union decides whether and how to address these trade issues. Drawing on an original dataset of (allegedly) illegal foreign trade barriers faced by European Union businesses, we show that industries dominated by a few large companies are more successful in gaining the support of the Commission to challenge these foreign trade barriers. Moreover, we find that the European Commission’s strategy depends on the economic power relationship with the trading partner: the European Union privileges negotiations when seeking to enforce international trade rules against economically weaker states, while it prefers to use litigation against stronger trading partners.
- 21 May 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-5
World Trade Organization (WTO)
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 31 March 2020
- Published by Cogitatio in Politics and Governance
- Vol. 8 (1) , 243-253
Towards Explaining Varying Degrees of Politicization of EU Trade Agreement Negotiations
Over the last decade, European Union (EU) trade agreement negotiations in the form of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada have been strongly contested. By contrast, many other EU trade negotiations have sailed on with far less politicization, or barely any at all. In this contribution, we assess a series of plausible explanation for these very varying degrees of politicization across EU trade agreement negotiations—conceived of as the combination of polarization of opinions, salience given to them in public debate, and the expansion of the number of societal actors involved therein. Through a review of existing explanations, we show how each of these explanations faces a set of challenges. In the third section, we argue it is useful to conceive of these existing explanations as structural background conditions enabling agency on the part of interest group and civil society organizations. We therefore close by sketching how literature on the relationship between interest group mobilization and public opinion could inform further comparative research on trade policy negotiations, and on politicization of EU policy making in general.
- 31 March 2020
- Published by Cogitatio in Politics and Governance
- Vol. 8 (1) , 243-253
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessTowards Explaining Varying Degrees of Politicization of EU Trade Agreement Negotiations
Over the last decade, European Union (EU) trade agreement negotiations in the form of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada have been strongly contested. By contrast, many other EU trade negotiations have sailed on with far less politicization, or barely any at all. In this contribution, we assess a series of plausible explanation for these very varying degrees of politicization across EU trade agreement negotiations—conceived of as the combination of polarization of opinions, salience given to them in public debate, and the expansion of the number of societal actors involved therein. Through a review of existing explanations, we show how each of these explanations faces a set of challenges. In the third section, we argue it is useful to conceive of these existing explanations as structural background conditions enabling agency on the part of interest group and civil society organizations. We therefore close by sketching how literature on the relationship between interest group mobilization and public opinion could inform further comparative research on trade policy negotiations, and on politicization of EU policy making in general.